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BRITISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE HOLY SEE

DIPLOMATIC relations between England and the Holy See may be said to have ceased when Cardinal Reginald Pole died on the same day as Queen Mary I. It must, however, be remembered that in those times there was not the present system of Nuncios. The Pope worked by means of legates, who were appointed *ad hoc* to carry out some specific negotiation or reform and not as permanent residents at a foreign Court. Nunciatures began to be established shortly after the period when, at the accession of Queen Elizabeth, diplomatic relations between England and the Holy See were broken off. The agent of Queen Elizabeth at the Court of Sixtus V (if, indeed, he ever existed outside the fertile imagination of Gregorio Leti)* was more of a spy than a diplomatist.

During the reigns of the Stuarts we find occasional informal communications between the British Court and the Vatican. For instance, in May 1621 a representative of the British Roman Catholics, George Gage, arrived in Rome ostensibly with a request from them to Pope Gregory XV for a dispensation for the marriage of the Spanish Infanta and Prince Charles (afterwards Charles I) on condition that it would not be used until the British Roman Catholics had received freedom of worship, but in reality to carry forward the matrimonial negotiations on James I's behalf: he returned to England with the Pope's conditions (which were almost entirely unacceptable) in July 1622. He went back again to Rome on the same errand in January of the following year, but the negotiations at Rome were interrupted by Prince Charles's personal visit to Madrid in March 1623. There was at the same time a mysterious figure travelling from

* See H. K. Baker, *Elizabeth and Sixtus*, The C. W. Daniel Company (1938).

Rome to England on several occasions, a Capuchin called Padre Alessandro d'Alice Montferrato, under the alias of Francesco Rota ; but he seems to have been more concerned with the internal affairs of the English Roman Catholics (the usual squabbles between Regulars and Seculars) than with high diplomatic matters.

In 1633 Sir Robert Douglas, a Roman Catholic Scotsman, arrived in Rome. He was more the envoy of Queen Henrietta Maria than of Charles I, but Charles seems to have taken him to some extent into his confidence, and was not averse from his plan of trying to get the Pope (Urban VIII) to create an English or perhaps preferably a Scottish Cardinal. He also suggested that the Pope should send an envoy to London, and the latter chose for the purpose an Oratorian, Gregorio Panzani, who arrived in London on 15 December, 1634. He was instructed that he was sent as agent to the Queen, but, in fact, his relations with the King were reasonably close. He was under the protection of the two pro-Catholic ministers, Cottington and Windebank. He was succeeded by the Scotsman George Conn, a Dominican, who stayed in England from 1636 to 1639 and, being *persona grata* with the King, was able to do much for his co-religionists, while another Scotsman, Sir William Hamilton, acted at the same time as Queen Henrietta Maria's agent at Rome. After Conn, Count Carlo Rossetti came to England for the Pope in 1639. But all of these made the mistake of trying for individual conversions, especially of people highly placed in society, instead of confining themselves to the general position and treatment of the British Roman Catholics, and to the pursuance of questions of foreign politics, such as the Palatinate, and so brought upon themselves the opposition and anger not only of the Puritans, but also of the "High Church" Caroline divines, such as Archbishop Laud, who would otherwise have had much sympathy for them. After 1640, with the growing power of the Puritan Parliamentarians and the intervention of the Scottish Covenanters in English affairs, the position of the British Roman Catholics rapidly deteriorated. The arrest, and in some cases the execution, of priests recommenced ;

the Papal agents left England; and though Sir Kenelm Digby, a romantic but flighty personage, appeared from time to time in Rome and was sometimes considered the Queen's agent, diplomatic relations were for the time totally at an end. On this period the student may consult *Charles I and the Court of Rome*, by the Rev. Gordon Albion (London, 1935), a book that contains much new and interesting matter, but is rather ill arranged.

The next attempt at establishing contact was made by the mission of Cardinal Charles Erskine (whose name does not even find a place in our *Dictionary of National Biography*) at the end of the eighteenth century, and an attempt is here made to give a brief account of his visit to England and what he achieved. Charles Erskine was the son of Colin, seventh son of Sir Alexander Erskine of Cambo by Lady Anne Erskine, daughter of the third Earl of Kellie. Colin Erskine, being a strong adherent of the Stuarts, went into voluntary exile and, coming to Rome, married Agatha Gigli of the noble family of that name, of Anagni. These had two children, of whom the elder was Charles, born in Rome on 13 February, 1739. Colin Erskine dying while Charles was very young, the latter was placed under the care of Cardinal York, and was sent by him, when only nine years old, to the Scots college in Rome. He entered it on 27 May, 1748, but left on 4 November, 1753, having refused to take the customary oath not to join a Religious Order. He then determined to become a lawyer and took the degree of Doctor of Laws on 21 November, 1770. He had success in his practice and was favoured by Pope Pius VI. He appeared in several important lawsuits and was on the way to becoming famous and rich. This career was interrupted by the Pope promoting him to become his Pro-auditor and at the same time Promotor Fidei, a Domestic Prelate, Canon of St. Peter's and a Consistorial Advocate. On 1 June, 1782, he was made Dean of the College of Consistorial Advocates. On 28 May, 1783, he received minor orders in St. Peter's from Cardinal York and was ordained sub-deacon on 28 August of the same year by the same Cardinal. We shall see that he remained in that order for the rest of his life. (In this

connexion we may remember that Cardinal Pole only took priest's orders at the age of fifty-seven, less than eighteen months before the end of his life. He was priested on 20 March, 1557, said his first Mass on the next day, and on the day after was consecrated bishop and enthroned Archbishop of Canterbury.)

In 1793, owing to the general confusion of affairs in Europe caused by the French Revolution, the Pope desired to enter into relations with the British Government and tentative inquiries were made through a Mr. Jenkins, an Englishman then living in Rome as British consul or agent. The answer to these overtures was favourable, but it was stipulated that any mission should not have a public character; and Monsignor Erskine left quietly for England on 4 October, 1793. He travelled through Tuscany, Trent, Botzen, Augsburg, Stuttgart, Aix-la-Chapelle, Brussels and Ostend, where he took ship and landed at Margate on 13 November. Monsignor Erskine was much pleased with his reception. He thought that the police and custom-house officials must have been previously advised of the arrival of a diplomatic personage, for they displayed to him courtesy far exceeding what was due to a mere fellow-countryman. Even the postillions, divining from this special treatment the quality of the traveller, took care on each change of the post-horses to announce with emphasis to the postillions who succeeded them, "The Ambassador of the Pope." He did not begin his diplomatic work at once, but went up to Scotland to see his kinsmen in the county of Fife, especially visiting Lord Kellie, the head of the family. They there made to him a curious proposal. Being without male issue, they suggested that he should divest himself of his Orders, marry and produce children who would finally inherit all the properties of the family and the Scottish earldom, although, as a Roman Catholic, he would not be able to take his seat in Parliament. Monsignor Erskine was pleased with this attention but refused the offer, although it was thought possible that he could have obtained the necessary dispensation from the Pope. Returning to London he began to attend the receptions held by the King on

appointed days, and skilfully took a place between the last of the diplomatists and the first of the nobles attending the reception. The King was much pleased with his tact and showed his satisfaction by stopping longer as he went round to speak with him than he stayed with the others. He did not wear the dress of a Prelate of the Roman Court, but put on the black court dress of a secular and even wore a sword, which seems to us rather strange for an ecclesiastic. He has left a record of the various topics on which he conversed with the King from time to time, and the satisfaction of the Pope may be judged from the fact that almost at once, in a secret Consistory on 21 February, 1794, he promoted him from Pro-auditor to Auditor. He was also nominated to be the papal representative at a congress of plenipotentiaries which the Powers allied against France were contemplating in May 1795. The congress, however, did not take place. Meanwhile he led a busy life in London, communicating with the Vicars Apostolic in England and Scotland and with the Irish Bishops, giving them advice and instruction. He had frequent and friendly interviews with Pitt, pleading for the interests of the Holy See, of the British Roman Catholics and the French refugees. He was able, as regards these latter, to do a great deal to leave them undisturbed with their modest possessions; even when their presence in England was against the law as it stood at that time, at least as regards members of religious communities.

The state of unrest caused by the French Revolution now began to be felt outside France itself and the Pope suffered as much as any other ruler. On 16 March, 1798, he wrote to Erskine describing how the French troops had arrested Prelates in Rome, had banished some Cardinals and finally had forced him to go almost under guard to Siena. He suggested that this should be mentioned to the British Court, using the following careful words: "Now although We quite understand that in London you cannot bring to the front religious motives, yet such motives when they involve questions of sovereignty and the rights of nations must make a strong impression." In fact, Monsignor Erskine was directed to

mention this personal outrage upon the Pope to British Ministers in an informal manner, although he knew that diplomatic intervention in the strict sense of the word was not possible. In the course of these troubles Monsignor Erskine had lost all his revenues as Auditor and as Papal Envoy, as the Pope had no funds from which to pay him, and he received very little from his Canonry of St. Peter's owing to the heavy forced contributions levied by the French in their occupation of Rome. George III, however, showed both generosity and good sense and provisionally pensioned him during the time of the occupation of the Papal States. In 1799 there reached London the news of the death of Pius VI at Valence, which took place on 29 August, 1799. Monsignor Erskine very rightly determined to take advantage of this by celebrating a requiem as publicly as possible, and he chose for the purpose the Irish Chapel of St. Patrick in Sutton Street, near Soho Square. The appointments were made with great magnificence and the Ministers of Austria, Russia, Naples, Sardinia, Portugal and Bavaria were all present. Monsignor Erskine, being neither a bishop nor even a priest, could not take any very active part in the service, but absolutions were given by five bishops, and in the choir assisted no less than ten other French bishops, then refugees in London.

On 14 March, 1800, Cardinal Chiaramonti, a Benedictine, was elected Pope and took the name of Pius VII. He continued the high opinion which his predecessor had of Monsignor Erskine, and at a Consistory held on 23 February, 1801, thirteen Cardinals were publicly proclaimed and thirteen reserved *in petto*, Monsignor Erskine being one of the latter. He begged the Pope not to publish him as Cardinal as long as his mission lasted in England, in order not to offend the susceptibilities of a Protestant nation. His action in this matter gave great satisfaction to Pitt and to George III, to both of whom his creation *in petto* was known. The King showed some interest in the cardinalitial dress which he would in future wear. The only unfortunate feature of the new reign was that Pius VII's Secretary of State was the great statesman, Cardinal Ercole Consalvi, who is rightly

described as "the ablest ecclesiastical statesman of the century". He had, however, not the same regard for Monsignor Erskine, and we shall presently see that to this were due many of the clouds which surrounded the latter part of Cardinal Erskine's life. Before Monsignor Erskine left for Rome for the publication of his cardinalate he had one very important task to perform. It has been mentioned above that several French bishops were present at the requiem in London for Pius VI, and there were, in fact, no fewer than three French archbishops and sixteen French bishops in England. In view of the Concordat being concluded between Pius VII and Napoleon, it was necessary, in order to effect a redistribution of the French dioceses, for the Pope to ask all the old bishops to resign their sees, and the task of communicating to them this request was entrusted to Monsignor Erskine. He sent the bishops the Briefs on 16 September, 1801, together with a letter which he afterwards published in French and Italian, trying to make the unpleasant process easier by including the words: "His Holiness has charged me to assure your Lordship that he has in every possible way recommended you to the First Consul, whom he has asked to keep you in view in his nominations to the new dioceses and at least to provide for your subsistence; and such is the anxiety of the Pope to contribute in every possible way to the relief of your Lordship that he will not omit any favourable conjuncture for alleviating the burden of your situation and helping your personal needs." He concluded the letter by proceeding in his private character to offer his personal services to each.

The bishops at first intended not to send separate replies, but met together at the house of the Archbishop Nabonne to draw up a joint letter to be sent in the name of all. Monsignor Erskine, hearing of this, wrote to the Archbishop intimating that a common answer would not satisfy the Pope, who had written to each Prelate individually. This had its effect, and by 6 October he had answers from all and sent them through the French Minister in London to Monsignor Spina in Paris for transmission to the Holy See. On the whole the bishops refused the resignation of the sees which they canonically

held ; and strangely enough this obstinacy, whether it proceeded from a latent Gallicanism or from a natural reluctance to give up a lawfully acquired and honourable position, operated on the whole to the advantage of the Church of France ; for the result was that the new Concordat with Napoleon was never fully carried into effect, and a later Concordat between the Pope and Louis XVIII, after the Bourbon restoration in France, gave the Church of France substantially better terms than those originally proposed.

This was really Monsignor Erskine's last business in London and he left it on 12 December, 1801, on his way to Rome. His journey through France was not very comfortable, as he was not treated with the same courtesy by the French *douaniers* as by the custom-house officials in England. But he finally reached Paris and saw much of the ecclesiastics of various countries there assembled, and on 30 December, 1801, he had his first interview with Napoleon, which seems to have been mostly formal. His second visit was on 9 April, 1802, when, after the conclusion of the Concordat, the legate *a latere*, Cardinal Caprara, paid his first official visit to the French Government, taking with him his staff, Monsignor Erskine, and other theologians. He was also present at the High Mass at Notre Dame on Easter day, 18 April of the same year, which was celebrated by the legate with great pomp in the presence of all the great dignitaries, civil and military, and after the gospel the new bishops took the oaths according to the stipulations of the Concordat. Finally, he left Paris on 29 August, 1802, for Rome, travelling by Lyons, Turin, Milan, Parma, Modena and Florence. When he had almost reached Rome (at Viterbo, to be precise) he received a message from the Secretary of State, Cardinal Consalvi, to the effect that he would be published a Cardinal (Cardinal-Deacon of the Church of Santa Maria in Campitelli) in the next Consistory. This news, however, was tempered by a less agreeable message, to the effect that the Monsignor, who had for eighteen months performed the duties of Pro-auditor, should continue the Auditor's business, while Erskine would only have the title and honour of Auditor

and the usual residence at the Quirinal or the Vatican. This meant that the moneys derived from the Auditorship, which Pius VI had ordered to be funded and placed in deposit to meet his expenses when he should be proclaimed a Cardinal, would no longer be available: and from this time forward, in spite of his new dignity, his fortunes were somewhat in decline. This must be put down to the growing French influence at Rome, which, on the whole, turned Consalvi against Erskine, and he did not receive the various high honours which he might have expected.

The routine of his life at Rome and his duties there are mostly alien to the subject of British diplomatic relations with the Holy See, and I pass over them very cursorily. But there is one curious episode which is certainly worthy of mention. On 8 July, 1803, there died at Albano the eccentric Frederick Hervey, fourth Earl of Bristol and Bishop of Derry. He was wealthy and much devoted to art, and, having passed five years in Italy, had given many commissions to artists and made large purchases and so left a good many debts. None of his family were at his deathbed or in the country, and Cardinal Erskine, being uncertain whether there was any will left by the bishop, took provisional possession of all his property and employed his own lawyer to compile an inventory of everything belonging to him and to bring all the property and articles to Rome from Albano. He also secured the safety of the deceased's effects in a villa which he had taken at Florence. The family were extremely grateful and there is still preserved a letter from the fifth Earl offering his Eminence warm thanks. Less than a year later he was made Protector of Scotland and he managed to secure to the Scottish Vicars Apostolic a considerable amount of property which had been designated for their support by previous Popes, but meanwhile alienated.

Bad days were dawning for the Church of Rome and especially the Church *in* Rome. Pius VII went as far as he could to make terms with Napoleon, even going to Paris in 1804 to officiate at his coronation as Emperor. This, however, was insufficient. Napoleon expected that

all Italy should submit to him and that the Pope should abandon his neutrality and help him against England. He put forward increasing demands both in political and ecclesiastical matters and, when these were refused, he occupied Rome in 1808 and in the following year proclaimed the union of the Papal States with the French Empire. Meanwhile, he exercised pressure on the Pope by getting rid of members of the Curia, and in February and March, 1808, fourteen Cardinals were forced by the French Commander to leave. In June Cardinal Erskine was made pro-Secretary of Briefs in the place of Cardinal Antonelli and took up residence in the Quirinal with the Pope. On 5 July, 1809, he was warned that he too would have to go, and on 6 July the Pope himself was carried off, first to Savona and then to Fontainebleau. Erskine himself was ordered to proceed to Paris on 8 December, 1809, but, being indisposed, did not immediately start. On 2 January, 1810, however, his passports were brought and he was compelled to leave at once. Fortunately, his Scottish relations knew that he must be in financial difficulties, his revenues having been appropriated by the French, and just as he started he received through a Roman banker the sum of £400 sent to him by them. He travelled by way of Foligno, Cesena, Bologna, Turin, Chambéry and Lyons, reaching Paris on 26 January. (He relates in his diary a trifling circumstance there, which has given me some surprise. He went one day to dine with Cardinal Doria and was surprised to find a meat dinner on a Saturday, but they were informed that in all French dioceses where the cathedrals were dedicated to the Blessed Virgin Mary it was the privilege to eat meat on all Saturdays between Christmas and Candlemas. I knew that the Saturday abstinence was only abolished in Rome in our own times, but not that it was regularly observed in France at so late a date.) The long and trying journey had undermined the Cardinal's health. He recovered for a little time by a stay at Versailles, but on his return to Paris his illness increased, and in February 1811 he took to his bed, never to rise again, and died on 20 March. The requiem mass for him and Cardinal Vincenti (the French would only allow one for

the two Cardinals) was held on 2 April in the Church of St. Thomas Aquinas, which had been Cardinal Vincenti's parish church. Their bodies (which had been embalmed) were taken to St. Geneviève and were buried beneath that church. There is also a monument to him in marble in the Church of Santa Maria in Campitelli in Rome with the following lettering: CAROLO COLINI FILIO S.M. IN PORT. DIAC. CARD. ERSKINE QVI PATERNO GENERE SCOTVS ROMAE NATVS DIE XIII FEB. AN. MDCCXLIII OBIIT PARISIIS DIE XX MAR. MDCCCXI NOMINI MEMORIAEQVE EIVS.

This account of Cardinal Erskine is based mainly upon his own diary and memoirs which were worked up into a biography by Mr. W. Mazière Brady and published in 1890 in a book now too little known entitled *Anglo-Roman Papers*. (Its other contents are an account of the English Palace in Rome and a sketch of the career of the eldest natural son of Charles II.) The Cardinal's papers were to some extent dispersed after his death, but I believe that a good many of them are still in the possession of the English College at Rome.

After the conclusion of Monsignor Erskine's mission to England I do not know of any endeavour to send a Papal representative to London. In 1823 and 1824 Canning wished to obtain the views of the Pope as to the best practicable method of reconciling Irish (and English) Roman Catholics to the Crown. He would have liked to institute regular diplomatic relations; but the Law Officers of the Crown expressed the opinion that direct correspondence with the Pope might imply recognition of his claims to be the spiritual head of Christendom, and that Canning might therefore, under the statute V Elizabeth Cap. 50, 32 incur the penalties of *praemunire* if he replied officially to the letter of Leo XII (September, 1823) to George IV announcing his accession to the Holy See. Canning did, however, make use of an indirect channel, and in 1825 instructed Lord Burghersh (afterwards Lord Westmoreland), our Minister in Tuscany, to find out the Pope's real and personal views. His Holiness replied that he was much dissatisfied with an "unruly spirit" displayed by the Irish clergy, and was very

ready to concert with the British Government in steps to better this, such as "granting to the [British] Government a power in the election of bishops and other Church dignitaries such as has been secured to other Protestant Governments".* It was considered desirable in 1831 to send a British agent to Rome, to endeavour, in concert with the French and Austrian Ambassadors, to persuade Pope Gregory XVI to introduce moderate liberal reforms in his provincial possessions (the attempt was quite unsuccessful) and so to induce the revolted Romagna and the Marches to return to Papal rule; and in that year Sir Brook Taylor, former British Minister at Berlin, was told that while there were reasons which prevented the British Government from appointing any acknowledged and accredited agent to go to Rome to negotiate openly with the Pope, he was empowered to proceed there in the character of a confidential agent of the British Government without any diplomatic character.

It was clearly felt, however, that some inconvenience was being caused by the employment of these indirect channels, and the Law Officers of the Crown, who were consulted in 1832 and 1837, and the Solicitor-General in a private letter to Lord Palmerston in 1833, expressed the opinion that there was no law which prevented the Crown from accrediting a diplomatic agent to the Court of Rome. The doubt that existed as to the legality of diplomatic intercourse appears to have arisen from an interpretation of the word "communion" in the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement. The law was that the Crown was not to hold communion with the Court of Rome, and the doubt existed whether the word "communion" should be strictly interpreted as applicable to religious "communion" or whether it applied to diplomatic intercourse. With a view to removing these doubts and to enable diplomatic intercourse with the Vatican to be put on a regular basis, a Bill was introduced into Parliament in 1848 and was finally passed on 4 September of that year. It was entitled "An Act for enabling Her Majesty to establish and maintain diplo-

* H. W. V. Temperley, *George Canning, the Catholics and the Holy See*, DUBLIN REVIEW, July 1933.

matic relations with the Sovereign of the Roman States." This curious expression was deliberately adopted in order to soften Protestant opposition. As originally introduced in the House of Commons the Bill would have enabled Her Majesty "to receive at the Court of London any Ambassador, Envoy Extraordinary, Minister Plenipotentiary or other diplomatic agent or agents whatsoever of and accredited by the Sovereign Pontiff". These words, however, aroused considerable opposition and they were finally changed and a clause introduced to the effect that "it shall not be lawful for Her Majesty, her heirs or successors, to receive at the Court of London as Ambassador, etc., accredited by the Sovereign of the Roman States any person who shall be in Holy Orders in the Church of Rome or a Jesuit or member of any other religious order, community or society of the Church of Rome bound by monastic or religious vows". When Rome and the Roman provinces were united to Italy in 1870 and an Italian law of 1871 laid down the Papal guarantees, which included the right to receive envoys of foreign Governments and to send envoys to foreign Governments, it was felt that the Act of 1848 had become obsolete and that it was no longer necessary to make any provision of the kind. Accordingly, in 1875 the Statute Law Revision Committee came to the conclusion that it might be repealed and with the concurrence of the Foreign Office this was done. At present the legality of the appointment of a diplomatic representative of the Pope in London is still considered to some extent open to doubt, and if such an appointment were seriously proposed, it would doubtless be necessary to obtain an authoritative opinion from the Law Officers of the Crown before a decisive reply could be given. I shall return later to this subject.

The ecclesiastical situation in the Island of Malta has always been a matter of much preoccupation to the British Government. There are also political questions connected with our relations with Italy which make it important that the upper clergy in Malta should be sound and well-disposed men. It was found necessary in 1886 to make a communication to the Vatican respecting

the appointment of a successor to the Archbishop of Malta, who was in failing health. This communication was made verbally and privately through the Italian Chargé d'Affaires in London, who begged that his intervention might be kept secret. This channel was obviously unsatisfactory and in the next year, 1887, when it was necessary to make a further communication on the same subject, instructions were sent to our Ambassador at Rome to make representations through the medium of Cardinal Howard. Edward Henry Howard, 1829-1892, was a grandson of the twelfth Duke of Norfolk and after being educated at Oscott and Edinburgh entered the Second Life Guards; but he had always had a leaning to the priesthood and was ordained by Cardinal Wiseman in the English College at Rome in 1854. He became an accomplished linguist in Eastern languages, and after a year in India, where he was sent on a special mission to settle some ecclesiastical difficulties at Goa, he spent the rest of his life in Rome. He was created a Cardinal Priest by Pius IX in 1877, and in 1884 he was raised by Leo XIII to the dignity of Cardinal Bishop, being translated to the suburbicane see of Frascati. I remember an aunt of mine who used to visit Rome frequently telling me that she thought that Cardinal Howard, as he swept through St. Peter's in his robes (he was for a time arch-priest of the Basilica), was the most magnificent figure she could remember ever having seen.

Sir John Lintorn Simmons (1821-1903: afterwards Field-Marshal), a former Governor of the Island of Malta, was on 1 August, 1889, appointed a special representative of the British Government for the purpose of entering into communication with the Papal authorities on the subject of religious matters and the marriage laws in Malta. He arrived in Rome in the middle of November and was withdrawn in March 1890 when some points had been settled, but there were still a few left to clear up.* Apart from the outcome of the discussions a noticeable feature of the proceedings was the obvious desire of the Holy See to protract Sir J. L. Simmons's

* See Parliamentary Paper C. 5975 (1890), containing the correspondence about this mission.

stay in Rome, and the frequent hints dropped and allusions made to the desirability of entering into diplomatic relations of a more permanent nature with the British Government. The time, however, was not ripe for this, and in 1895, when a question arose as to the appointment of a British subject as the Bishop of Port Louis (Mauritius), Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was asked if the communication to the Vatican on the subject should be made through the Duke of Norfolk, Cardinal Vaughan or the British Embassy at Rome, and chose the last named. Instructions were accordingly sent to the British Chargé d'Affaires at Rome to make the necessary communication privately to the Vatican through such channels as he might consider most suitable. Later in the same year he also received instructions to inquire confidentially into the truth of a rumour as to the intended appointment of a coadjutor of the Bishop of Malta and he conducted his inquiries "through the Prelate to whom he generally appealed in such matters".

In 1887, on the occasion of the Jubilee of Queen Victoria, the Pope sent a Monsignore on a special mission to convey his congratulations.* The British Minister at Rome was informed that earnest hopes were entertained in Vatican circles that the mission would be reciprocated by the appointment of a British envoy to the Pope on the occasion of His Holiness's Jubilee. The Queen, in a letter to the Pope, expressed her great gratification at the courtesy shown to her by the Monsignore's mission, and in November of the same year she desired to express further her sense of the courtesy shown by His Holiness and proposed to accredit the Duke of Norfolk on a special mission for that purpose. This proposal was communicated to the Pope in a letter addressed by Lord Salisbury to Cardinal Howard through the British Minister at Rome and was welcomed by the Pope. On 28 November, 1887, Lord Salisbury notified the Duke of Norfolk that he had been selected by the Queen for this purpose, enclosing a letter from Her Majesty to His Holiness

* See Parliamentary Paper C. 6137 (1890), "Correspondence respecting Monsignor Ruffo Scilla's Mission".

accrediting the Duke of Norfolk in his capacity of special envoy. Lord Salisbury instructed him to proceed to Rome and request an audience in the usual form, at which he was to present his credential letter. He was given two attachés, who both received formal letters of appointment signed by Lord Salisbury. On 17 December, 1887, the Duke, accompanied by his suite, was received by the Pope, the ceremonial being that used for the reception of special envoys from crowned heads. The Duke read a speech and handed the Pope his letters of credence. The Pope delivered a speech in reply. Both of these were in French and were published in the papal newspaper, the *Osservatore Romano*. At the same time the Duke handed to His Holiness the Queen's autograph letter. On 26 December, 1887, the Pope received the Duke alone and handed to him an autograph letter for Her Majesty. The Duke and his suite were then received in the Throne Room, and the latter handed to the Pope a present, consisting of an ewer and basin, which the Queen had sent him. He arrived back in London on 29 December on the conclusion of his mission.*

In 1902 many Powers sent special missions to Rome on the occasion of the celebrations in honour of the Pope's Jubilee. King Edward VII selected for this purpose the Earl of Denbigh, who was personally known to the Pope. After the Pope had signified his willingness to receive this envoy, matters proceeded much as with the Duke of Norfolk's mission, three attachés being appointed to form a suite. Lord Denbigh arrived at Rome on 28 February, and was met by Archbishop Stonor, Monsignor Stanley and two chamberlains of the Papal Court. His audience with the Pope was delayed owing to the fact that His Holiness had first to receive those who were accredited with the rank of Ambassador (Lord Denbigh was Special Envoy), but the audience was ultimately held on 8 March with the full ceremonial observed only at the formal reception of Ambassadors. An autograph letter of thanks from the Pope to the King was forwarded to Lord Denbigh through the post by Cardinal Rampolla, and

* See Parliamentary Paper C. 6136 (1890), "Correspondence respecting the Duke of Norfolk's Special Mission to the Pope".

Lord Denbigh handed it to His Majesty on 17 March, 1902.

In December 1914 Sir Henry Howard was sent as British envoy on a special mission to the Holy See. The purpose of this was in the first instance and nominally to congratulate Pope Benedict XV on his election, but there were further reasons of a political nature. It was felt that, in the absence of any British representative at the Vatican, the German and Austrian representatives had too much influence in the critical time of the Great War, and it was thought necessary to explain to the Pope the motives which compelled the British Government to intervene in the War, and that the British Government should acquaint the Pope of their attitude towards many questions arising therefrom. In 1916 Sir Henry Howard retired and Count de Salis was appointed as Minister at the Vatican and was still there when the Armistice was signed. There is no doubt that at that moment the mission was still regarded as temporary, and the question of its withdrawal as soon as the Peace Conference was over was seriously considered.

In November 1920 there was a certain change of attitude towards the question of the permanence of the mission, and the British Cabinet agreed that the Foreign Secretary "should have authority to retain the British diplomatic representative at the Vatican". This attitude was made precise in an answer to a Parliamentary Question given by the Prime Minister on 11 November, 1920, in which he said that "His Majesty's Government have decided, after full and careful consideration, that it is desirable in the public interest to continue the diplomatic representation of Great Britain at the Vatican which has been in existence since the first year of the War and has been attended with beneficial results." This has probably placed the Legation to the Holy See on a permanent footing and it may be observed that, though the scope of the mission was in the first instance work in connexion with the War, it was soon occupied with other matters. For instance: (1) Malta: (2) the right claimed by the British Crown of presentation to certain bishoprics in Bombay (this right being shared or

contested by Portugal): (3) troubles in Canada in connexion with the question of languages in religious schools: (4) questions in connexion with the Holy Places and the claims of France to a religious protectorate in the East: (5) questions concerning Ireland and the position of the Irish clergy in political issues between Great Britain and Ireland. The envoys since the permanent establishment of the mission have been:

1914: Sir Henry Howard.

1916: Count de Salis.

1922: Sir Odo Russell.

1928: Sir Henry Chilton.

1930 } Chargés d'Affaires { Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes.
1932 } { I. A. Kirkpatrick.

1933: Sir Robert Clive.

1934: Sir Charles Wingfield.

1936: Mr. D'Arcy Osborne.

It is only natural to ask why, if there is a British diplomatic representative at the Vatican, there should be no diplomatic representative of the Holy See at the Court of St. James's. One answer to this is that it is not obligatory for diplomatic representation to be mutual. Before the Great War there was no Nuncio at Berlin, although a Prussian envoy was accredited to the Pope at Rome. There is, further, a technical difficulty in that a Nuncio, if appointed, would certainly claim precedence and assert that he was *ipso facto* the doyen of the Diplomatic Corps. This claim on behalf of Nuncios is founded on regulations annexed to the Vienna Congress Treaty of 9 June, 1815, the relevant regulation being as follows: "Diplomatic agents shall take precedence in their respective classes according to the date of the official notification of their arrival. The present regulation shall not cause any innovation with regard to the representatives of the Pope." At the time of and before the Vienna Congress the Nuncio was always the doyen whenever he arrived, and the Pope claims that this holds at all Courts where he has appointed a Nuncio. The British Government, however, contest this and support the view of Lord

Clarendon, who held that the privileged precedence of the Pope's representative recognised under these regulations applied only to countries in which that privileged precedence was in fact accorded in 1815. Consequently the Nuncio cannot claim precedence in any capital where there was not a Nuncio in 1815.* In any such capitals, when the Nuncio has claimed precedence and been accorded it by the Government to which he is accredited, the British envoy has been instructed to state that he accepts the position only under protest, and as a matter of courtesy, without conceding the principle claimed by the Nuncio and accorded by the local Government. No considerations of the kind arise if the Pope has appointed a Delegate Apostolic with residence in London. Delegates Apostolic do not possess or claim any diplomatic character and it is not necessary for the Pope to ask the consent of the British Government before appointing a representative of that character. Monsignor Godfrey will receive a hearty welcome in all quarters.

STEPHEN GASELEE.

* Satow, *Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (3rd Edition, 1932), p. 156.

JOSEPH DE MAISTRE

(Continued)

MODERN Russia—Petrine Russia, that is—had not, Maistre argued, the religious foundation. It was begotten by Peter the Great, not under the aegis of priests and oracles, but amidst the contemporary slime of the French Regency.* There was the more reason not to abolish serfdom or introduce liberty without making sure of the only adequate sanction of both. Intuitively, as we can see, Maistre saw the essence of Liberty as “a perfect law” and not as a choice between pleasure and pain which much Liberal thought has made it. In Science—to come now to the second subject of his reflections—he perceives a good servant but a bad master; which indeed it increasingly proves to be as its powers both of beneficence and maleficence enlarge. Here too Religion—“the aroma”, as, quoting Bacon, he calls it, “which prevents Science from growing corrupt”—is shown to be necessary, and so much the more that the spirit of Illuminism is in the world, trying all things by novel standards, challenging the powers ordained by God, seeking to utilize human presumption to make all things new. Illuminism—Aufklärung, to give it its German name—that ingrafting of philosophy upon the poisonous tree of Calvinism†—there for him is the enemy.‡ And he tracks it in its long descent from the Protestant fathers, through names like those of Noodt and Jones, which are scarcely even names to us, down to its latest scions—Rousseau, Condorcet, Helvétius, and (a somewhat pathetic figure in such company) Kant. The memorial closes rather oddly with a note of warning against the Jews—that perverse, brilliant, incomparable race amongst whom the Illuminists were thought to be principally recruited and with whom the spirit of Catholicism is, as he sees things, always at war; and in face of the part that the Jews were to play, when the Revolution at last came to Russia, the passage might, perhaps, be cited as another example of Maistre’s uncanny powers of prediction.

* *Œuvres*, VIII, p. 291.

† *Œuvres*, VIII, p. 330.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

What Alexander precisely thought of his monitor's opinions we do not know, nor how much exactly they influenced him, for Russian freemasonry also was working for a change of Ministers. But it is significant that, not long after the memorial was presented, Speranski, the advocate of a French alliance abroad and of French Revolutionary models at home, fell from power, whilst Maistre rose to the summit of his influence. In the new struggle with Napoleon upon which Alexander was entering, his prophetic assurances of victory made him an agreeable, his influence with the Jesuits in Catholic Poland a useful adviser. These recommendations, however, were wasting assets. When, after the fall of Napoleon, he returned to Russia, Alexander was none too well pleased to hear of the progress of Catholic propaganda. The conversion of a young Galitzin especially brought Maistre under suspicion. The Jesuits were banished; and the Emperor eventually demanded the recall of the Sardinian Minister, which was agreed to.

Maistre left Russia with something to show besides the memory of his diplomatic career. Whilst Napoleon was invading the great countries of the Continent and Europe was draining to the dregs the cup of wrath, the diplomatist had been quietly filling his note-books; and two remarkable volumes remain to attest his industry. *Les Soirées de Saint-Petersbourg* is by common consent the most agreeable, just as *Du Pape* is the most influential, of his works. It opens with an exquisite description of a summer evening on the Neva, which might confidently be called the most charming passage in Maistre's writings—so tender, so graceful, so delicate is it—if unfortunately it were not known to have been written by his brother Xavier. The three characters of the coming conference—the spirited young French Chevalier, the grave Russian senator, and Maistre himself, thinly veiled under the title of "Le Comte", are seen approaching the stage by water. The delicious oriental twilight, the gorgeous clouds gathered above the sunken sun, the strange Russian melodies sounding from the boats, the statue of the great Emperor, austere surveying the city which, as if by magic, he had called up out of the marshes, have

guided their thoughts into that sublime borderland of the imagination, of which the cold rationalism of the preceding century had lost the chart; when it suddenly occurs to the young Chevalier to wonder whether the scourges of God, "the monsters who weary the earth", the Attilas and Napoleons of the world, are capable of experiencing the aesthetic sensations of which he is aware himself. "I would have one of these perverse men here with me," he exclaims. And, when the others ask him simultaneously what use he has for such a being, "I would ask him if the night appears to him as beautiful as it does to us."*

The silence is broken and, as by a side-door, the problem of pain is introduced into the scene. Maistre sees, rather than says, that we are so reduced in moral fibre as neither to be able to live with it, nor yet without it; and he is more concerned to reconcile vicarious suffering with the justice of God than the existence of evil with God's omnipotence. He maintains the view that Divine Justice is here and now executing its judgements and claims that from the chronicle of the Deluge and the fall of Sodom down to the words of Christ addressed to the sin-stained leper, he has the authority of the Bible behind him. One case and one case only—that of the Blind Beggar—seems to tell in a contrary sense: "Neither did this man sin, nor his parents." He argues that this is the exception which by the very tenor of the language used can be seen to witness to the general rule. And then he recalls the grim pleasantry of Seneca: "Do you wonder at the countless number of diseases? Count the cooks."†

The broad conclusion thus proclaims that physical evil is punitive.‡ But, when we see just men in tribulation, we are to consider two things—the solidarity of the race and the general vindication of virtue. We are to consider that in the first place "no man is punished as a just man but always simply as a man", that "it is human nature which is suffering and that human nature is always culpable", and "in the second place that great temporal happiness is in no way promised, nor

* *Œuvres*, IV, p. 128.

† *Œuvres*, IV, p. 38.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

could be, to the virtuous man, but only to virtue".* Original sin elucidates all puzzles. We live under the discipline of a Law, operating not indeed always by express and unmistakable judgements (for this would be to deprive virtue of merit and vice of temptation), but on a grand scale; exacting its penalties in fact vicariously, so that, as Maistre will presently teach,† the doctrine of Indulgences and of the Treasury of Merits is only a reflection of the order and system of the Universe.

This is not all. The seeming negligences of Divine Vengeance are the opportunities of Civil Justice. The Sovereign must before all things be careful not to bear the sword in vain. For "Punishment governs the whole human race; preserves it; watches it whilst human guardians are slumbering and is regarded by the wise man as the perfection of justice."

It is against the background of this sombre and louring sky that Maistre proceeds to paint his famous portrait of the Executioner conceived as the one indispensable minister of State, and as the pivot upon which civilization turns—a portrait both hideous and horrible, yet in its way so arresting that men have picked it out as the characteristic example of his literary genius. He compels us to come with him on to the scaffold—the frightful scaffold of his age, adorned with wheel and bar and horizontal cross; he causes the intolerable scene to be enacted before us; and then suddenly brings our thoughts back from the maimed and writhing victim to the masked minister of justice.

The executioner has finished; his heart beats but with satisfaction. He congratulates himself, he says in his heart: "No one uses the wheel better than I." He descends: he holds out his hand stained with blood, and Justice tosses some coins into it—coins which he carries off past a double hedge of men who fall back with horror. He sits down to a meal and he eats; he goes to bed and sleeps. And the next day on awakening he thinks about something altogether different from that which he has done the day before. Is this a man? Yes: God will receive him in his temples and allow him to pray. He is not a criminal:

* Ibid., V, pp. 81 and 82.

† Ibid., pp. 208 and 209.

yet no voice will consent to say, for example, that he is virtuous, a good man, or an estimable one. No moral eulogy can befit him, for all such assume humane relationships and he has none.*

Time and circumstance have done nothing to deprive the executioner of his position. In Russia, where some Englishmen and women obstinately persist in seeing the dawn of a new age, he has not only held his own but strengthened his hold. In Germany, where instruction has been raised to its highest possible co-efficient, he has been active to excess. In all the great nations of the world his services are thought necessary; and without his shadow upon its pages a favourite form of fiction would lose all its pungency. In the midst of civilization, culture, refinement, he stands between us and ourselves, an awful reminder of what human nature can come to, of where—in the memorable phrase—without the grace of God we may any of us go. Maistre, in a word, has shown the keenest sense of political reality, as well as of artistic effect, in throwing a high-light upon this masked and melancholy form. Yet, awful as is the resulting shadow cast over human life, it might be questioned whether it is more terrible than that which the scientific determinist has conjured up. T. H. Huxley in a memorable passage† has compared our condition to that of a chess-player matched against an opponent who neither makes nor tolerates a mistake. For Maistre at least there remains a force which can from a human standpoint reverse all probabilities, overturn all statistics, reward all expectations. Do not tell me, he says, in disproof of the efficacy of prayer, that the rainfall over a certain area is approximately calculable. There is always a margin of uncertainty, if not about its quantity, at least about its distribution, and this margin is the opportunity of man.‡ He might have gone on to say, as was afterwards said with great acuteness by W. G. Ward,§ that this margin of uncertainty only appears to exist within the space enclosed by the atmospheric air and is a mundane, not a cosmic, fact. Beyond our world

* *Œuvres*, IV, p. 33.

† *Œuvres*, IV, p. 221.

‡ W. G. Ward, *Prayer, Free Will and Miracles*, pp. 29 and 30.

† Huxley, *Lay Sermons*.

Law is apparently unalterable ; but here, within the little compass of the earth, science is foiled at a thousand points in attaining that exact precision of prophecy after which it strives.

Maistre, of course, is perfectly aware that the Prayer which knocks at Heaven's gate is a comparatively infrequent event. With his usual trenchancy of expression he describes his thoughts during the solemn intercessions of the Church :

In the midst of these splendid psalms, these august rites, I ask myself how many of the assembled crowd have the right by their faith or by their works to pray at all or have any well-founded hope of praying with efficacy. How many are there who really pray ? One is thinking of his business, another of his pleasures ; a third is busy with the music ; the least culpable perhaps is he who yawns without knowing where he is. How many are there, I say again, who really pray, how many who deserve to be heard ?

"If you ask me," the Chevalier is made to retort, "I am already certain that in these solemn and pious gatherings there was at all events one man most certainly who was not praying . . . that is yourself, M. le Comte, who were busy with these philosophical reflexions of yours instead."*

The company of the Chevalier affords Maistre an excuse for paying a two-edged compliment to the French nation, to whose language he was in truth very deeply indebted :

Indubitably there was never a people easier to deceive, more difficult to undeceive, nor more capable of deceiving others. . . . I think that twenty-five centuries ago, a prophet, with one stroke of his brush, painted a life-like portrait of you, when he said, "Every word that this people utters is a conspiracy." . . . The least opinion that you let loose upon Europe is a battering-ram driven forward by thirty millions of men. . . . I remember reading a letter of Christopher Wren's, in which he examines the proper dimensions of a church. He determined them by the reach of the human voice (which is right enough, since preaching has become the principal part of the rite—almost the whole rite—where sacrifice has ceased). He fixes the limits, then, beyond

* *Œuvres*, IV, pp. 307 and 309.

which the voice for an English ear is only sound ; but he adds : "A French speaker would be heard farther : for his pronunciation is clearer and stronger." That which Wren has said of the spoken word seems to me much more true of the word, penetrating in a very different sense, which resounds in books. A French one always carries furthest, for style is an accent.*

It was then, perhaps, no wonder, given his own very different opinions, that he dealt savagely with the stylist who, with the possible exception of Pascal, made the French language carry a greater distance than any man before or since : "Voltaire astonishes Vice itself. . . . Paris crowned, Sodom would have banished him. . . . Poised between admiration and horror, sometimes I feel inclined to cause a statue to be raised to him—by the hand of the executioner."†

All this, however, is but in passing. For the tale of pain is not yet told. As if his colloquy were a Dance of Death, Maistre now bids us look upon the most sanguinary of all scourges. War—what are we to make of that ? There for him lies the mystery of mysteries. He has little light to throw upon it ; he might rather be said to register than to resolve the enigma. Yet his conference on the subject is, as he was himself‡ aware, as good as anything in the book. "Explain", cries the Senator, "why the right of shedding innocent blood is by the common consent of Humanity reckoned the most honourable thing in the world ! Look close and you will see that there is something mysterious and inexplicable in the extraordinary value men have always attached to military glory. The executioner at least takes the life of the guilty, but for that you count him accursed. The soldier wades through indiscriminate slaughter, and for that you place him at the apex of earthly distinction. The former, who exacts no more than what is just, is brutalized by his labours. The latter, whose vengeance strikes the guiltless and the guilty alike, is strangely perfectible, is often actually perfected, as well in tenderness as in courage. It is no chance which acclaims the Deity as the God of Battles and which causes projects for a society of nations to fail. The law of destruction

* Ibid., IV, p. 379.

† Ibid., p. 210.

‡ Ibid., V, p. 83.

which runs through all creation and turns the whole world into an altar does not stay its operation when it comes to man. He, born full of pity, born to love his fellow-creatures, to weep over them, even to fashion tragedies for the mere pleasure of being moved—he is destined, also, to put them to violent death, and on the field of battle, even at a tyrant's command, does not refuse to do his duty. But despite this, never does Christianity seem so sublime, so expressly framed to satisfy human needs as in warfare. What is the significance of this terrible enigma?" *

Here, perhaps, this brief paraphrase of an outstanding nocturne in the series of *Soirées* is best concluded. No one can hope to exhibit the mystery of human conditions without deepening their obscurity. But as against eighteenth-century rationalism, and nineteenth-century rationalism too for the matter of that, Maistre, by displaying the confusion in our finest feelings and noblest aims had restored force to some traditional theology, whilst the enigmas of the executioner and the soldier were well calculated to cause men furiously to think.

Another figure, in some ways more suggestive still of the mystical character of human society, occupies the topmost rung of the ladder which rises from the butcher to the priest along all the scale of sin and sacrifice. The prestige of the Papacy had sunk low whilst Maistre was writing; and the ultimate imprisonment of Pius VII by Napoleon had but imperfectly atoned for the Pontiff's earlier compliance. It was a bold step to seek at such a time to raise anew the fallen majesty of the Pope as the constitutional head of Christendom, and not the less bold that the thesis involved a refutation of the Gallican view of the Church familiar to the most part of Maistre's readers. Indeed, so far as the French Government of the time had any power to effect it, his book, which appeared in December 1819 under the title of *Du Pape*, was boycotted by the Paris Press. He was nothing, however, if not a man of vision. The treatise struck chords for which the world of the Restoration was unconsciously

* *Ibid.*, p. 10.

listening and which can be heard echoing through the Positive Philosophy of Comte. Its unfamiliar theme harmonized with the airs which Lamennais was elaborating, caught the ear of the young Catholic intellectuals of the time, was discussed, repeated, reset and resung, and in a word opened the way to a new orientation of thought—Romewards. The prophetic soul of Joseph de Maistre, brooding on things to come, had in fact proved a match even for Bossuet's eloquence; and the old Gallican tradition of royal influence in French ecclesiastical affairs lost ground. Not of course that Maistre in any sense forestalled the precise definition of Papal infallibility adopted by the Vatican Council! *Théologien laïque de la Providence*, as Brunetière called him, he may have been, but only if the emphasis is thrown upon the adjective. He wrote, and he said that he wrote, as a man of the world;* he believed that "theological truths were merely general truths manifested and rendered divine (*divinisées*) in the religious sphere"; and he took infallibility for a synonym, in the spiritual order, of sovereignty.† In any monarchically constituted state, he argued, the King could not in practice be guilty of error—could, as we should say here, do no wrong—and thus infallibility automatically ensued in the case either of Pope or King. For he conceived the idea of sovereignty in the manner of Austin as definitely concentrated in some factor of the constitution and makes a point against the conciliar theory of ecclesiastical authority that, if it were true, it would leave the Church for the most part of the time without any sovereign at all. His doctrine of infallibility thus leans as much towards ultramontanism as Bossuet's towards Gallicanism; and it must humanly speaking be reckoned fortunate for the Church and the world that the Vatican decree of 1870 was the work, not of the *théologien laïque de la Providence*, but of trained theologians who credited the Pope with infallible powers in his capacity as a doctor and not as a ruler.

With definitions of faith Maistre was in fact no more concerned than St. Thomas More. "The Church", he

* Du Pape, *Discours Préliminaire*.

† Du Pape, I, c. 1.

says very beautifully in speaking of his differences with Bossuet, "is not naturally argumentative; it believes without dispute; for faith is a belief by love (*une croyance par amour*) and love does not argue."* Conscious, like St. Thomas, of an unfailing virtue in the Papacy that he would not have been able precisely to define, he made it his business to show the Pope, not so much as the heaven-sent guide of faith, but as the corner-stone of European morals; and he did this with such effect as to arrest the attention of thinking Europe. Lord Morley later on in the flood-tide of Liberalism was indeed to sneer at Maistre's "one benign and central figure, changeless in the midst of ceaseless change; laboriously building up with preterhuman patience and preterhuman sagacity, when other powers, one after another in evil succession, were madly raging to destroy and to pull down; thinking only of the great interests of order and civilization of which it had been constituted the eternal protector, and showing its divine origin and inspiration alike by its unfailing wisdom and its unfailing benevolence".† Yet, even through the medium of this ironical epitome, the broad justice of Maistre's case, whatever reserves may be required, can be perceived. His partiality is not gross; nor does his estimate differ so widely from that of other competent authorities. Listen, for instance, to the historian of Latin Christianity, who cannot be accused either of partisan bias or literary exuberance. Writing of the Papacy in its most political period, Milman, after declaring that it was "the power . . . most imperatively required to preserve that which was to survive out of the crumbling wreck of Roman civilization", and that, "to Western Christianity was absolutely necessary a centre, standing alone, strong in traditionary reverence and in acknowledged claims to supremacy", continues, "On the rise of a power both controlling and conservative hung, humanly speaking, the life and death of Christianity—of Christianity as a permanent, aggressive, expansive, and to a certain extent uniform system", and then finally concludes by saying that "it is impossible to conceive what

* Du Pape, I, c. 1.

† Essay on Joseph de Maistre.

had been the confusion, the lawlessness, the chaotic state of the Middle Ages without the medieval Papacy”.

Such tributes, not so readily to be wrung nowadays perhaps from Deans of St. Paul's, are the best vindication of the worth of Maistre's labours. Even in France, however, the influence of the book on the Pope was, as Goyau observes, “slow though profound”; and, dying as he did in 1821 within two years of its publication, Maistre did not live to see its full triumph. He had returned from Russia in 1817 and had filled for a brief period the dignified office of Sardinian Minister of Justice with his headquarters at Turin. During this last phase of his life we catch a glimpse of him in Paris, noting amidst a whirl of sight-seeing his own sensibility to that *je ne sais quoi* which made Paris then, and makes it still, the capital of Europe. A year later his observations on French politics were put on record by a friend, and once again his old uncanny gift of foresight appears.

“The Royalists”, he observed, “are triumphing over the fall of the Ministry of Decazes; no doubt they have reason to, but the revolutionary principle, repelled for the moment, will not accept its defeat. It will assail the monarchy once more and with greater vigour. And the Royal Family will once again be driven from France.” Then with animated voice he had gone on to sketch the future as he felt and fancied it: “France marching at the head of ideas, political Protestantism pushed to the point of the most absolute individualism”; and finally, “a penultimate revelation of the truth in the mind of the masses”, when “men would be utterly surprised to see and understand that that which they were seeking in the distemper of discussion and dispute was simple and easy”. . . . “On that day”, he added, “the Revolution would be over.”*

With that cryptic but suggestive utterance upon his lips, Joseph de Maistre passes from our view, for, as Charles de Lavan happily expressed it: “Before the close of the year 1821, le Comte de Maistre had ceased to live and was beholding face to face the Absolute Truth.”†

He deserves to be remembered by the Church for the part he played in the recovery by the Papacy of its proper stature in the thoughts of churchmen, and by the

* *Œuvres*, XIV, p. 286.

† *Ibid.*, XIV, p. 286.

World for his vindication of an international order based upon historic and spiritual foundations. As for the rest he merits recognition in Russia for the profound and melancholy conferences which his residence there inspired ; in France for the lucid argument and incisive style which gave her the lead in the coming ecclesiastical movement of the time ; in Italy for his sympathy with its hopes of union and his services to the House of Savoy. But here, too, in England he has some special claim to remembrance if only by virtue of a casual remark thrown out in the course of his reflections upon events in France. "If ever Christians", he observes, "draw together, as everything invites them to do, it seems as if the impetus must be given by the Church of England."* Forty years later, in Oxford, where at every turn the memorials of the old religion of our country compel our eyes, Newman was to begin to verify a prediction, which even if by devious ways and after divers manners, still advances towards fulfilment.

ALGERNON CECIL.

* *Œuvres*, I, p. 23. Consid. sur la France.

EUROPE AFTER MUNICH

ANYONE who attempts to write on international politics in these rapidly changing days must be very conscious of the "two nows" to which Elia called attention in simple language long before physicists and philosophers disputed about "the relativity of simultaneity". "What security can I have," he asked his distant correspondent, "that what I now send you for truth shall not, before you get it, unaccountably turn into a lie?" The present article is an attempt to estimate the European situation and outlook as they present themselves in the first week of December.

The spectacle is rather a bewildering one, and those who regard it, as the casual newspaper-reader may be tempted to do, as a collection of heterogeneous facts, may well despair of making sense of it. But apparently we are all scientists and philosophers now, and those who take an interest in politics appear more inclined to approach the whole subject with a general theory, under which they have no difficulty in subsuming all the facts. From this point of view, particular occurrences are almost irrelevant. It is necessary only to understand the scheme of things. The Marxian sees the development of a decaying capitalist order towards the cataclysm which will introduce collectivism. The anti-Fascist recognizes only the developing struggle between Fascism and democracy, and the anti-Communist is liable to present the same general outline with a different set of sympathies. A line of interpretation, very popular in some Catholic circles, interprets everything from the point of view of the machinations of international finance, sometimes described as "the gold gangsters".

Whatever truth there may be in any of these schemata, there can be no doubt that they are all applied with excessive rigidity by those who believe in them. Instead of being used for the interpretation of duly attested facts, they are employed in order to show that events must have happened in this or that way. Great caution is necessary in reading some of the best-intentioned political writing today if the reader is to separate what has been arrived at

a priori from what rests upon objective evidence. This article is written from the standpoint of one who is unable to accept any theory of inevitable development in human societies. The writer believes that politics is largely concerned with contingent matters and that prediction must always be very cautious and conditional. Certainly as moralists we must form our opinion on what ought to happen, and we may be inclined to sit in judgement on acts without presuming to do so on persons. The more carefully we study the various forces which are interacting on the international scene, the more confidence we shall have in prophesying their action, but the resultant of all the conscious forces and the accidental factors will always defeat human foresight.

Munich, for good or ill, marked a decisive stage in European history, and it makes a good starting-point for our inquiry. Two commentators have noted it as marking the end of a phase. Herr Hitler saw in the Czecho-Slovak settlement the last of his territorial demands in Europe which could threaten the peace, and Lord Halifax subsequently referred to it as the culminating point of the progressive reform of the peace treaties. To Mr. Chamberlain it was the beginning of a new phase, the laying of the foundations on which was to be raised the superstructure of "peace for our time".

It would be difficult to say whether more nonsense has been written by friends or by foes of what was done at Munich. The latter have exploded with wrath at a "betrayal" without condescending to say who or what has been betrayed. Undoubtedly the Czecho-Slovak Republic had substantial grievances against France, but what is the case against this country? We may be disposed to dispute whether it would have been wise or justifiable for this country to join France in a war against Germany for the sake of Czecho-Slovakia, but when, for reasons which are now common knowledge, it was apparent that France would not go to war, who can seriously argue that we had any duty or even right to do so?

Enthusiasts on the other side were inclined to see in the Munich Settlement the dawn of the Millennium. Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini were much misunder-

stood men whose sincerely pacific desires were now to have full expression, and it remained only to beat our bombing aeroplanes into electric tractors. The statesmen who met at Munich have been represented as "four just men" determined to smash the international money power. Such an attitude, we believe, leads either to disillusionment or to a succession of interpretations of events which defy belief.

The picture of Herr Hitler which emerges from a dispassionate study of the diplomatic documents is that neither of an ogre nor of an angel of peace. The most foolish, though perhaps the most widely believed, of the popular versions of the whole business was that which talked of "Hitler's bluff". The Führer does not bluff, and the Duce does so very rarely. Herr Hitler, it is true, said that he was prepared to risk a European war. He believed the odds against France declaring war on him in any circumstances were sufficiently long to justify him in going ahead in Czecho-Slovakia. The bluff that was called at Munich was French bluff. Everybody except the British public knew the truth about France.

The real achievement of Munich was the settlement without war of the last of the European disputes which, through the alliances and compacts involved, might have led to an international struggle. Whether it meant the end of treaty revision is quite another matter. From 1919 Germany has been vowed to the defeat of the *Diktat* of Versailles, and since the League of Nations was an organization for the maintenance of that "settlement" there was never any excuse for illusions about the German purpose in entering the League or for surprise at the retirement. Nowhere in the Covenant is there any provision for the revision of the treaties and never has France looked upon such revision as admissible. The system of alliances built up by the French was designed to enforce the settlement, and, as far as action at Geneva is concerned, Germany might have been talking and gesticulating down to this moment. She could escape from the fetters neither by diplomatic action at Geneva, nor by war, which she was not in a position to make. Her only policy was to profit by the weaknesses of the former

allies and to rearm herself. There is an element of the fortuitous in all these matters. A strong Britain, France and Russia, determined to maintain the fruits of victory, could have done so indefinitely. But Russia had become the enemy of the European order, with whom no effective alliance was possible. It was a card of considerable value to Germany that thoughtful people were asking everywhere in Europe whether we should not need her help against international revolution. Great Britain had never believed in the Versailles Settlement. The excitement of the coupon election had hardly died down before the prevailing English sentiment was vaguely pro-German from a variety of motives in which a sentimental regard for the under-dog had a considerable place.

France believed in Versailles. At no point since the war has there been any real identity of British and French policy. When we have said the same things, we have said them with different meanings. But France has been the victim partly of British sentimentalism and partly of her own misdeeds. When the German contemptuously declares that modern France is decadent, those who have the privilege of knowing many French people may be inclined hotly to deny it, but if we look at the position of France as a whole we shall find it difficult to deceive ourselves. No country can practise race suicide as persistently as the French have done without a destruction of the national culture. We have tried to tell elsewhere * the story of the disintegration of France by the agents of the Third International, but we shall not understand why their work has been so successful unless we appreciate the extent to which Frenchmen have been displaced by foreigners. In the Marseilles strike of last year only two out of five of the strikers were of French nationality and one of them had been nationalized. At the time Hitler wrote *Mein Kampf* it was still possible to believe that Germany would need to settle accounts with France before she could do anything else. Since then she has formed the unflattering opinion that she can ignore her Western neighbour and carry out her designs in the East. The last chance of challenging this policy came with the

* *Russia's Work in France* (London, 1938).

militarization of the Rhineland. It is interesting to reflect that those who were recently shouting for war with Germany over Czecho-Slovakia were all opposed to any action at that time. What was most criticized by the Parliamentary Opposition was the decision to hold staff conversations with the French. Mr. Lloyd George's speeches and articles on the subject make interesting reading today. The impossibility of resisting Germany in 1938 was decided in 1935. *Quantilla prudentia mundus regatur!*

If France is suffering today from a deep sense of humiliation, British foreign policy since the war cannot be dispensed from a terrible responsibility. The legitimate anxieties of the French met little sympathy here. We were blind to the facts of German rearmament and treated as "French nervousness" what we now know to have been sober fact. Anything short of a complete desertion of our allies was assailed by a considerable section of British public opinion with the cry that we were "in the pocket of France". The fact is that the French were so anxious for our support that they followed us in one folly after another, from the Disarmament Conference at Geneva to the crowning lunacy of "sanctions", which administered the *coup de grâce* to the League of Nations and produced the Rome-Berlin axis. And all the time France merely increased the British exasperation, since she did not believe in any of it. There are still people who think Mr. Eden might have won his gamble on the weather in Ethiopia if the French had played the game.

It must still be a matter of bewilderment to informed Frenchmen that we can count it unto ourselves for righteousness that we made the Anglo-German naval treaty on the morrow of the Stresa Conference. The Stresa front had not long to live, and the Abyssinian folly made an end of it.

In a Europe like this Germany could hardly fail to get what she wanted, provided she was highly armed and known to be determined. But how is a nation persuaded to go without butter for guns? Not by academic arguments or party politics on traditional lines, but by a *mystique*, the creation of a fanaticism. It is no use proving

that the Nazi movement is a frenzy and its anti-Semitism an atrocity. Of course they are, but Germans will judge by their results.

There is no need to recapitulate here what Hitler has accomplished. History holds no parallel to it. He declares that it has been by "German armed might", and could have been done in no other way. Who will venture to contradict him? We shall waste our energies in preaching the wickedness of force to those who have proved the ineffectiveness of argument.

What is the next step? According to the sentimental interpretation of events, everything was now to be done by sweet reasonableness. This shows little knowledge of human nature. Was it ever within the probabilities that Hitler would develop overnight from the fanatical leader of a new crusade into a perfectly reasonable person asking for his due and no more? Are there any indications that the other countries are now prepared to seek a settlement on a basis of perfect equity? There is little enough in the political temper of any of the countries concerned at the moment of writing to encourage any such idea.

And Italy? The *mystique* of Fascism is sufficiently close to that of National Socialism to enable Italy and Germany to walk together for a considerable distance, though with no illusions on the part of either country about the other. That the difficulties in the way of their association were not insuperable is part of what we owe to Mr. Eden and the desire of Lord Baldwin to cash in on the results of the so-called "Peace Ballot".

Nothing was less likely than that Germany and Italy would feel that the period of revision by threats had come to an end. Even if they had been prepared to trust Mr. Chamberlain, they could not fail to see what heavy weather his policy was making, and behind the pacific figure of the Prime Minister stand those who have only themselves to blame if they are regarded abroad as wanting war. We cannot, therefore, profess the least surprise at the Nazi campaign against this country and the Italian provocations to France, coupled with German endearments for the French and Italian bouquets for Great

Britain, which are the principal features of the international situation as we write.

So, after all, it may be said, a European war is inevitable sooner or later. We believe, on the contrary, that few things are less likely. Our reasons are based on a study of Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini, the policies they have followed and the hopes they may be assumed to entertain.

These two dynamic personalities have achieved a work in their respective countries which makes attempts to belittle their genius merely ridiculous. They are not Christians. Their systems are fundamentally anti-Christian, and even if we had not the unequivocal encyclicals of Pope Pius XI there would not be very much sense in pretending because they have attacked Communism that their *Weltanschauung* is reconcilable with that of the Catholic Church. For reasons of expediency, Signor Mussolini has been less ready to ignore Christian morals in some departments, but both the Dictators will claim for Caesar what belongs to God.

The argument is not that war would offend the conscience of Führer or Duce. It is that it would ruin their plans. Few books can have been more misrepresented than Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. We have studied the integral text of this work with some care. It is the writing of a pagan, with a good many of the pagan virtues. The passages which extol the value of manual labour and attack the snobbish contempt for it in modern societies give an impression of sincerity and some nobility. The practical psychology displayed is that of a shrewd observer of his fellows. When the Jews are in question Hitler loses all sense of proportion and we get the impression that on this subject the writer is hardly sane.

Any interpretation of such a book must distinguish between its philosophy, which may be regarded as a permanent expression of the author's mind, and the prescriptions of practical policy, which must be subject to changing events. There is a widespread idea in this country that *Mein Kampf* is a detailed political programme which its author has remorselessly carried out step by step, so that it is necessary only to study its pages to see what he is going to do next, and to marvel at the blindness of Mr.

Chamberlain after he has been so thoroughly forewarned. Many people also believe that in this political testament the Führer has described the successive stages by which, after having absorbed Austria and dismembered Czechoslovakia, he would destroy France and turn back later on Great Britain and seize her colonies.

Almost everything in this picture is false. Colonial development is definitely rejected by Herr Hitler, and the "colonies question" represents a complete departure from *Mein Kampf*. This fact is now becoming recognized, and we have seen it described as the only modification. Herr Hitler wrote this book at a time when Germany was still smarting under the indignity of the Ruhr occupation. He argues that a settlement with France must be the first step, since France aims at the destruction of Germany. It is beside the point here to argue whether this was a correct interpretation of French post-war policy. Nobody who visited Germany in those years can doubt that it was the one which was sincerely held there. It found also a good deal of support in this country. True, the portions of *Mein Kampf* which contain the bitter attack on France were written when Franco-German relations were supposed to have improved. Germany had entered the League of Nations. No illusions on these subjects are now permissible to those who have studied the remarkable *Vermächtniss* of the late Dr. Stresemann, a work which, like *Mein Kampf*, has never been completely translated into English. This book makes it clear that the public declarations of the German Foreign Minister were a façade behind which fear and suspicion of France remained undiminished.

"I shall never satisfy these gentlemen of the Extreme Right," wrote Stresemann to General von Schoch in July 1925. "They admit that France wants to ruin Germany, but they still criticize the policy which, as I once pointed out, aims at driving France back from trench to trench, since a general offensive is not possible." Stresemann is found assuring the ex-Crown Prince in September 1925 that the abandonment of claims to Alsace-Lorraine is "purely theoretical", and recommending Germany's entry to the League on the ground that her

representative could present matters to the Assembly "in such a way as to create serious differences between members of the Entente".

In the light of these facts Herr Hitler cannot be reasonably presented as standing for a policy of aggression against France when the German rulers had abandoned it. But the position has radically changed since then. The policy of encirclement which convinced Hitler that Germany could do nothing in the East until she had settled accounts with France in the West has collapsed. From the strictest standpoint of *Realpolitik* there is every reason to believe in the sincerity of Hitler's pledge to France. Why should he wish to embark on a policy which would inevitably lead him to war with Great Britain? Nowhere in *Mein Kampf* does he consider the idea of Anglo-German conflict except to reject it.

War would be fatal to Hitler's plans. The eugenic theories by which he is seeking a progressive "purification" of the German race are in our view detestable, but it must be conceded that they imply long views. Hitler is thinking generations ahead. A war which maimed and destroyed much of the Young Germany on which his hopes are based would be a fatal error. It would mark, too, the destruction of much of the reconstruction of German towns, to which the Führer, who has a real sense of artistic values, attaches so much importance.

Signor Mussolini, for his part, is colonizing Libya. He, too, is thinking of the future. Let us, if it gives us any emotional satisfaction, admit that the Dictators are very wicked men, it is at least worth while to try to understand the nature of their wickedness.

They do not want war. Who does? The Russian Government and the Third International, those "two minds with but a single thought", want a European war. We are not here falling into that error of *a priorism* which we have already criticized. Our opinion is based on the open avowals of those concerned. Nobody can have read the works of Lenin with any care and failed to recognize that a war between "capitalist countries" is good business for Communism, and it is impossible to study Soviet policy without seeing that Russia has every

interest in drawing the thunders of Germany against France if it can be done. There is, however, more recent evidence. In *Pravda* of 7 November last there was an article by Georges Dimitrov, the General Secretary of the Third International, which was reproduced in the French official Communist organ *L'Humanité* six days later, occupying a whole page of that journal. Its argument is extremely interesting. It is that the European conflict from 1914 to 1918 was the first imperialist war. The second is now in progress. Its opening engagements are the aggressions against Ethiopia, China and Spain. The British and French governments have made a criminal pact with the Fascist aggressors. The international working class, led by the Communist Party, must first overthrow the capitalist governments and then turn on the Fascists.

The idea that a world war can be averted has no meaning for the Muscovite Communist, for he holds that it is now in progress. His business is to see that it is extended. "The democratic powers," wrote Luis Araquistain, in the *Vanguardia* of Barcelona, on 18 April, "know very well that our war is the beginning of a conflict that will decide the fate of Europe."

Here, then, is the position as we see it. Germany and Italy are determined to take what they can get by the threat of war, but a war is no part of their plans and could only result from failure in what is undoubtedly a dangerous game. For Russia, on the other hand, war—for other people—is an object of deliberate policy.

What of Britain and France? The answer to that question depends largely on what happens to our ally, and no question could be more difficult to answer. M. Daladier has won over the general strike a "triumph" much less equivocal than most of those claimed by or for French statesmen in recent years, but the outlook is uncertain. The Italian calculation appears to be at the moment that we shall be compelled to break with France and that satisfaction of Italy's ambitions may be secured at the expense of the Third Republic. This shows that the countrymen of Macchiavelli have more to learn than they think they have.

The Spanish tragedy meanwhile continues, and is commented upon in this and other countries with very little regard to Spain. The speeches and writings of apologists for Barcelona may now be searched in vain for any trace of the "ideological" arguments which are the real inspiration of their cause. The appeal is entirely to strategic considerations, and if the subject matter were less serious there would be something richly comic in the spectacle of English Labour members using the "patter" of Tory diehards for the purpose of attacking General Franco. In France there are genuine fears about the future of the Peninsula, but it is impossible to congratulate the Third Republic on the way she has played her cards. The whole apparatus of "non-intervention", that legal monstrosity, was invented to cover the persistent assistance of France to the Spanish Reds, and the French have made the worst of both worlds. They have made it difficult for National Spain to forgive them without any real chance of securing the victory of Barcelona. In France, to a far greater extent than here, the forces of the Left have secured the support of a number of intellectuals who display in the political sphere the "blank misgivings of a creature moving about in worlds not recognized". At every point in the Spanish struggle, the forces whose ultimate direction is communistic have been able to rely on the propaganda of intellectuals who declare and probably believe themselves to be *en dehors et au-dessus des partis*. At the correct moment they can be relied upon to display a strictly selective horror at aerial bombardments or urge the necessity of mediation. As far as can be seen at present, the end of the Spanish war is still distant. Its horrors defeat description, but there are horrors greater than those of civil war, and it is not the part of the Christian to cry, "peace! peace! where there is no peace".

The effect of all this on our own country raises problems too big to be dealt with at the end of an article. Sir John Anderson has just introduced his scheme of voluntary national service. The popular "line of talk" is that the democracies are prepared to do as much as the authoritarian States, and that we are prepared to defend all our interests. Is it true? Is it conceivable that in a demo-

cratic community, with the Opposition ready, often in a mood of complete irresponsibility, to exploit any point against the Government, there is the least chance of the British public accepting the same standard of living as the Germans and the Italians? And if not, will it not be better to abandon the idea that we can have it both ways? Democracy has to be paid for. We may think it worth the price, but let us not imagine that we can escape the payment. On the other hand, the authoritarian countries may fail to stand the strain. We are not astrologers, and we do not believe these questions can at present be answered, but upon the answer to them the future of Europe depends.

REGINALD J. DINGLE.

THE VIENNA AWARD

The Truth about the Peace Treaties. By David Lloyd George. (Gollancz.)

The Struggle for the Danube and the Little Entente. By Robert Machray. (George Allen & Unwin.)

Hungary and Her Successors. By C. A. Macartney. (Oxford University Press: for the Royal Institute of International Affairs.)

A GREAT deal was said at the time of the Munich Agreement about the "artificial" and unhistorical nature of the post-war State of Czecho-Slovakia. Those not disposed to dispute the German advance into the Sudeten areas found much that was incontestable to say about the anomalous position of the minorities under the control of the Prague Government. But it is nevertheless true that the frontier which was abandoned at Munich was as old and as obviously a natural frontier as any in Europe except the Pyrenees. The Germans who then joined the Reich had not been separated from it at Versailles. It is clear that, if there was a case for that revision, there was an even greater case for the reconsideration of the frontier between Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia, which had been drawn by the Treaty of Trianon where never had been a frontier before, and which disregarded the most elementary geographical and economic considerations in its attempt to satisfy the national aspirations of the Slovaks, while leaving three quarters of a million Magyars under the rule of Prague.

The Munich agreement, in deciding the terms of the transference to the Reich of the German minorities in Czecho-Slovakia, removed the immediate threat of European war, and the dramatic relaxation of tension diverted general attention from the events of the succeeding weeks, when the questions of the Polish and Hungarian minorities were resolved. The Polish presented no very difficult problem, although the imperious way in which it was handled was in marked contrast to the more patient methods of the Hungarians. They occupied a more or less compact area in the Duchy of Teschen, which had been detached from Poland under cover of the Russian advance on Warsaw in 1920, and

which was occupied by Polish troops without delay. The Hungarian problem was more complex. An annexe to the Munich Agreement provided that this, "if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective Governments, shall form the subject of a further meeting of the heads of Governments of the four Powers here present". Agreement between the respective Governments proved impossible; a conference held at Komarom, on the Danube below Bratislava, broke down after only four days on 13 October. The decision regarding the territories that were to be transferred to Hungary was in fact made at Vienna on 2 November, by the representatives of Germany and Italy, acting in an arbitral capacity at the request of the Czech and Hungarian Governments. The advice or opinions of the British and French Governments were not sought, despite the facts that the Munich Agreement had provided for arbitration by all four Governments, and that the British and French had already committed themselves to guarantee the final frontiers of the Czecho-Slovak State. This situation appears to have passed without comment in the London Press. The Germans and Italians had made their guarantee conditional on the settlement on a satisfactory basis of the Polish and Hungarian questions; the British and French had undertaken the guarantee—and one which, for Britain, was something wholly unprecedented—regardless of the nature of those settlements. Yet when arbitration was called for, Germany and Italy alone arbitrated; and they, more than either Britain or France, had economic and strategic interests and ambitions of their own in the areas concerned.

When the frontiers of the nations that emerged from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were drawn after the War, the chief consideration was made that of race. Those responsible for the Treaties had no local knowledge of racial distribution; they were dependent wholly upon statistics, and, "in such a confusion of tongues and origins, no statistics could be regarded as reliable. They depended entirely on the bias of the authority that took them. Each party exaggerated or

minimized according to the exigencies of their contention".* The matter was settled according to what appeared to be the broad lines of justice, and wherever areas were in dispute the claims of those who had fought with the Allies were accepted. "At the same time," remarked Sir Eyre Crowe, with an irony presumably not apparent at the time, "this principle must not be carried too far, for our ultimate duty is to produce a condition of things likely to lead to permanent peace".†

At Komarom eighteen years later there was no such easy way out of the difficulties involved in drawing a northern boundary to the Magyar people. No sort of responsibility for the Great War can be brought home to Hungary; yet none of the Peace Treaties was more crushing than the Treaty of Trianon. The Hungarian cabinet in 1914 pressed upon Count Berchtold, the Foreign Minister at Vienna, its emphatic desire for a peaceful settlement with Serbia; nevertheless Hungary had to fight, and therefore, when peace was made, to pay the penalty of having fought on the vanquished side. But at Komarom the sole, and not merely the ultimate, purpose was "to produce a condition of things likely to lead to permanent peace". And the conference broke down simply because the task of dividing Magyars from Slovaks without injustice to either was an impossible one. A reliable map of the distribution of races in the southern foothills of the Beskiden Carpathians, in the region which was comprehensively labelled as "Slovakia" after the War, is now available.‡ It shows the whole area to be a bewildering mosaic of nationalities, and is itself sufficient evidence that any frontier must necessarily leave large minorities on both sides. The matter is further complicated by the fact that the region was under an aggressively Hungarian administration for many years before the War, and an aggressively anti-Hungarian administration after. The census of 1910, conducted by

* D. Lloyd George: *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*. Vol. II, pp. 914-15.

† Ibid., II, p. 920.

‡ That made by Count Paul Teleki, and published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs in Hungary and her Successors, by C. A. Macartney.

Magyar officials on a language basis at the close of a long period in which intensive efforts had been made to enforce the use of Magyar, and designed to show the predominantly Magyar nature of the whole country, is scarcely more misleading than that of 1930, which was conducted by Czechs and intended to prove that the Magyars had been no more than an alien and superficial caste. The only excuse for the existence of such a frontier is the ethnological excuse ; and it is quite impossible justly to draw an ethnological frontier.

But if a racial criterion leads to confusion, a physical map of the areas under discussion shows a beautiful simplicity. Two geographical units lie in proximity, the one the historic Kingdom of Bohemia and the other the historic territories of the Crown of St. Stephen. Bohemia, the smaller unit, lies within the circle of the Sudeten mountains, the Böhmerwald, the Erzgebirge, and the Riesengebirge ; and its rivers, drained by the Elbe and the Moldau, flow northwards. The larger unit lies within the circle of the Carpathian mountains, and its rivers, watering the Hungarian Plain, flow southwards into the Danube. The former unit is inhabited chiefly by Czechs but also by Germans. The latter is inhabited chiefly by Magyars, but in the mountainous regions that were severed from it by Trianon live also Slovaks, whose economy depends naturally on that of the agricultural people of the Hungarian Plain. The rivers of "Slovakia" run southwards into Hungary, not westwards into Bohemia ; its roads follow the valleys southwards towards Buda-Pest instead of leading to Prague. Between it and Bohemia lie Moravia and the White Carpathians. No degree of sympathy for the work of Masaryk can alter the fact that there is absolutely nothing to connect the Slovaks with the Czechs except that both are Slav peoples and both have traditions of nationalism suppressed under the Dual Monarchy. If common cause brought them together in 1918, the Slovak movement for independence of Prague began almost at once to emphasize the difference.

The Slovaks are bound to the Hungarians by such evident geographical and economic considerations, and

it is so difficult to separate them by a racial frontier, that it will seem inexplicable to the future historian that such a frontier was ever drawn. It will perhaps seem even stranger that the man with whom the pre-eminence of the racial principle was associated was the President of the United States, a nation synthesized from most of the peoples of the world. "In our country," said Mr. Joseph Kennedy recently, "citizenship almost completely overshadows any sentiment of racial origin." A further irony lies in the fact that Wilson, whose third "Point" had been "the removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers", should have assisted, in deference to "sentiment of racial origin", in the creation of a system of economic barriers that nearly starved the population of Vienna to death, and had consequences only a little less severe in Hungary. The inter-dependence of the peoples of the middle Danube is so manifest that a heavy responsibility lies with those who allowed political considerations to override them. Moreover, it is now established as certain history that in this "the Peace Treaty went beyond the original intentions of the great Allied Powers. The tearing up of the Austrian Empire into disparate and unconnected fragments was no part of the policy of France, Russia, Britain, America or Italy. We knew there must be a readjustment of frontiers in favour of Italy, Serbia, and Rumania. As for the rest of the Austrian Empire, the idea that found favour was that expounded by General Smuts in his interview with Count Mensdorff: the conferring of complete autonomy on the component races who made up the Austro-Hungarian Empire, inside a federal constitution. Had that been found practicable there can be no doubt that it would have conduced to peace and stability in central Europe".*

But the vigour of the new Slav nationalisms was allowed to prevail, championed from Paris by Benes and in the United States (where the Constitution of the new Republic was drawn up, and where there were sufficient Czech and Slovak populations to bring considerable pressure to bear upon Wilson) by Masaryk. Recognized

* *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, I, pp. 90-91.

by the Allies as belligerents in the Allied cause before the Armistice, the Czechs and Slovaks had seized before the Peace Conference opened practically the frontiers in which they were subsequently confirmed. An independent Republic was proclaimed and the peacemakers were virtually presented with a *fait accompli*. It was even then impossible to claim that the new State was more than an agglomeration of minorities round a nucleus of two Slav races, with an eastern appendage inhabited by the Ukrainians of Ruthenia. "But the Czechs were specially favoured by the Allies. They had rendered considerable service to the Allied cause by starting the rot in the Austrian army which hastened that process of disintegration that destroyed its value as a fighting machine. The result was the recognition of the polyglot and incoherent State of Czecho-Slovakia, and the incorporation in that State of hundreds of thousands of protesting Magyars and some millions of angry Germans".* Only a month before he published this very straightforward account of the matter, Mr. Lloyd George had broadcast an eloquent condemnation of the separation from Czecho-Slovakia of the "millions of angry Germans".

It is difficult to believe that, if it was considered possible to confirm the existence of this precarious Republic, the alternative plan of General Smuts, providing administrative autonomy for the races of the Empire within a federal structure, was genuinely impracticable. The forces working for sovereign nationalisms were allowed to prevail with such remarkable ease that the very existence of centripetal movements has already been largely forgotten. The Peace Conference met at Paris on 18 January, 1919. In October 1918, the Emperor Karl had issued a manifesto promising the transformation of Austria into a federation of national states. It is true that this was met at once by protests from Hungary. But on 31 October Count Michael Károlyi took office as Provisional President of Hungary, and chose Oskar Jaszi as his Minister for Nationalities. These were the men in control when the Peace Con-

* *ibid.*, II, p. 942.

ference assembled. Jaszi "went so far as to repudiate the idea of Magyar supremacy altogether, and to advise 'equal rights for all nationalities and the development of national autonomy on the Swiss model'. The activities of this Ministry form an interesting and little-known chapter of Hungarian history. It was able to agree on and actually to put into operation a statute for the Ruthenes which probably satisfied the majority of opinion among that people, in so far as an articulate opinion existed. It also produced a statute for the Germans, which was put into force in West Hungary, and even a Slovak Statute, which might have satisfied the Slovaks if Hungary had had to deal with the Slovaks alone".* No international support was forthcoming for these efforts, however, despite "the original intentions of the great Allied Powers"; in March, Károlyi resigned, practically driven from office by the Peace Conference, and Hungary fell into the hands of Bela Kun and the Bolsheviks. At Paris the structure of the Dual Monarchy was disintegrated when it might have been re-conceived; it was resolved, as was pleasantly believed, into its component parts; and Britain, in accordance with her traditional policy of seeking a balance of power in Europe, exerted herself to curb the more violent projects of the French and to revive the power of Berlin.

The necessity of anticipating the possibility of an arrogant French hegemony may seem rather remote today, but it was real and urgent then. "Anyone who supposes that a French government dominating the Continent as Napoleon dominated it after Tilsit will remain friendly to England must be a poor judge of national psychology", wrote the British Ambassador in Berlin shortly after the occupation of the Ruhr. "Desiring the maintenance of the Anglo-French entente, I am compelled to desire the existence of a strong Germany"† For that reason the restoration of the Reich was undertaken. The soundness of the principle can hardly be gainsaid; no real sort of "collective security" can possibly be achieved unless it is built on a

* Macartney, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

† The Diaries of Lord D'Abernon, Vol. II, p. 239 (Aug. 20, 1923).

foundation of balanced strengths. But it is today only too clear that the mistake lay in strengthening the Prussian of Berlin without also the South German of Vienna. The counterweight to a victorious France should have been found rather in a federation of the peoples of the Dual Monarchy on the lines advocated by General Smuts. Berlin, however, was chosen for the same reason as we subsidised Frederick the Great and fought with Blücher at Waterloo: the low countries and the mouths of the Scheldt must be secure from danger of domination. What was not appreciated in time, was that modern communications, modern technical achievement, and particularly the development of aerial warfare, had completely changed the position of Britain in Europe, and that the old principles of foreign policy were no longer valid.

The chief weakness of the Dual Monarchy lay in its denial of national identities, and particularly in its suppression of the Slav elements within it. But the realization of Wilson's tenth Point, that "The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development", was not incompatible with the preservation of a unity in central Europe that could have been a sufficient bulwark equally against pan-Germanism and pan-Slavism. The Dual Monarchy had Imperial ministries of war, finance, and foreign affairs, but no Imperial parliament. A similar system might have been devised on a broader basis. Within an economic Zollverein, the Slovaks could have realized the essential ambitions of Kollar, the Hungarians those of Kossuth. The Czechs could have preserved their national identity under Masaryk, whose counsels were always more moderate than those of Benes. And a co-ordinated defence system and Foreign Ministry could have made the path of international politics in the post-war period incalculably easier.

Cecil Chesterton, who was so often remarkably right, uttered during the War a clear warning against allowing the Empire to disintegrate. "If the War leaves the Prussian Empire in being, even though reduced, while

the Austrian Empire is dismembered, Prussia will certainly seek compensation by laying hands, sooner or later, on the German provinces of Austria . . . and might ultimately emerge stronger in resources and more of a menace to European civilization than ever."* In March 1938 his prophecy was exactly fulfilled. In May it became clear—if it was not clear already—that Greater Germany intended to proceed to the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia. It was believed in Berlin that she could overrun the country without armed interference from the West in a short and efficient campaign that would blood the new German army and give it an unchallengeable command in central Europe. It is evident that then was the time for a reconsideration of the whole position of Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary, and of the wisdom of the post-war settlement. Bohemia, with a German frontier on three sides, was in obvious danger of isolation from the rest of the Republic. Hungary was pressing for a revision of the crushing terms of the Treaty of Trianon. In the interests of justice and national rights, as well as in the larger interests of European security, there was a clear case for the citation of the neglected Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which provides for "the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world". But no statesman had the vision to suggest that a plan should be drawn up for the consideration of the League, of which Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia are still members, for the federalization of Magyars, Slovaks, and Ruthenes, together (since no other possibility except subservience to Germany lay open to them) with the Czechs and Moravians. The non-Magyar peoples might have been placed in a relation to the Crown of St. Stephen similar to that of Croatia-Slavonia before the War. Such a plan could have been presented to the rulers of Germany as the price of their occupation of the German areas of Bohemia.

It is very difficult to attempt to estimate what would

* Cecil Chesterton : *The Jewels of Peace*, pp. 236-37.

have been the reactions of the peoples concerned to such a proposal. It may be assumed that nothing but approval would have been encountered in Hungary; and it is probably a safe generalization to say that it would have been acceptable to the greater part of authentic opinion, as distinct from the voice of those working for larger political or strategic ends under cover of local racial enthusiasms, among the Slovaks and Ruthenes. National feeling among both these peoples has increased considerably since the War, but still remains slight in the wild and primitive district of Ruthenia. There are at least as many Ruthenians in the United States as in Ruthenia, and it is among them that patriotic sentiment is really strong. It was in Philadelphia that they agreed to throw in their lot with Masaryk and his new Republic; it was at Scranton, Pa., that their National Council adopted a resolution in favour of union with the Czech-Slovak State. It is therefore significant that the Ruthenians of America should have sent a telegram to Dr. Imrédy, the Prime Minister of Hungary, on 19 October last, after the breakdown of the Komarom conference, to express the hope that their fatherland would be incorporated, with due provisions for autonomy, under the Hungarian Crown. Allegedly spontaneous manifestations of that kind in Ruthenia itself must always be suspect; coming from America at a time when public opinion there was running very strongly in favour of the Prague Government, the telegram probably fairly represented the feelings of the Ruthenian people. Dr. Brody, the Ruthenian autonomous leader who resigned on 26 October, was probably a genuine spokesman of his people. He was compelled to resign because the Government at Prague, by this time orientated towards Germany, was determined to preserve its Rumanian frontier, and he had declared that he would rather that Ruthenia was united and autonomous under the Crown of St. Stephen than divided for the sake of keeping some at least within the Czecho-Slovak structure. He was arrested in Prague next day and tried for high treason, and a week later the Vienna Award left Ruthenia no more than a crippled strip, deprived of its only railway and its only towns of

importance ; a German corridor and a rallying point for disaffection in south Poland, presumably enjoying a British guarantee.

In Slovakia there has been a separatist party advocating reunion with Hungary ever since the inception of the Czecho-Slovak Republic ; but how far its separatism has simply been a weapon for extorting concessions it is impossible to say. Fr. Hlinka was originally a pan-Slav and himself consistently repudiated any separatist ambitions ; but among his associates have been many avowed *Magyarones*, such as Fr. Jehlicka, and many more, such as Dr. Tuka, who has been in prison since 1929, who have done everything short of actually declaring in favour of the return to Hungary. Since the Anschluss, and more than ever since the Henleinist agitation assumed serious proportions, the numbers of those Slovaks in favour of such a policy have steadily increased. But the vigorous propaganda of the political parties so obscures the genuine voice of public opinion that it is impossible to assess how great a fraction of the population men like Fr. Jehlicka really represent. If concrete proposals for the federalization of the people of Czecho-Slovakia under the Hungarian Crown had been drawn up, however, there can be little doubt that a plebiscite taken during the summer of 1938 would have resulted in their acceptance by the Slovaks. Sooner or later the Czechs would have become reconciled to acceptance also as the only possible course.

The details of such a project cannot be discussed here : it is intended only to indicate in the broadest terms the strength of the case in its favour. The difficulties with which it would have been faced cannot be minimized ; nor can the international complications which such a suggestion would certainly have aroused. There would have been immediate anger and apprehension in Rumania and Yugo-Slavia, but, subject perhaps to one or two minor frontier adjustments in favour of the Hungarian minorities, their integrity would have provided a more worthy subject of international guarantee than the pathetic and incoherent remains of Czecho-Slovakia ; a guarantee which would have been extended to safeguard

the Slav elements in the federation from Magyar domination. Opposition would have been loudest from Germany, but occupation of the Sudeten areas would have been made conditional upon its withdrawal. The German objection that their trade *Drang nach Sudosten* would be obstructed would not have been difficult to meet. There is at present in the Balkan Entente considerable apprehension that German economic penetration (which is necessary both to it and to Germany) will be followed by political influence; the abrupt suspension by Rumania of her trade talks with Germany, which happened on 15 November, while King Carol was in London, was symptomatic. All the Balkan countries could make commercial arrangements with the Reich with much more confidence if there was an effective central European bulwark against political penetration. To that extent the project would have favoured Germany economically.

Speculation of this kind about opportunities for European settlement that have passed without notice can perhaps have only an academic interest; but it is at least instructive to consider them, and to contrast the actual course of events. At Munich the German demands for the Sudeten areas were accepted in principle, and the independence of any government conducted from Prague then became impossible. The Hungarians were agitating for the cession to them of what they regarded as predominantly Magyar areas in the rest of Czecho-Slovakia. The Poles, with strong Italian support, urged the absorption of the whole of Ruthenia by Hungary, in order to create a common Polish-Hungarian frontier. The Germans opposed this, desiring to keep open a road from Prague to Rumania and the Ukraine, and desiring also to have a base from which a strong but submerged current of Ukrainian nationalism might later be stimulated. Herr von Ribbentrop visited Rome; the German policy prevailed; and the Vienna Award was made. Four facts deserve emphasis. First, that the well-being of the masses of people concerned was considered only secondarily in the Award. Second, that the resultant position of the Republic of Czecho-Slovakia leaves her

as no more than a German sphere of influence, a German stronghold reaching into the heart of Eastern Europe. Third, that Great Britain and France are pledged to maintain her as such. Fourth, that Poland, Italy, and Hungary were defeated in the attempt, in which they did not receive British or French support, to avert this situation. The proceedings in the Belvedere Palace were scarcely more than a formality; the matter was settled, as *The Times* later remarked, when Herr von Ribbentrop went to Rome on 27 October.

Colonel Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister, has long been working to bring into existence a "neutral bloc" in eastern Europe, to consist of Poland, Hungary, and Rumania. To this end he visited Bucarest on 19 October, in an attempt to gain Rumanian support for the idea of a common frontier on the Carpathians between his country and Hungary. His visit met with no success; Rumania, a member of the Little Entente, and including within her frontiers over a million Magyars of Transylvania, feared the possible consequences of restoring too much to Hungary. It was a sadly short-sighted apprehension. If Colonel Beck had been backed by a full measure of British and French diplomatic support, and had achieved his purpose, a great step towards stability in Europe would have been taken. The granting to the Reich of what Herr Hitler insists is "the last territorial demand" she has to make would have been coincident with a substantial check to Nazi hegemony. And Hungary would have been entrusted again with the historic purpose of the masters of the Danubian Plain. Where for centuries she held back the Turk from Europe, would she have defended Europe from the disruptive influences for which Czecho-Slovakia has since the War been a channel. Poland holds the northern sector in the East; Hungary could have held the southern.

The Vienna Award represents no more than an uneasy compromise, made when a great opportunity for real settlement presented itself. It was little more than a trial of strength in the artificial partnership of the Berlin-Rome axis. It cannot last. It is safe to prophesy that a generation from now its terms will have been forgotten.

The minorities problem has not been solved; it has merely been altered. 100,000 Slovaks and 90,000 Ruthenes have been brought within the frontiers of Hungary, which now has a Slav minority of nearly ten per cent of her population, and have no particular prospect of being allowed to regulate their own affairs. The Slavs within the circle of the Carpathians can never, while they are divided between Buda-Pest and Prague, achieve any sort of unity or autonomy. If the Hungarian frontier, as distinct from the Magyar frontier, had been taken right up to the Carpathians, to include all the Slovaks and all the Ruthenes, the satisfaction of their legitimate national aspirations would have been relatively easy to achieve, on the lines that have been indicated. As things are, all that can be expected is Slav agitation on a serious scale. It may be expected to begin with the stimulation of Ukrainian nationalism by the Reich. If the Munich Agreement paved the way for peace between the four great powers of the West, the Vienna Award left a situation in Eastern Europe that must either be changed or produce a major threat to peace: and that probably within the coming year.

MICHAEL DERRICK.

(1st December, 1938)

CHRISTIAN MORALS AND THE MEANS TEST

THE problem of Unemployment is in its essential analysis a simple one. The unemployed are those men and women whom Society under the present method of disposing over the means cannot feed and provide with the necessities of life. Such men in a modern community are of course not actually allowed to perish of hunger and cold. The community, with some difficulty, taxes itself just sufficiently to keep these alive, and thus shows that it has in some small measure been inforced by the Christian ethic. Apart from the claims of the Christian morals there is no particular reason why, at any rate, a considerable proportion of the unemployed should not be exterminated. Their existence is not conceived of as serving any useful purpose. The argument that they are useful as consumers may appeal to a minority of economic amateurs, but it is of course nonsense. For the act of consumption has never made any community richer. Only production creates wealth. The fact that a belief to the contrary could gain any currency merely proves that the world in which we live is going mad.

Another minority may argue, and argue rightly, that the annihilation of a million or so of their redundant fellow citizens might intensify the disastrous effects already produced by a declining birth rate. But comparatively few people reason this way just at present. Most people acquiesce in the maintenance of the unemployed because they recognize their rights and value as human beings, and niggardly as the contribution may be, these are the grounds on which it is made. So much must be accounted for righteousness.

Now I said just now that the unemployed are those men and women whom, with the present method of disposal over means the community cannot feed, and the question naturally arises whether we are not in duty bound to make a different disposal over means. Let us, however, first get a clearer notion of the way in which

faulty disposal of the means brings about unemployment. In the first place it would probably be more accurate to speak of a faulty use of *savings*. This arises because the principle governing their application is not the production of exchangeable commodities as an end in itself, but gain, or, to be more accurate, gain in exchange; for it is in this sense that I shall employ the word gain throughout this article.* That principle will act increasingly as ownership of the means of production becomes divorced from the labour that is applied to them.

If I have a sum of money to apply to enterprise, I can use it in one of several ways. I can use it to produce some form of value which the community lacks and cannot obtain by ordinary credit facilities. I shall thus help widen the circle of exchange. But if I am actuated by the stimulus of gain I shall probably not do this at all. If I am already interested and powerful in some particular line of business, I shall use it to drive out competitors who are already producing some established form of value, and the result will be that little or nothing is added to the community's stock of wealth, my own addition to it, such as it is, being largely offset by the bankruptcies it has caused. Again, I can use that sum of money to produce some new form of value, which replaces older forms, and can thus further increase the competition for the consumers' last shilling. In such an undertaking, I will, if I can command sufficient cash, be powerfully assisted by the huge apparatus of modern advertising and by the various forms of disguised publicity, and the general judgement on such a process today would still be that it is socially useful and economically sound.

* It is significant of our extraordinary muddleheadedness in regard to the fundamentals of economics that the words "profit" and "gain" can be used to denote two radically different things. They are used to denote what is really a reward or payment for services rendered, or, alternatively, a payment against which there is offered no commensurate productive return. This latter can, in every case, be analysed into a "gain in exchange" whether the exchange is immediate or, as in the case of a long-term investment, spread over a number of years. The essence of all such transactions is that the sum disbursed is less than the total ultimately received in return, and no productive effort is put forth that would justify the increment. The incentive of gain in exchange is not in itself immoral, nor can it be held that a reward for the mere use of capital is itself intrinsically unjust.

The premises from which such a judgement derives are worth examining. It is assumed in the first place that the consumers' judgement is free. He is conceived as weighing up carefully each act of choice, and deciding (after hours of prayer and meditation) that, say, the purchase of a radiogram on the instalment principle is worth the surrender of six mutton chops a week. Since, therefore, the radiogram, which has cost me much less money than I exact from the purchaser, is assumed to be the equivalent of x mutton chops, I am held to have created out of nothing the excess of x mutton chops over my costs.

There are, I need hardly point out, two grave fallacies here. First of all the idea that the consumer's judgement is free is an illusion. The notion that his readiness to surrender six mutton chops per week for a radiogram proves that he is getting a genuine equivalent is absurd. All that it proves is that the modern propertiless wage earner, who has no organic place in the community and has now come to regard his hand-to-mouth existence as normal, is singularly ready to part with the little money that he has. But the real flaw in the argument is that those x mutton chops, or their monetary equivalent, which have now become my property, will not be handed on by me to anybody else, unless I have another fit of "business vision", and can see the opportunity of engaging in some further enterprise that will yield me some new increment over costs. If I cannot do this (and I certainly cannot go on doing it indefinitely) the surrender of the mutton chops will not make the community richer. It will merely make some butcher bankrupt, and it will be the bankruptcy of that butcher that really pays for my gains.

The idea that the remunerativeness of any enterprise is in any sense the measure of its utility is therefore an illusion, and to permit capital to be guided wholly by considerations of remunerativeness under the influence of that illusion is to carry black superstition into the realms of statesmanship. The community's needs and the direction of the flow of capital under the stimulus of gain are by no means coincident with one another. They

are indeed all too often antagonistic. Capital flows into cinemas, chain stores, and patent medicine ventures because there is "money" in these things. Meanwhile, agriculture is denuded because capital cannot expect from that source a "reasonable return". Since the more capital is maldistributed, the more it will make pure gain the condition of its employment, the result is obvious. Maldistributed capital ceases to be an instrument for increasing and maintaining our common fund of real wealth, and with it our possibilities of employment, and becomes more and more of a "raiding machine" to exact revenues for absentee owners. The dynamic of the system is then largely the drive of a relatively small number of concerns towards complete monopoly and capital resources which should be used for the increment of necessary wealth and consequent employment expansion are applied to processes which neither achieve that end nor indeed profess to achieve it. The effects of such a system are obvious to the most casual observer. Agriculture, the key industry which must provide the raw material in the shape of food for every kind of work there is, is starved, as I have pointed out, because "there is no money in it". Yet many agriculturists could increase production if they had capital free and unencumbered by usury (which, while a minority holds a stranglehold on capital, is like saying "if they possessed the moon"), and an even greater number who now do not produce at all could start producing if they could be assured of a stable and more remunerative price level.*

But here again it is the maldistribution of capital wealth that impedes this desirable consummation. For urbanization, maldistribution, and monopoly all hang together. Monopoly thrives on the cities, and their easily controllable markets, and the cities in their turn

* The idea that the world as a whole has ever suffered from "over-production", and that our economic evils are due to a mere shortage of instruments of credit by which that over-production could be implemented, is not held by any reputable economist (which does not mean that credit is never needlessly short). Over-production sometimes occurs in specific products, whose producers then fail to recover their costs. In other words, production gets "out of step" at isolated points. It is also true that in many products that there are great possibilities of expanding production. But it is not true that if such production were expanded producers could go on recovering their costs.

are based on cheap food. Such a system will obviously allow only the more favourably placed among primary producers to produce at all. When, as in 1937, prices of food and other primary products show a tendency to rise and thus enable the less favourably situated producers to function, the whole structure collapses. The whole system is thus geared down to constant under-production of primary wealth and has its huge permanent fringe of poverty. It will only yield a semblance of sustenance to those who are fortunate enough to find a place within the profit-earning machine. The whole process has a fitting commentary in the far too little quoted passage in *Quadragesimo Anno*. I will quote the whole passage in full :

Another point, however, of no less importance must not be overlooked, in these our days especially, namely that opportunities for work be provided for those who are willing and able to work. This depends in large measure upon the scale of wages, which multiplies opportunities for work as long as it remains within proper limits, and reduces them if allowed to pass these limits. All are aware that a scale of wages too low, no less than a scale excessively high, causes unemployment. Now unemployment, particularly if widespread and of long duration, as we have been forced to experience it during Our Pontificate, is a dreadful scourge ; it causes misery and temptation to the labourer, ruins the prosperity of nations, and endangers public order, peace and tranquillity the world over. To lower or raise wages unduly, with a view to private profit, and with no consideration for the common good, is contrary to social justice, which demands that by union of effort and goodwill such a scale of wages be set up, if possible, as to offer to the greatest number opportunities of employment and of securing for themselves suitable means of livelihood.

A reasonable relationship between different wages here enters into consideration. *Intimately connected with this is a reasonable relationship between the prices obtained for the products of the various economic groups : agrarian, industrial, etc. Where this harmonious proportion is kept, man's various economic activities combine and unite into one single organism and become members of a common body, lending each other mutual help and service.*

But the present system, so far from achieving a correct relation between prices, is actually based on an incorrect

relation, depends on the maintenance of that incorrect relation, and destroys itself when that relation is corrected. We must, however, above all recognize that the present economic order is governed by an operating principle which is radically faulty. It is the rule to which I have really already made allusion, the rule that funds shall not be employed unless such employment can produce for their owner a series of payments against which the recipient gives no further productive return and which are greater in their totality than the actual sum invested. Such payments as I have already pointed out are, for the most part, offset by the abstinence or loss of *somebody*, and since no community has the power to sustain losses indefinitely, or enforce abstinence beyond a certain point, there is naturally a limit to the succession of gain. There is clearly a limit to the amount of revenue that can be drawn when the recipients are not expected to give an equivalent in productive work. Unfortunately, the expectation of such revenue is in every cycle cumulative. A proportion of the community's income is saved every year, and the holders of such savings refuse to apply them unless there is a prospect of gain. Since in every year the expectation of revenue from new savings is added to that from savings already invested, we have an increasing expectation of revenue proceeding concurrently with diminishing possibilities of supply, and thus work always to a point where the sheer logic of facts must lead us to periodic collapse. We are operating a system which not only does not work but can no more be expected to work than a steam engine with a pentagonal driving wheel. The mechanism is inherently faulty.

I do not think that any of the above views are particularly controversial, or that any economist would seriously dispute them. We have to ask ourselves how far the power of the human will, acting in accordance with justice, can correct such things. It must be clear that the moral issue on which the matter turns is the nature of ownership. In the first place, is it permissible for funds or real capital to remain idle simply because there is no prospect of absentee gain from the employ-

ment of such funds or such capital? Here again let us be careful of over-simplifying the issue. The preservation of a certain minimum of liquid reserves is a social necessity, and a refusal to allow funds to be employed unless such employment can secure a return of costs is a legitimate safeguard against bankruptcy. To some extent the insistence on profit ensures this. To insist that funds shall only be used when a return that is greater than cost can be expected, at least makes it probable that returns will rarely be less than costs. Even, however, when this is taken into account, a survey of the national income, to say nothing of ordinary observation, shows clearly that too many people are holding the community up to ransom, that there are too many people riding on the producers' back who are either giving no return whatever for the revenues they exact, or who are exacting revenues and often excessive revenues for what are purely notional services.

The factors therefore which determine the essential character of the fluid economy of capitalism can, in their present manifestation, hardly be held to justify themselves. The law of profits and the great overshadowing fact of social insecurity stand in the relation of cause and effect, and the slight advantages deriving from making profitability the prime determinant in our affairs are heavily outweighed by the havoc so caused. We have further to take into account that the fluid character of our economy is not merely the *result* of the profits principle, but that it is the medium through which a not inconsiderable proportion of profits are made. Fortunes are made (perhaps indeed the majority of modern fortunes now have such an origin) by the seizure of transient opportunities. Not only does the fluctuating price level create such opportunities, but the state of chronic under-employment with which it is bound up is essential to their successful exploitation. The entrepreneur cannot operate unless he can be assured of speedy and cheap supply. He needs a buyers' market as regards his supplies both of capital and labour. A flexible labour reserve and access to plentiful supplies of liquid funds are the essential conditions of his trade.

Christian Morals and the Means Test 65

He must have both labour and money in waiting subservience to do what he bids and when he bids it. If he is to thrive, therefore, a stable organic rhythm is unattainable, for he lives by its non-attainment. This is the essence of the modern dynamic economy.

To say that such conditions are irremediable is absurd. Our ability to remedy them depends on our willingness to make and suffer inroads on individual rights of property and gain. If we were willing to make the necessary inroads we could abolish unemployment within a year. But the fact is that under the present order such measures, involving as they would, a regrouping and reorganization of national life, and involving, above all, real and perhaps appalling tangible sacrifice, given and exacted, are simply not to be thought of. Unemployment is not cured because we are not sufficiently concerned about it to cure it. We are sufficiently concerned about it to display a certain journalistic lachrymosity and shake our heads, but we tolerate and acquiesce in a political and economic order under which it is inevitable. If our desire to cure it were, as it should be, a burning passion, all obstacles to a cure would simply be swept aside. In a word, the failure to cure unemployment results from a disease or weakness of our collective will.*

Now if this is true, what is our position in morals? Are we accessories to the denial of a right? Is there besides a right to mere animal sustenance, also a right to function? Does not such a right arise from the very nature of a man as it was created by God? Is not such a right therefore a debt against all of us? If therefore we continue collectively to employ our assets for gain in such a manner as to leave this debt permanently undischarged, are we not all accessories to an act of fraudulent bankruptcy? If this conclusion is correct, certain interesting consequences arise in relation to a measure which was some time ago a subject of acute controversy,

* The authoritarian states have, in point of fact, destroyed the cyclic phenomena of unemployment, and are correcting the distorted relation between town and country by precisely such an invasion. Hitler takes 40 per cent. of all company profits, and makes the dividend recipient pay income tax in addition. If my contention is correct that most company profits are simply a tax on the community, then Hitler's action is simply a refunding of that tax, and this would appear to be morally justified.

and which is still the cause of undiminished embitterment among the poor. This measure is popularly known as the Means Test.

The essence of this is, as the reader doubtless knows, the condition that an unemployed man whose statutory benefit is exhausted shall, before further benefit is granted, prove that he is destitute or within a certain determined margin of destitution, and that his relatives have not the means of supporting him. Now if the sole moral ground on which such assistance is claimed is nothing but a right to support bare life, then the provision is clearly just, at any rate in so far as it merely touches the man himself. The obligation placed by law on the relatives is a different matter. As far as the man himself is concerned it is quite obvious that if we are concerned with nothing more than a bare claim to subsistence, then, while the means of sustaining life remain, the destitute has no claim to public relief.

But what if the right is a wider one? What if there is such a thing as a right to a living, a right to function to partake in the production of necessities and to receive necessities in return? What if our unemployed man is unable to exercise that right through the definite fault of another or, as in this case I claim, through the collective fault of all us? Does not the character of such a man then immediately change? Does he not thereupon become a *damaged party*, and is he not on those grounds entitled to redress? Such of course was not the view of the legislators who introduced this series of measures, but it is nevertheless perfectly lawful, if my general supposition is correct, for the recipients to regard these relief payments as liquidating a part of that debt. This money, they may say, is owing to us not because we are starving, but because we have been unjustly deprived of our livelihood. Now if that claim is valid, it is in no way conditioned by the private reserve which any particular individual has been able to make, nor (and this is even more important) has the fact that the receipt of such payments would have a deteriorating effect on the character of the recipient any bearing on the matter.

If a debt is due in equity it has got to be paid and the

effect of such payment on the creditor is irrelevant. If I run over a man in a motor and incapacitate him from making further provision for his family, I have got to pay. And if a man were, like the gentleman in Mr. Belloc's poem, the victim of a series of such accidents and

The damages that he obtained from these
Maintained him all his life in cultured ease

or were at any rate sufficient so to maintain him, it would be quite useless for me to point out that the gentleman in question had not acquired the requisite degree of culture to employ his ease with the discretion, that he might use his new effortless affluence to indulge in dram drinking or proving that Bacon wrote Shakespeare or in some other hideous and degrading pursuit; I should be roundly told that that was none of my business, nor would it get me off one halfpenny of my debt. It is necessary to stress this point because the Means Test is continually being defended on the ground that its abandonment might have a demoralizing effect. To receive money without having to work for it would, we are told, destroy the moral fibre of the working class (though holders of debentures and gilt-edged securities are always treated as being immune from this strange pathological misadventure). The argument is probably quite sound as far as it goes, but if my main contention is correct, it is irrelevant.

Arguments of this sort unfortunately help to obscure an even more iniquitous characteristic of this piece of legislation, and it is not irrelevant here to point out that this legislation was itself introduced during the critical months of the last depression. Now it is clear that during a depression the first task of authority is to keep a certain minimum of money in circulation. For this somebody has got to be mulcted. Somebody's income or somebody's accumulation has got to be attacked. In the judgement that he generally makes that capital should not be dissipated (which is a different thing from redistributing it) the statesman is undoubtedly right. He must thus attack income, and he

should clearly attack the income of the unproductive, or of those whose incomes are from the point of view of the common good incommensurate with their productivity.

Such a course would be logical enough. The immediate occasion of the slump is the judgement that the community is "living beyond its means". The phrase has incurred undeserved censure of late, but it expresses the essential truth well enough, namely, that the community is carrying on its life on an uneconomic basis, above all that it is carrying too many people who are either producing nothing or producing goods and services which are unessential to our collective needs. It must, therefore, be the statesman's aim to bring about a readjustment that will increase the supply of necessities (at the price of luxuries) which can be exchanged against one another. His ultimate aim must be a more balanced type of capital distribution. But his immediate aim is to keep the destitute from starving, and justice clearly demands that those whose revenues are in any way parasitical should pay the price to the very utmost of their ability.

Unfortunately this is a conclusion that he shirks. He fails to make the requisite attack on income and, instead, he attacks capital. Since, however, he dare not attack the accumulation of the well-to-do, he attacks and dissipates the accumulations of the poor. He thus works to preserve that stranglehold of a minority on the means of production to which allusion has already been made, and sees that the essential grouping of capitalism—a fluid labour market held in waiting subservience to a minority holding, or having access to, the bulk of the liquid funds, is carefully perpetuated.

The Means Test breaks down the reserves of the poor. It thus asserts that the situation which it helps to recreate is normal situation, and that its recreation is more important than the safeguarding of almost any other human right. The essential capitalist principle, the sanctification of gain at the expense of right order, asserts itself through this measure in yet another way, and that a very insidious and, I may add, a thoroughly

hypocritical one. It is hypocritical because it professes to appeal to a principle that is in itself perfectly sound, the principle of family solidarity and the undoubted duty that sometimes arises for children to maintain their parents. The trap about the whole thing is this, that the existence of this particular duty does not in the least exempt other people from their obligations towards that particular parent.

If I owe a bill to my grocer and he summons for payment before the county court, a plea on my part that the payment of this bill would relieve the grocer's children of their natural obligations and that I would thus be undermining the principle of family solidarity, might provoke laughter but would certainly lose me my case. Yet the trick is worked time and again in the sphere of political controversy and seems in particular to deceive those who work professionally among the poor. I cannot imagine why. But I do know this for a fact: these men and women will in all good faith whip themselves into a fury about some little girl who complains of having to hand over to her father the few shillings she wants to spend on clothes; yet they have nothing to say about the people who have stolen her father's income.

For the real truth of the matter is simply this: that many people have found it more profitable to let their capital employ women making and selling things for women to buy. This is at present the expanding market in which costs are low and returns so very gratifying. It therefore pays to short-circuit the natural breadwinner and pass the money through the hands of his daughter. Even if you insist on the daughter handing over enough to her parent to prevent him from physically starving and freezing to death, there still remains a sufficient residual income for you to net back a substantial portion into profits—and that is all the talk on family solidarity amounts to. It is perhaps the biggest piece of humbug that has been perpetrated within our generation.

The Means Test implies the definite acceptance and affirmation of the principles by which the trade cycle

is made possible. It finally affirms the proposition that the power to exact tribute shall be the supreme and only condition governing the employment of capital and that the exaction of this tribute is the supreme end of our collective economic effort. That this view should persist as a guiding principle of policy places the democracies in a position of moral inferiority to other countries in at least one very important particular.*

J. L. BENVENISTI.

* Throughout this article I have paid little attention to the use of capital as an instrument for bringing about economies of process. There is a superstition abroad that this is the normal object of employing capital. But such uses of capital are today very rare, as a glance at the issue market will quickly reveal. If every time £1000 was invested some form of cheapening were to result, profits could of course expand indefinitely. But such pleasant results only take place in the land of make-believe.

ANARCHISM—COMMUNISM— CHRISTIANITY

1. *Michael Bakunin*, by E. H. Carr. (Macmillan, pp. x, 501, 25s.)
2. *Lenin*, by Christopher Hollis. (Longmans, pp. 285, 10s. 6d.)

IN *Russia's Work in France*, a book replete with valuable information, Mr. Reginald Dingle rightly says that "France represents the last hope of the Communist International. It must fight there or go down without a struggle." Having made an extensive study of Comintern methods and activities, this writer does not exclude the possibility that France may become a "second Spain". Perhaps in this he is mistaken, for, both as an ideology and as a political force which but a short time ago threatened the very existence of Christian civilization, Communism is on the wane. It may yet flare up in one or another country, may still achieve certain political successes, but no longer can it exercise any lasting influence on the destiny of man. Its untruth has been exposed, and its application to practical life, carried out to its logical conclusions, has shown it to be utterly unworkable, in spite of the strenuous efforts made to preserve Communism from any "heresy" and the ruthless eradication of all avowed or only suspected enemies.

But whilst Communism is everywhere losing ground, its passage will have left indelible traces upon mankind as an inevitable stage in its development, needed to open the eyes and minds of men to a higher truth. Communism (and Socialism, which differs from it only by its lack of courage to carry out its theories to their ultimate conclusions) has attempted to solve the problem of human society and of man as its member. It is an attempt to destroy human personality by transforming man into a being possessing value only in so far as he is a member of a collective body. This attempt is being carried out with a ruthless intensity that will live in the memory of future generations. The advent of Communism was inevitable, because the world had reached a stage when further development on the old lines was

impossible. A reviewer of Dr. Maynard-Smith's book on *Pre-Reformation England* said that "England (and this should refer also to Europe as a whole) lost at the Reformation—at, and not by it only—two high qualities of life so great that they are imperishable, but so rare that, once lost, it takes ages to recapture them. The one was a certain integrity of life as a rounded whole. And the other . . . might be called Fraternity." Indeed, at the Renaissance and the Reformation, as in subsequent centuries, the world lost its organic unity in the multiplicity and diversity of its members, its *oneness*, all the elements which welded together mediaeval society into one living body. The ensuing era of unrestricted individualism, which led to the capitalist system of the nineteenth century and the orgy of extreme nationalism culminating in the catastrophe of 1914, was the result of the rejection of the principles upon which the unity of the mediaeval world had been built.

Since Russia had to a great extent preserved this consciousness of the unity of mankind, it was natural that Russians transplanted into Western Europe would be quick to sense the disintegration of human society. Two names stand out among these Russians, those of Michael Bakunin and Vladimir Ulianov (Lenin), because of their efforts of "integration", and they must take place next to another "Oriental", the Jew Karl Marx, in whom Western individualism could not obliterate the traditional Jewish Messianism, though in his vision it is not the Jews but the proletariat which became the chosen race. It is a moot point whether Bakunin and Lenin, had they remained in Russia, would ever have become apostles of the two great revolutionary ideologies—Anarchism and Socialism. In a country where a spirit of rebellion was inherent to the people they might have headed revolts, but without having encountered the contradictions of the Western world they would scarcely have been able to embody their thoughts into a whole system. For, despite the rebellious temperament of her people, Russia as a whole had preserved her organic structure from the Middle Ages well into the eighteenth and even nineteenth centuries. Classes were segregated

in conformity with their *service* to the State: this was particularly the case of the *dvoriane* (gentry), with whom, as Professor Kluchevsky points out, personal ownership of landed estates became a corporate privilege solely of the class of state servitors, even as military service was assigned to it as its special corporate obligation. The peasants had at the same time the duty of personal service on the land of squires, whose bondsmen or serfs they gradually became. Peter the Great had a lofty conception of the duties of each citizen from himself downwards; to quote again Professor Kluchevsky: "He realized that a State should make its first and foremost aim the weal of that State's contained population, not a dynastic interest, and that the means to that end lay in legality, in assured preservation of rights, civil and political, and in recognition of the fact that the Sovereign's authority was not the Sovereign's private, hereditary asset, but an obligation to perform his duties as Tsar, and to shape his policy so that the Empire should be served thereby, and the Empire alone."

A severe blow to this ideal was dealt by his grandson, Peter III, whose Ukaz of 18th February, 1762, abolished compulsory service for noblemen. The whole conception of privileges based upon obligations for the common weal was undermined, yet it needed another century and the growth of industrial capitalism to rid Russia of the old structure of her organic unity. It is easy to trace in the legislation of Catherine II and her successors the same conception of a hierarchical structure of society, whereby each class was considered an homogeneous entity responsible for the welfare of its members and for their obligations to the State. Even after the liberation of the serfs in 1861 and until the twentieth century the Russian rural community was maintained by law as a self-governing entity, and, whilst its dependence upon the squire had ended, popular imagination still believed in their unbroken unity. A traditional sentence Russian peasants were wont to address to their squires, "We are yours, you are ours", expressed their idea of mutual service. It was only when the people felt that the gentry and the higher authorities neglected their

obligations towards them that they rose in revolt and gave way to that anarchist instinct of destruction which is dormant in almost every Russian. There is a strange duality in the Russian character—an inborn sense of equity, a sincere desire that the social order be grounded in justice, and simultaneously a spirit of rebellion which passes throughout the whole of Russia's troubled history. Maybe the contradiction would not appear so great if we remembered that these risings mostly had, or aspired to assume, a mass, a "world" (*mir*), character.

Michael Bakunin, of whom Professor Carr has given us a brilliant biography, was both rebel and dreamer of a new social order. But he was mainly a rebel, and this biography conveys the impression that he was only a turbulent revolutionary, a demagogue. Were it so, could he have engendered, so to say, contemporary Anarchism? Bakunin was born in an old noble family; he seems to have been a mutineer by nature who from boyhood was always inciting younger brothers and sisters to rebellion against parental authority. Later he invariably got himself mixed up in every revolutionary outbreak and conspiracy which occurred in Europe between 1848 and 1871. As his biographer puts it: "A sure instinct drew Michael Bakunin to the scene of prospective maximum disturbance." He made his *début* on the Paris barricades in 1848, and these were the happiest days of his life: "Bakunin . . . was on his feet from four or five o'clock one morning till two o'clock the next; and life was one constant round of assemblies, meetings, clubs, processions, marches and demonstrations. He preached destruction so long as there was anything left to destroy. He preached rebellion—even when there was nothing left to rebel against. He was less interested in the constructive work of building up the new order." In March he was already rushing through Germany to fan the flames of revolution in Eastern Europe. He hoped for a rising in Poland which would be the signal for a revolution in Russia against the oppressive régime of Nicholas I. Expelled from Berlin, Bakunin settled in Breslau, whence he went to Prague to attend a Pan-Slav Congress which, to his intense delight, ended in an

insurrection. He was then a Pan-Slavist, and dreamt of the disruption of the Austrian Empire and ensuing emancipation of all Slav minorities, which would be welded into a free Slav Federation. Already in Paris he had made his famous speech, calling the Poles to fight at the side of Russians for the freedom of their respective countries. When the Poles cold-shouldered his appeal Bakunin focused his hopes upon the Czechs, whom he believed to be enemies of the hated Germans and democrats like himself. Deception followed soon enough. True, the Slavs loathed Germans, but above all others they hated German democrats who were also Pan-Germans, and this to such a degree that they preferred the Habsburgs to suppress the insurrections of German and Hungarian democrats. This shattered Bakunin's dreams: Slav nationalism appeared as the ally of the forces of reaction; loyal Slav troops, cheered on by the Czech bourgeoisie, marched under Windischgraetz against Czech workers. Then Croat forces under Radetzky strangled Italian democracy, and Jellacic, the Croat leader, helped Windischgraetz to suppress a rising in Vienna.

Bakunin reacted to this deception by an *Appeal to the Slavs*. In it, whilst insisting on the disintegration of the Austrian Empire and consequent liberation of the Slavs, he no longer viewed the bourgeoisie as a revolutionary factor. His hopes now centred upon the workers, and even more so upon the peasants, especially in Russia. His mind now developed along anarchist lines: "We must overthrow," he wrote, "the material and moral conditions of our present-day life. We must overthrow from top to bottom this effete social world, which has become impotent and sterile, and could not support or sustain so great a mass of freedom. We must first purify our atmosphere and transform completely the *milieu* in which we live, for it corrupts our instincts and our wills, and contracts our heart and our intelligence. The social question takes the form primarily of the overthrow of society." This *Appeal* seemed too drastic for the German democrats, and its German translation was published in a censored form, the social

aspect being scarcely mentioned. We must note here that Bakunin had an entirely wrong conception of the peasantry, especially the Russian peasants. He viewed them through the eyes of Baron Haxthausen, a mystically minded German traveller who had visited Russia in the early 'forties and written a book which misled both progressives, like Bakunin, and conservatives of the *Slavophil* type. Influenced by Haxthausen, Bakunin perceived in the Russian village community a survival of primitive Communism, whilst the *Slavophiles* imagined it to be based on an equalitarian principle of distributive justice, a mainstay of national life, and of the monarchy. Both were wrong, for, as was demonstrated later, the old Muscovite community was based not on any equalitarian "distributist" principle, but on that of a more productive utilization of the land in the interests of the State.

As to the destruction of the Austrian Empire, Bakunin merely anticipated in 1848 the events of 1918. Marx and Engels especially ridiculed his plan of the creation of two States, one composed of Czechs, Moraves and Slovaks; the other of Southern Slavs together with those of Turkey. Reading today Engels' objections in his article in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, one has to agree that the happenings of this last year proved that national problems could not be solved as simply as Bakunin had imagined.

The melodramatic participation in the Dresden upheaval of May 1849 cut short the first stage of Bakunin's revolutionary career. Arrested in Chemnitz, he was delivered to the Saxon Government, tried and condemned to death; then handed over to the Austrian Government for his participation in the Prague insurrection, condemned to death for a second time and finally turned over to the Russian Government, which had already condemned him in 1844 to hard labour in Siberia. For a term of six years he was incarcerated in the fortresses of St. Petersburg and of Schlusselfburg, then deported to Siberia, where, as usual under the Imperial régime, supervision was so slack that Bakunin absconded in the autumn of 1861.

We shall not follow his revolutionary activities during

this second period, from 1861 to his death in 1876. Professor Carr paints a vivid picture of this peculiar character, ever plotting, conspiring, quarrelling impartially with friends and foes alike; of the absurdity of his schemes and enterprises, the curious inconsistencies of his nature and the chaotic character of his tenets. Most important in this period were Bakunin's relations and subsequent rupture with Marx—a quarrel between anarchists and communists, the sequence of which we have just witnessed among Red factions in Spain. Though Bakunin was enrolled in 1868 as member of the Geneva section of the International, he was always a turbulent member. At the second Congress of the League of Peace and Freedom in Geneva the same year he denied being a communist: declaring himself a collectivist, he advocated the abolition of the State, since every State is naturally evil by the purpose for which it exists—the negation of human justice, freedom and morality. The Church and God Himself were also unacceptable to him because, in his opinion, the very idea of God was tantamount to the abdication of man's reason and liberty. His hatred of Christianity, and especially of the Catholic Church, which he nevertheless considered "the only consistent, legitimate and divine church", was possibly due to the influence of Italian freemasons with whom he came in close contact in Florence in 1864 (though he became a freemason as early as 1845 in Paris). It was during his stay in Florence that he wrote his important essay *God and the State*, in which he rejects every authority, whether of God or of men: "Consequently . . . no external legislation and no authority—one, for that matter, being inseparable from the other, and both tending to the servitude of society and the degradation of the legislators themselves." He acknowledged the authority of specialists in their own specialities, but not as rulers, and pictured an order in which "each directs and is directed in his turn. Therefore there is no fixed and constant authority, but a continual exchange of mutual, temporary, and above all voluntary, authority and subordination". The greatest, or perhaps unique, authority which Bakunin would

accept was the "power of collective sentiment", "the natural and inevitable solidarity which binds men together".

Professor Carr gives a detailed account of the struggle between Marx and Bakunin. Both pursued the same object, but their ways and methods to attain it differed widely. Temperamentally they were antipodes, and their interpretation of Hegel, their common teacher, conflicted. Whilst Marx, together with the younger Hegelians, developed along materialistic lines, Bakunin remained a Hegelian idealist. Mr. Carr, however, may be mistaken when he views Bakunin as an out-and-out individualist. True that he valued freedom above everything, but this freedom, carried to the extreme limit of anarchism, to universal destruction by the irrational elemental forces of a revolutionary mob, belonged to mankind in its totality, not to any individual group. For him *Unity* was "the goal to which mankind moves by necessity", and "Society" the "natural means of existence of men independent of any contract". Practically all Bakunin's writings are not those of an individualist, and Berdyaev is right in saying that "In contrast with Max Stirner, Bakunin's anarchism is anti-individual, collective, communist. Bakunin repudiated personality and its independent worth and autonomy." In spite of his inherent spirit of rebellion Bakunin, like the true Russian he was, deeply felt the unity of mankind and believed in its essential goodness. The only thing which had to be done was to make a clean sweep of everything that stood in the way of man's progress—God, the State, law and every organization, the natural instinct of man sufficing to lead him to perfection.

The views of Marx and his disciple Lenin differed from Bakunin's not as regards the ultimate goal of a classless society and consequent disappearance of the State, but as to the form this society was to assume. Bakunin, the anarchist, visualized a universal community of free men, knowing no law, either human or divine, but Marx and Lenin perceived this perfect society as a well-organized whole, governed for the good of the community. It fell to Lenin to mould on a grand

scale this new society which, developing gradually, would engulf all mankind.

Mr. Christopher Hollis' interesting book sheds some light upon the personality of that remarkable man. The writer's sources being limited, and his knowledge of Russia's political and social background somewhat incomplete, the work is naturally not perfect. But we mention these minor shortcomings only because the biography is so excellent, easily the best and most vivid study of Lenin. Mr. Hollis succeeds in painting a full-size portrait of the man who showed at his best in his relations to his family, a man of modest bourgeois tastes in private life, yet withal the ruthless fanatic of a single idea, the professional revolutionary, the leader bent upon the fulfilment of his plans, whatever the cost. The predominant trait of Mr. Hollis' Lenin is an unswerving loyalty to his ideal; having once accepted Marxist teaching in his youth, he clung to it tenaciously throughout his life. He was not the initiator of the philosophy upon which the system was built, nor did he take any interest in abstract speculations, but, having once defined his conception of the orthodox Marxist doctrine, he jealously guarded it from any heretical deviations towards Mechanism or Idealism. He understood his mission to be the promotion of World Revolution and the establishment of a triumphant Marxism on the ruins of other obsolete systems. There may have been a moment—though Mr. Hollis denies it—when these dreams were uncomfortably near realization!

Lenin is depicted as a shrewd politician, an opportunist when circumstances demanded it, yet a perfervid stickler to his own creed. As politician he readily collaborated with people who did not share his views or who denied him the blind obedience he exacted from his followers. All his relations with Trotzky, whom he both disliked and distrusted, were based on the understanding of Trotzky's genius, which could be utilized. When expedient, he never scrupled to reverse his policy, the outstanding example of such a "tactical retreat" being the proclamation of NEP (New Economic Policy), which was the very negation of Communism. But he argued, and

rightly, that, whilst NEP was a reversion to Capitalism, as long as the government was in communist hands there was no danger of any capitalist domination. However, admitting the necessity of compromise, Lenin ruthlessly maintained the unity and integrity of his own party. Very early he grasped the necessity of banding together a small and "very conspiratorial and solid nucleus of professional revolutionaries". He had in view men and women ready to dedicate themselves to the revolution and to the perfecting of its technique. They had to face privations and live as best they could, and above all they had to be blindly obedient to the chosen absolute ruler. The number of such dedicated revolutionaries was not as important as was their utter trustworthiness. They had to be absolutely devoted and as absolutely orthodox in their Marxian faith, or, to be more correct, in the way Lenin chose to interpret Marx. These were to form the "general staff"; at the other end of the scale were the small fry, the "privates"—people in town and factory willing to join the Party; and in between—a whole hierarchy of intermediate officers, as necessity might demand. Of tactics they should be told as much as might be necessary for the efficient performance of their task—and no more. His rivals, the *Mensheviks*, were prompt to understand that Lenin's creed contained germs of a tyranny in comparison with which all earlier tyrannies would pale. But their criticisms left Lenin undisturbed; liberty was for him but a "bourgeois love"; moreover, industrialism had already killed the love of liberty among the workers: "Thanks to its factory schooling", the proletariat would accept any tyranny. He had a profound contempt for majorities and for elected bodies: when in power he tolerated the election of the Constituent Assembly as a concession to his followers, only to dissolve it immediately it had assembled.

His attitude to the sacredness of human personality was in complete harmony with his general philosophy. When Friedrich Adler made an attempt on the life of Count Sturgk, the Austrian Premier, Lenin condemned this act not because he believed in the sanctity of human life, but merely because such individual terrorist

acts were harmful to the revolutionary cause ; however, terrorist acts are justified "when they are directly linked with the mass-movement". Therefore he was consistent when, after the murders of Uritzky and Volodarsky, he unleashed the Red Terror against all suspected of counter-revolutionary sympathies. The rising of the Kronstadt sailors in March 1921 marked, as Mr. Hollis says, a new phase in Bolshevik history. These men were convinced communists, and all they demanded was free and secret voting for the Party's Central Committee. They were mercilessly butchered for having dared challenge the authority of the rulers. "At Kronstadt they (the Bolsheviks) did not kill those whom they thought class-enemies ; they called class-enemies those whom they wished to kill. The Marxian language was used as a mere rhetoric of abuse of those whom it was convenient to murder. It is a trick that has been played by Stalin in recent years. It is only fair to remember that it was Lenin and Trotzky who taught it to him."

Lenin's attitude to men, his elation at the coming world war with its human hecatombs, is understandable when his atheism is realized. "Lenin was not a free thinker ; he did not profess to be. He was a dogmatic atheist, so fixed in his dogma that he refused even to discuss the question." For Lenin the idea of God and even an inclination to any form of spirituality was anathema, and his biographer, dismayed by this uncompromising fanaticism, is at a loss to explain it. Yet this constitutes the central point in the struggle of Communism against Christianity. It is not enough to say that it is due to Lenin's alleged Mongolian origin or to some vague influences of Russian pseudo-mystical sectarianism. The same hatred of every religion is to be found in Marx and Engels (the latter in nowise an "Oriental"), and it is the corner-stone of the communist system. As Professor Berdyaev points out : "Communism in actual fact is the foe of every form of religion, and especially of Christianity ; not as a social system, but as itself a religion. It wants to be a religion itself, to take the place of Christianity." It is true that both Marx and Lenin saw Christianity subservient to capitalism and

liberalism, but Lenin revolted at the mere thought that Christianity might recover its integrity and that its traditions could be restored: "A Catholic priest who violates young girls is much less dangerous to 'democracy' than a priest who does not wear surplices, priests without vulgar religion, ideological and democratic priests who preach the creating and making of little gods." In its essence true Communism is totalitarian; it embraces mankind, claiming the possession of the entire man; any other system advancing similar claims cannot be tolerated, but must be considered as the enemy *par excellence*. It cannot be denied that some kind of Oriental mysticism influenced the formation of this "religious" aspect of communist ideology—it was the conception of mankind as an entity, the idea that the individual has no other value except as a member of this collectivity. The significance of Marxism was its claim to the creation of this new "collective man". This was to be achieved through organization, and it marked the cleavage between Marxism and Anarchism. Bakunin did not believe in organizing the proletariat, whilst Lenin spent his life working for this object, yet both were inconsistent in the way they put their creed in practice. Whilst believing in complete freedom, Bakunin to the end strove to form a strictly disciplined inner party, almost on the lines of Lenin's "Old Guard", the secret International Brotherhood of which he was to be the autocrat. Lenin, whilst insisting on organization, started in 1917 by letting loose the forces of anarchy: his call to "rob the robbers", his incitement to the peasants to seize all the land, was a tactical manœuvre in direct opposition to Marxism. So was the establishment of the "Committees of the Poor" and the promise that the land would remain the property of the peasants, as well as the temporary return to capitalism in 1921.

Both Bakunin and Lenin laboured, as they imagined, for the ultimate good of future generations; both were collectivists, however widely their conception of collectivity differed. The former visualized it as something loosely piled together with no inward or outward power of cohesion; the latter maintained its unity by rigid

outward forms which, though keeping the parts together, permitted of no development from within. Neither could see mankind as a living organism which has to grow and develop or wither and die. The world has witnessed the outcome of both teachings. Stalin is Lenin's inevitable and logical successor, and the man who succeeds Stalin, if he professes the same creed, will have to follow in his steps, for there will be no other choice. Bakunin's unrestricted freedom has been demonstrated by his disciples in Barcelona, where they are said to have surpassed even the communists in atrocity. Both Communism and Anarchism are out to extirpate man's dignity through the perversion of his nature. As Mr. Hollis says, by "refusing to admit that they were less than God" these men "made themselves in the end less than Man, and became incapable of those little decencies and charities of which even the normal man is capable". Both Communism and Anarchism have been carried to their logical conclusion: having started with the intention to improve mankind, they achieved, to quote Pope Pius XI, "the ruin of intelligence and even of human nature". And yet the Christian solution is simple. Maybe it is because of its very simplicity that these men in their overweening pride disdained it. This solution consists in the recovery of the lost integrity of the Christian world, the realization of mankind as one living body, as an organic whole.

In the Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* the Pope has spoken of this living body, the Church. Having explained that union of hearts and minds may be attained through charity united to justice, he continues:

Yet this union, binding men together, is the main principle of stability in all institutions, no matter how perfect they may seem, which aim at establishing social peace and promoting mutual aid. In its absence, as repeated experience proves, the wisest regulations come to nothing. Then only will it be possible to unite all in harmonious striving for the common good, when all sections of society have the intimate conviction that they are members of a single family and children of the same Heavenly Father, and further, that they are "one body in Christ, and everyone members one of another", so that "if one member suffer anything, all

members suffer with it". Then the rich and others in power will change their former negligence of their poorer brethren into solicitous and effective regard; will listen with kindly feeling to their just complaints, and will readily forgive them the faults and mistakes they possibly make. Workingmen too will lay aside all feelings of hatred or envy, which the instigators of social strife arouse so skilfully. Not only will they cease to feel weary of the position assigned them by divine Providence in human society; they will become proud of it, well aware that every man by doing his duty is working usefully and honourably for the common good and is following in the footsteps of Him, who, being in the form of God, chose to become a carpenter among men, and to be known as the Son of a carpenter.

These words should be repeated again and again until they are branded on the hearts and minds of men, for they show on what foundation all true social activity should be based. Actually or potentially the Church embraces mankind. Not all are aware of this; many are in open rebellion and can be compared to those cells of the human body which grow to the detriment of others and consequently of the whole organism. To be "one body in Christ" excludes that exaggerated individualism against which rose Anarchism and Socialism with their mendacious promises. Unity in the "one body" means neither chaos nor uniformity, but order in diversity. St. Thomas Aquinas stressed that inequality comes from the perfection of the whole, but at the same time this inequality must be ordered according to some hierarchical principle, whereby various members of the collective body are placed on different rungs of the hierarchical ladder. Not only individuals, but entire nations, are disposed according to some hierarchical principle, unknown to us, and are fulfilling the task assigned to them. No individual, nor any separate nation, dare pretend to represent the whole of mankind—this is presumption for which sooner or later penalty will be exacted, and it is only in a peaceful collaboration of all individuals, all nations and races that the destiny of man can be fulfilled.

G. BENNICSEN.

PLANNED ECONOMY IN CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT

SO long as the typical form of State was liberal-capitalistic, critics tended to extol State intervention in every sphere of life as the solution of society's distempers. But today, when the thesis of the liberal State has in many countries been replaced by the antithesis of the totalitarian Leviathan, a shadow of hesitation is beginning to cloud the critics' former confidence. It is not that the evils of liberalism are less; obviously a community such as the United States, in which the vested interests of some sixty families can hold the government and a large majority of the people at bay, is radically unsound. But the feeling grows that the ruthlessness bred by politicized economics, regimentation and absolute State control are equally alien to a healthy social organism. The need today is for neither the thesis of *laissez-faire* liberalism, nor the antithesis of totalitarian collectivism, but a synthesis of those elements in both which, in combination, would produce a good society.

Some people doubt whether such a synthesis is possible. They argue either that the specifically liberal virtue of freedom must be sacrificed to economic dictatorship in the interests of social justice, or that the totalitarian aim of creating a better integrated social organism must be suppressed in the interests of the complete freedom of the individual. But is this really the case? Surely it is a humiliating indictment of the behaviour of men in society to believe either that freedom implies licence, or that social discipline involves the loss of liberty. The pendulum swing of human thought and action may always tend to go from extreme to extreme. It is the task of statesmanship or philosophy to find a means, a synthesis of the opposite factors, in this case a society in which freedom and discipline go hand in hand, and neither are discredited.

Catholic social teaching is remarkable in that, before all else, it is an attempted synthesis. It is not an accident that the two most important social Encyclicals, *Rerum*

Novarum, written in 1891, and *Quadragesimo Anno*, which appeared forty years later, condemn not only the glaring evils of capitalist society, but also the two extreme doctrines of social change—Fascism and Communism—which claim to cure them. That the Encyclicals are not as widely known as they might be is, in fact, largely due to their balance. On the one hand, their condemnation of violence and defence of private property have relegated the Church without a hearing to the ranks of the “reactionaries”, while, on the other, her teaching on the duties of wealth and the right ordering of society have proved too revolutionary for many of her own wealthier and more influential children—some of whom, for example, managed to ban *Quadragesimo Anno* in their own districts. Now it is notoriously the fairest judge who is most likely to displease both claimants.

The fundamental weakness of liberal-capitalist society is the maldistribution of wealth, the way in which “a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the teeming masses of the labouring poor a yoke little better than that of slavery itself”.* This state of affairs has been brought about by the ravages of the acquisitive instinct operating freely in a society in which all dams and hindrances to anti-social action have been abolished in the name of *laissez-faire*. Inevitably the class in society with least reserves and defences has suffered most, and both Encyclicals condemn, in the strongest terms, the brutal exploitation and misery of the working-classes. Leo XIII urges that a remedy must be found at once “for the misery and wretchedness pressing so heavily and so unjustly at this moment on the vast majority of the working-class”,† and forty years later, Pius XI writes that “the whole economic regime has become hard, cruel and relentless in a ghastly measure”,‡ and echoes Leo XIII’s protest that “it is shameful and inhuman to treat men like chattels to make money by, or to look upon them merely as so much muscle or physical power”.§

* *Rerum Novarum*, § 2.

† *Quadragesimo Anno*, § 109.

‡ Ibid.

§ *Rerum Novarum*, § 15.

Planned Economy in Catholic Social Thought 87

In these last few lines the Popes are criticising not merely the misery of the poor, but the whole organization of society. Under the capitalist system the workers are mainly propertyless. They are men whose only commodity is the work they do. Thus society is divided into two classes: those who buy and those who sell labour; one all-powerful, the other defenceless; one exploiting, the other exploited—and for the rich diversity of function expressed in different trades, arts, or types of employment there is substituted two all-embracing categories within which individuals are linked together by one fact only, either that they are exploited or that they exploit. “Society has completely lost its organic form”,* workers and employers face each other in the market like two rival armies, and their conflict masks the fundamental fact that “capital cannot do without labour nor labour without capital”.†

Utter poverty, the exploitation of the workers and the destruction of social cohesion within the community—these are the evils attacked and criticized in both Encyclicals. But *Quadragesimo Anno* is more radical, and in its criticism more penetrating, than *Rerum Novarum*. To his strictures on a disorganized society, Pius XI adds his condemnation of a situation wherein “not wealth alone is accumulated but immense power and despotic economic domination are concentrated in the hands of a few”, where the monied interests grasp “in their hands . . . the very soul of production, so that none can breathe without their permission”.‡ Economic power has conquered political power, and the State itself has been handed over into the hands of irresponsible interests who misuse the State’s God-given attribute of authority to their own private, often dishonest and generally economic, ends.

But the Pope’s violent condemnation of liberal-capitalist society does not drive him to defend the revolutionary alternatives offered by either Fascism or Communism. Fascism violates the fundamental rights of the individual citizen who, according to Catholic teaching,

* *Quadragesimo Anno*, § 78.

† *Rerum Novarum*, § 15.

‡ *Quadragesimo Anno*, § 105.

is the basis of society, and, on the plea of renovating social life, destroys its fundamental premise, free activity. "The true aim of all social activity should be to help members of the social body, but never to destroy or absorb them."* Fascism may claim to respect primary rights, such as the right to property, but in practice citizen and property alike are entirely at the disposal of the all-embracing, all-controlling, all-devouring totalitarian State. Even in the sphere of economics, State control is not the right remedy for the evils of *laissez-faire*, for "the economic dictatorship which within recent times has taken the place of free competition . . . is a headstrong and vehement power, which, if it is to prove beneficial to mankind, needs to be curbed strongly and ruled with prudence"†; but *quis custodiet ipsos custodes*? If all economic power is in the hands of the omnipotent State, who shall put on the curb?

It is on this account that Pius XI specifically condemns Italian Fascism. It is an error to imagine that Italian corporatism corresponds to the teaching of the Encyclicals. The elaborate corporative structure is, as the Pope rightly points out, a political straight waistcoat into which the economic life of the community has been thrust. "The new syndical and corporative organization tends to have an excessively bureaucratic and political character . . . and it ends in serving particular political aims rather than contributing to the initiation and promotion of a better social order",‡ a criticism which, incidentally, applies to the now defunct corporations of Austria as well. A state-forged, state-imposed and state-controlled corporative form bears as much resemblance to the Catholic ideal of an organic society as does a lath-and-canvas pantomime oak to the living tree. Nor is Communism more acceptable. In its immediate form of a proletarian dictatorship, the same strictures apply to it as to Fascism, for the two systems are equally totalitarian. But even in its final (probably unattainable) form of a Stateless, classless, collective society, it is still unacceptable, for in this collective society man is still the unimportant unit subordinate to the economic law of the

* *Quadragesimo Anno*, § 78.

† *Ibid.*, § 88.

‡ *Ibid.*, § 95.

Planned Economy in Catholic Social Thought 89

collective whole. Moreover, both the earlier and the later stages are based upon a premise which is in flat contradiction to Catholic teaching, namely the abolition of private property. Finally, both Fascism and Communism (from the Catholic standpoint there is some justification in grouping them together under the one heading of Totalitarianism) contravene the spirit of the Encyclicals in that they base society upon materialist principles, the collective wealth of the community, the solidarity of blood, or the imperial ethic; whereas the "true and effective guiding principle"* must lie in social justice and social charity working together to the glory of God.

Catholic criticism of Totalitarianism goes deeper and covers more points than it is necessary to state here, but in the light of the Church's own teaching three criticisms should above all be borne in mind, the violation of the individual right to property, the overstepping of the limits within which State action is legitimate, and the negation of the fundamentally spiritual and theocentric purpose of life. The Catholic view of society is based upon the individual man. God has created each soul in His own image and likeness, hence the supreme value of human personality. Man preceded the State and even society and, though he is a social animal, both State and society must exist for him. Anything that threatens his fundamental dignity as a human being undermines the whole fabric of society. One attribute of this dignity is freedom, freedom to do what is right and to follow conscience without interference from the powers that be; another is the right to possess private property.

The right to private property is an important point and one that is frequently misinterpreted or misunderstood. How is it that a Church whose Master had nowhere to lay His head and bade a follower sell all he had and give to the poor, a Church whose children since apostolic times have counted as a virtue the abandonment of proprietary rights in the monastic system, how is it that this Church has run the risk of being counted with

* *Quadragesimo Anno*, § 88.

the "reactionaries" because of her uncompromising defence of private property? The answer is simple. Catholic teaching defends property, because property is a safeguard of freedom. The propertyless man is the defenceless man, whether his master be private capitalist or totalitarian State. The Church is unconvinced by the argument that if nobody owns anything, everybody will own everything. Property will be "owned" by those who control it, and the propertyless man will be left without defences and with no economic buttress to his independence. Deprive a man of property and he is open to every kind of exploitation, material or psychical, in whatever form of society he may happen to live.

But it follows that the Church's ideal is not the existing form of liberal-capitalistic society wherein the right to private property is allowed in principle and in practice restricted to the few, but an economic democracy based upon the widest possible distribution of property so that all citizens may enjoy the spiritual and economic independence which private property alone can give. In parenthesis it may be remarked that the relative stability, order and freedom of such communities as Denmark, Norway, Sweden, or New Zealand, are largely due to the fact that property is fairly evenly distributed and there are no extremes of wealth and misery such as exist, for example, in England or the United States. The Church, then, guarantees the right to private possession, but she adds a careful distinction between the right to property, and the use of property, the one inalienable, the other indeterminate and fixed at any given time by a whole scale of values, social and individual, by local and secular conditions, by custom, by geography, by climate. Varying forms of society require a greater or lesser degree of co-operative control of property. The pioneer pushing out into the trackless, empty veldt has an absolute right to all he finds. The self-sufficient community of independent farmers also calls for little co-operation between the various units, but the more complex and co-operative the economic forms of society, the more collective and social the forms of property must become. In a highly industrialized country where the processes of production

Planned Economy in Catholic Social Thought 91

are roundabout and indirect and entail the collaboration of literally millions of different men, any man's claim that his property is his own to dispose of as he thinks fit, is in complete contradiction to the social needs of the community. Without taking away from the individual's right to own property absolutely, the State can and must intervene to ensure that the use of property is in the interests of the community as a whole. Leo XIII declared that "the State has by no means the right to abolish it [property], but only to control its use and bring it into harmony with the interests of the public good"*; and Pius XI emphasizes the same idea: "free competition . . . and still more economic power must be brought under the effective control of the public authority in matters appertaining to the latter's competence. The public institutions of the nation must be such as to make the whole of human society conform to the needs of the common good".†

But how is this common good, this general prosperity of the community, to be secured? The Popes wholly condemn the old liberal idea that by a miraculous identity of interests, the untrammelled liberty of the few to go their own way results in the greatest possible good for the many. "The proper ordering of economic life cannot be left to free competition" and "it is very necessary that economic life be once more subjected to and governed by a true and effective guiding principle".‡ The law of the jungle, the survival of the fittest (in other words of the most brutal and relentless), will never produce a good society, any more than "the unity of human society" can be "built upon the opposition between classes".§ Free competition in search of private profit has produced disorder, waste, exploitation and class war. A new order must be built, based on "a true effective guiding principle".

Perhaps the reader of the Encyclicals may at this point lay down his book in bewilderment and ask in what—if anything—Catholic teaching differs from Socialism. The Pope's recognition of the right of the State to

* *Rerum Novarum*, § 35.

‡ *Quadragesimo Anno*, § 88.

† *Quadragesimo Anno*, § 110.

§ *Ibid.*

order the use of property in the interests of all, his condemnation of the misuse of private property, of exploitation, are not far removed from the strictures of moderate Socialism. As we shall see in an interesting passage in *Quadragesimo Anno*, the same thought appears to have occurred to the Pope, nor ought we to be astonished at it. Two critics of the same evil, however divergent their philosophies, are bound to coincide on some points, especially when the evils which they attack are as blatant as those of our present system. The divergence between Catholic and Socialist theory (apart from the fundamental difference between the religious and secular basis of their respective metaphysics) lies in the general solution they put forward to restore society and economics to sanity and good health.

For, after condemning free competition with energy, the Pope turns with equal severity to State ownership, to that form of economic dictatorship under which the State takes over one by one all the functions of society. Society and the State are separate and distinct. The State exists for society, exists to fulfil certain functions in society, and once these limits are overstepped, society can be as much menaced by State power as it is today by the private power of the vested interests. State ownership is harmful not only to society, in that it threatens the essential freedom and independence of individual citizens, and strikes at the root of any spontaneous organic social co-operation, but to the State itself for, "encumbered with all the burdens"* once borne by other associations, it is in danger of becoming "submerged and overwhelmed by an infinity of occupations and duties"* not its own, and is rendered less capable of fulfilling its proper function adequately. We may repeat in this context, the Pope's fundamental maxim, that "the true aim of all social activity should be to help members of the social body, but never to destroy or absorb them", and the teaching is particularly interesting in relation to those doubts and anxieties of which mention has already been made, doubts that an increase in social organization is incompatible with personal liberty. Now it is possible that the

* *Quadragesimo Anno*, § 78.

Planned Economy in Catholic Social Thought 93

State, even if all-embracing, would be nothing more than the servant of its citizens; but experience shows that it becomes their god. From housing them, feeding them, and schooling them, it passes inevitably to controlling, leading, dragooning and finally enslaving them. The *quid pro quo* of security is servility, and on the debt contracted by the citizens for their free bread and circuses, the State extorts payment in human souls.

But, pace the Encyclicals, we seem to have returned to the old impasse. The Pope condemns free competition because it destroys social cohesion and contradicts social justice, but equally he condemns the State-planned economy which might take its place. But it is an impasse only if *all* the possibilities of social organization are exhausted in these two forms. This is not the case. Varying modifications of them exist already and the Church's solution deserves attention in that it really is based upon an attempt to combine the merits of both extreme alternatives, in a word, to produce a synthesis. How can harmony be achieved between a planned economy and personal freedom, between individual rights and social justice? For this is the root of the problem. Now the Pope argues that planned economies, in so far as modern experiments go, have always fallen short of the ideal, in that politics and economics are not sufficiently distinguished, and various economic concerns are handed over to the highest political authority—the State—which in fact fall outside its competence. But so long as private industry is run on a competitive basis, there seems no reasonable alternative. Would it not, however, be possible to secure an ordered and planned economy by the *self* co-ordination of industry and the abolition of competition by agreement? To some extent that process is going on imperceptibly whenever a programme of rationalization, be it in the steel trade or in shipbuilding or for white sea fish, is carried through. There is therefore nothing intrinsically impossible about it. Rationalization is very often the reorganization of industry on the basis of what it is profitable to produce, and of the output necessary to ensure a remunerative price. The evils of rationalization do not lie in the

abolition of competition, but in the fact that the reorganization creates a much more powerful *private* vested interest and is built up upon too limited a basis. The advantages of the capitalists only are consulted whereas the workers and the consumers, who are in the vast majority, ought to have first consideration.

The Pope takes up this possibility of grouping the various competing interests of an industry into one rationalized whole and develops it, with proper safeguards for the community and proper representation of all the interested groups, as a possible basis for the complete transformation of a country's economic life from a competitive to a corporative or (if the word smacks too much of the Fascist State) co-operative system. What else is a corporation but an industry from which competition has been banished and the conception of a fair price and equitable distribution put in its place? An industry which has been unified in this fashion can plan, because it is no longer dealing with imponderables, such as Smith's chances of undercutting Jones or Brown's determination to corner the market. In the fact of rationalization itself there is a certain rudimentary plan. The embryo can be developed and the planned economy achieved without the intervention of political authority in matters of the smallest detail, although, as we shall see, the State's powers of "directing, watching, stimulating, and controlling"* (so the Pope defines them) will be very great.

In the corporative system each industry is organized as a unit composed of complimentary groups and interests. The split between capital and labour is overcome by the recognition that within an industry they co-operate and do not compete, a recognition which, it is important to notice, can only come into being after the disappearance of differential profits. So long as profits over and above the costs of management can be gained by undercutting a fellow producer, then exploitation must continue, for the inducement remains to treat the wages bill as a mere cost, which must be cut in the interests of competition. But the corporation abolishes

* *Quadragesimo Anno*, § 80.

Planned Economy in Catholic Social Thought 95

competition and hence competitive profits. The instability introduced by the ability to make or mar a colossal fortune is replaced by the co-operative activity of the industry's component units in the fulfilment of an agreed quota. Such is the essence of a planned economy. Such, in spite of gross abuses, is already the aim of rationalization, of the syndicate, of the chain-store.

The Pope's corporations have a basis which, however faulty, already exists. The aim of Catholic social teaching is to develop this basis so that it may become capable of carrying the full weight of the community's planned economy. Therefore it strongly insists that the corporations shall be a voluntary growth, not a political creation. They must spring from economic organizations which already exist and are capable of development. This insistence upon the voluntary basis of corporatism, as opposed to the *political* origins of the Italian experiment, leads the Pope to welcome and encourage a strong and independent trade union movement, for the workers, once organized, are much better fitted to take their place in corporative life, in fact their organization is a pre-condition of the corporation in which the workers are as fully represented as the employers.

The workers' role in the corporation is not, however, confined to mere representation. The Pope maintains that the abolition of the division between employer and worker must be absolute and not merely consist in a truce based on the elimination of competitive friction. It is essential to bear in mind Catholic teaching on the distribution of property. One of the most blatant evils of the present liberal-capitalist system is the divorce of work and ownership. A business is "owned" by an anonymous collectivity of shareholders who have no interest in or knowledge of their "property" beyond its capacity of paying (or not paying) dividends. The work is largely done by propertyless men. Ideally, then, the workers themselves should participate in the ownership of the industry in which they are employed. As the Pope expresses it, "we deem it advisable that the wage contract . . . should be modified . . . by a contract

of partnership. . . . In this way wage earners and other employers participate in the ownership or the management or in some way share in the profits".* The corporation in the Catholic sense is not an artificial construction (as it is in Italy), designed to deprive the worker of the right to employ those limited means of defence which are his at present, but an attempt so to alter the structure of industry by transforming it from a competitive to a planned co-operative undertaking, and so to modify the present divorce of work and property, by abolishing the exclusion of workers from ownership and ownership from work, that a new social system can arise, not thrown up out of the inevitable and bloody conflict between class and class, but based upon the efforts of statesmanship and charity to transform those aspects of the present system which are capable of organic growth, and to suppress those in which the seed of discord is permanently implanted—possibly a Utopian ideal, but surely no more Utopian than the hope that out of a calculated exploitation of hatred a millennium of brotherly love will spring.

The task of the corporations, grouped together for national purposes into a council of corporations, would be the planning of each individual industry and the preparation of a general plan for the community as a whole. Within the scope of planning would be included matters such as research, new methods and new inventions. To the corporations would also fall such questions as the regulation of apprenticeship, pensions for retiring members, benefit in times of sickness and kindred subjects. Thus the corporations would take over many functions by virtue of which the State at present, in the Pope's words, "is submerged and overwhelmed by an infinity of occupations and duties", and the autonomy of the corporations (preferably recognized by law) and their strictly non-political character (the British Medical Council is an embryonic example) would, through the separation of politics and economics, free the individual citizen from the encroachments of an all-planning State.

* *Quadragesimo Anno*, § 65.

Planned Economy in Catholic Social Thought 97

But it must not be thought that the Pope agrees with the typical liberal dismissal of the State as a type of glorified ringmaster. Catholic teaching recognizes a Divine sanction behind civil authority and attributes to the functions of the State an august importance. The State is the guardian of the community, endowed with authority to chastize evil-doers, protect the weak, and secure the common good. In a society as complex as any modern industrial community, the problem of the common good is not one which can be settled by passivity on the part of the State. The interconnexion of interests and the possibility of friction arising therefrom call for a high degree of vigilance on the part of those whose duty it is to prevent suffering and social injustice. Private rights must never entail public abuses, and, as guardian of the public good, the State may and must intervene when society is in any way threatened by the activities of private individuals, for example, of gangsters, speculators, financiers and their like. The Divine Right of big business is unknown to the Curia, and the Pope expresses views upon the competence of the State which would rouse an indignant outcry in Wall Street or Mincing Lane. "Certain forms of property," he says, "must be reserved to the State, since they carry with them a power too great to be left to private individuals without injury to the community at large."*

It is significant that these forms are unspecified. The Pope does not consider a hard-and-fast definition to be either desirable or possible, for it must be left to the general structure and special conditions of society at any given time to determine which forms of property are ripe for public ownership. In our own day, financial power has obviously overstepped the limits fixed by the Pope and it is perfectly permissible for Catholics to argue and believe that many of the public utilities and heavy industries are also ripe for government control, or at least semi-public control along the lines of the Electricity Grid or the London Passenger Transport Board. It is the prevailing economic conditions of

* *Quadragesimo Anno*, § 114.

society that determine the need for, and therefore the extent of, public ownership. Catholics are not committed to a fixed policy and can approve a large measure of public ownership, provided there are reasonable grounds for it and the principle of private property is not attacked.

Hence it follows that in questions of structure and organization, Catholic teaching and the outlook of many moderate socialists agree to an extent which is freely recognized by the Pope himself when he writes that "it cannot be denied that its [Socialism's] opinions sometimes closely approach the just demands of Christian social reformers. For class warfare, provided it abstains from enmities and mutual hatred, changes little by little into a justifiable dispute, based upon the desire for justice. If this is by no means the happy social peace which we all long for, it can be and ought to be a point of departure for the mutual co-operation of vocational groups. The war waged against private ownership has more and more abated and is being so limited that ultimately it is not the possession of the means of production which is attacked, *but a form of social authority which property has usurped in violation of all justice. This authority, in fact, pertains not to individual owners but to the State.* If these changes continue it may well come about that gradually these tenets of mitigated socialism will no longer be different from the programme of those who seek to reform human society according to Christian principles."*

The social programme of the Church aims above everything else at balance, the balance achieved by combining planned economy with individual freedom, State control with private ownership, economic independence with political needs and social justice. But it would be a gross misinterpretation of Catholic teaching to assume that the outline given in the Encyclicals of a structural change in economic life is all that is necessary to bring about a change in society. As André Gide remarked with reference to Soviet Russia, "it is an error to expect and hope for a profound change

* *Quadragesimo Anno*, § 114.

Planned Economy in Catholic Social Thought 99

in human nature from a mere change in social circumstances . . . it is necessary, it is enough that they leave room for it . . . but they will not be the force behind it. For in this there can be nothing mechanical, and without interior reform we shall see the re-establishment of the old bourgeois society, the 'old man' will reappear and flourish".* We may compare this statement of André Gide, the Communist, with that of Pius XI, the Catholic Pope: "If we examine matters more diligently and more thoroughly, we shall perceive clearly that this longed-for social reconstruction must be preceded by a renewal of the Christian spirit from which so many people engaged in industry have at times lamentably departed. Otherwise all our endeavours will be futile and our home will be built, not upon a rock, but upon shifting sand."†

BARBARA WARD.

* André Gide. *Retouches à Mon Retour de l'U.R.S.S.*, p. 61.

† *Quadragesimo Anno*, § 127.

WHAT IS THIS NEO-PAGANISM ?

I

THE word "Neo-Paganism" is very apt to evoke in the minds of certain alert Christians an unpleasant picture of a world filled with anti-God conspiratorial leaders, wide-spread but more or less secret organizations for the purpose of undermining Christian morality and millions of ordinary good men, the deceived victims of such leadership and hidden plotting. It would be foolish to suggest that this is an entirely imaginary picture, that there does not exist plenty of good evidence on the basis of which to construct it. But, allowing that it is substantially a true picture, it is at best a description of the world as it is, not an accounting for why we are living in such perilous conditions. Every person, according to the nature of his mind and taste, reacts differently to his environment. It is the gift of some vividly to see the actual behaviour of men, bodies and nations, and to foresee with exactness the natural and immediate effects of such behaviour. Others tend to discount appearances and even the likely effects of what they see so clearly, preferring to ask themselves what is at the back of these appearances and whether it is possible in the light of the explanation to prevent their likely consequences. Both points of view are needed for a complete account, but it may be suggested that today, even among Christians, the first is being exploited at the expense of the second. We are so busy unearthing the actual enemies of Christianity that we fail to ask ourselves what we are going to do with them when their behaviour has been shown up. The result tends to be the creation of the fear or scare mentality, an attitude of mind whose main effect, at best, is to create nervous tension, panic and ultimately impotent hatred and, at worst, to make matters far worse by the uncritical invention of bogies that do not exist at all. The reader will recognize that this state of mind applies to a wider field today than to the clash between Christianity and

anti-Christianity. It pervades, for example, international relations.

As it happens I find it extraordinarily hard to see the world in such popular terms. I seem to be incapable of interesting myself in enemies lurking in dark alleys and meditating the ruin of the world. Those dreadful words, Freemason, Jew, Anarchist, Communist and even Bolshevik do not happen to strike me with the sense of dread foreboding—shall I suggest to Catholic readers, hate?—which they seem automatically to evoke among so many others. I find it hard to think of Christianity as a weak torch being carried about by the good in order to reveal by its light the secret plottings of villainous secret societies and foul conspiracies in a million unlit corners. On the contrary, the truer the foundation for the scare mentality the more needful it is for us to begin the work of guarding against danger by accounting for the causes of the anti-Christian conspiracies, of getting behind them, almost forgetting them and asking ourselves not so much where they are to be found but what they really are and really mean. It is rather a hopeless business to go about feeling one's way through the shadows until one unearths a new plot; it is surely far better to do all one can to light up the whole stage so that in that light the conspiracies and the conspirators may be shown up for what they are and thus unmasked, as it were, by accident. And the light with which to do this is the light of reason and the light of Christian revelation.

In the following pages I shall find it necessary, if the lines along which such lighting-up are to be usefully suggested, to cover a great deal of ground, but I would contend that what we are faced with today arises very naturally and obviously from the trend of thought since the beginning of the Christian era. I would further contend that unless we understand very clearly indeed how the Neo-Paganism of today has developed out of the history of the West there is not the remotest chance of our finding the means wherewith to break it down. Mere warnings against its presence and dangers are useful and indeed necessary, but unless they are accompanied by an understanding of when and where mankind began to live

on lies and fallacies instead of truth we shall merely find ourselves displaying in this field the same dangerous attitude of impotence, scare and hate which is poisoning both international and domestic politics.

II

It is important, first of all, to distinguish between Paganism and Neo-Paganism, between what one may call the pre-Christian, the Christian and the post-Christian. It is not for nothing that we date our calendar from the birth of Christ. It is Christianity and Christianity alone that has made Neo-Paganism or post-Christianity possible. With the exception of a handful of men in classical Greece it is, I think, roughly true to say that before Christianity and today where Christian influence has never permeated there never was and never has been a full sense of individuality, of personality, of the fact—to use Kant's phrase—that man is an end-in-himself and the world of men a kingdom of ends. It is not to be found in the Roman civilization to which we owe the full idea of the power of the State over the individual, nor even in the Greek to which we owe our constant questioning about what man really is, nor even in the civilization of Israel to which we owe the sense of God as a Person and as a Providence; still less is it to be found in more ancient civilizations or those which have survived in the East, the Hindu or the Chinese, high as these are. Israel, Greece and Rome all contributed to our Christian and post-Christian civilization, but they were without that specific difference of Christianity, its teaching that every human being, just because he is a human being, is something final, essentially sufficient to himself, the ultimate sole arbiter of his real fate, not to be made use of as a mere instrument by his fellow human beings.

Now we know that the reason why Christianity brought this view of the nature of man into general acceptance was because of the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Redemption which taught that God became man in order to save all men for all eternity. This meant that

God himself, having shown by his own example that human life on earth has a meaning, an end, pointed the way to the importance of each man's life on earth as the preparation for its more perfect existence throughout eternity. The—so to say—terrificness of these doctrines have cut the history of the world into two halves. Before them and wherever they have remained unassimilated, men might be atheist, agnostic, pagan, polytheistic, monotheistic, but whatever they were they had nothing really personally big to accept or to revolt against. They never really had the sense that they themselves mattered or that anything active mattered. At most it mattered to submit passively as among the Jews in regard to God, as among Buddhist civilizations in regard to the One outside change and time, as among the Romans in regard to the State-God or Gods. But once these Christian mysteries were launched and assimilated it became for centuries impossible to do anything but live in terms of them.

There were three alternatives : to accept them fully in their whole context ; to accept them without their context ; to fight against them. To accept them fully in their whole context was, of course, to be a Christian. And the whole point of being a Christian was first to believe in Christian teaching and then only in the consequences of it. That is, you first believe in God, in God-made-man, in God-redeeming-man, and because of these facts you believe in the importance of yourself, a tremendous ultimate importance in its own order and yet at the same time a thorough unimportance in contrast with God. To accept them without their context was to put the cart before the horse. You accepted your own importance, your own sense of ultimate responsibility and freedom, but you gradually dropped your belief in the only sort of rational justification for so strange a belief, one entirely unshared by every pre-Christian civilization. That is Neo-Paganism or post-Christianity. To fight against them expresses itself in more complex ways. It is a constantly enduring attitude, sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker, and it goes with both Christianity and post-Christianity. For example an

obvious consequence of the Christian teaching about man is that every man, *qua* man, must be in his soul independent of his fellow-men and the ordered society of which he is a member. But ordered society and particularly the head of ordered society, i.e. of the State, has never willingly acquiesced in this independence of each man. And so the history of the Christian era has been a continued fight between Church and State and between individual and State, the forces of the State constantly revolting against this dogma of Christianity or this intuition—as it is often called—of post-Christianity. Likewise there came a time when a whole host of new forces entered into play, all of them bearing against both the dogmas of Christianity and the intuitions of post-Christianity in regard to the independence of each and every man, forces which in their revolt against these dogmas and intuitions were—or, rather, are (for they are the main forces at work in our time)—creating again a condition of affairs that in certain respects bears important resemblances to the state of affairs before Christianity.

It is impossible here to cover the history of the West in terms of these attitudes to the specific difference of Christianity. We know how up till Constantine or, indeed, Augustine the Church had all she could do to defend herself against the Pagan-Roman idea of the State with its implicit denial that the person and the Kingdom of God counted; how there then emerged the adaptation of the Pagan idea of the State to that of a Temporal City with Christian jurisdiction over the this-world activities of Christians under Emperor or King, an adaptation entailing the great danger lest the Christian Temporal City should swallow up the Christian City of God, a danger enhanced by the invasions of the hardy, rough, nomadic, common-sense, non-philosophical, non-religious North-European peoples; how gradually the West came to settle down, in theory, if not in fact, in the Middle Ages, the height of full Christianity, with the roles of Church and State, of this-world man and next-world man carefully thought-out and, in theory one has to repeat, harmonizing.

Until then there had been plenty of Pagan revolts, whether from the Roman heritage or from Barbarian ideas or from the ambitions of Princes, against the Christian teaching about the true position of the individual, but there had been no Neo-Paganism, no Pagan ideas derived from the acceptance of the doctrines behind Christianity itself. Neo-Paganism in that sense dates from the Renaissance, the new Humanism. I mentioned at the beginning that the one exception to the otherwise universal non-Christian attitude to the individual was to be found among a handful of men in classical Greece. The reasons for this and the limits within it is true to say this need not be entered into here. Now during the scholastic Middle Ages Greek philosophy, in so far as it was known, was found to be a very useful help to Christian doctrine, providing as it did a rational framework in terms of which Christianity could conveniently and suggestively be presented. But with the Renaissance (I am using these terms in a general way ; real processes were of course overlapping and continuous)—not merely the rational speculation of ancient Greece, but the whole civilization of Greece and of Rome, particularly as the latter had been affected by Greece, came flooding into Christian Europe. From the contact between the two there emerged something new: the Christian insistence upon the greatness and finality of the individual, the person, man *qua* man, began to lose its supernatural setting and meaning and to find a new one, a this-world, pagan, purely intellectual one, the Greco-Roman one, whose brilliance in this-world achievement, especially in literature and the arts, dazzled the best minds of the time. In other words, the magnificence of the Greco-Roman heritage was suddenly given new life through its fertilization, as it were, by the Christian teaching about the individual and his sublimity, a teaching that went far deeper than anything that was generally available to the Greeks or to the Romans themselves. And on the other side Christianity began rapidly to lose its other-world, its supernatural aspect. Out of Christian dogma itself there grew a new kind of Paganism, at one and the same time intensely

strong, because deriving from the strength of Christian conviction, and extremely subtle, because to a very large extent clothed in Christian dress, with its other-world, supernatural formulas, surviving in appearance but gradually losing their real inner meaning. It was in fact the maintenance of the Christian edifice and even the Christian dogma, but with the tremendous difference that man in them was being substituted for God, this-world for the next. A new Paganism, the worship of man and man's work, was quietly taking over Christian thought, Christian institutions and Christian manners. The history of the West since the fifteenth century, and even earlier, is impossible to understand if we do not realize the incredible changes then taking place.

Having, I trust, made this clear, I need not dwell upon the Reformation, at once a consequence of the Renaissance and a protest (involving a split in Christianity) against it, the Counter-Reformation, genuine Christianity's struggle to retrieve its true position and meaning after the devastations of both Renaissance and Reformation, and the Enlightenment, the carrying through of the Neo-Paganism of the Renaissance after the Reformation. What I have to do rather is to try to assess the nature of the Pagan forces at work at present in the light of what I have said. The new Paganism or the post-Christianity of the Renaissance onwards, for all its strength, possessed one radical weakness. It took over from Christianity belief in the greatness and liberty of man as such, but it dropped Christianity's explanation of why man as such was great and free, namely that God not only made man to his own image and likeness, but became man himself in order to redeem all men and open the gates to perfect eternal life for every man hereafter who did not turn away. One need hardly say that at the time of the Renaissance and for centuries after these dogmas were generally still accepted, but the weight of emphasis had been taken off them and put on to *man* and his status as a consequence of these dogmas. All that was live and creative after the Renaissance tended to emerge, not from the Christian dogmas to which lip-service was long paid, but from man's belief in man or himself. Now so long

as lip-service was being paid to Christian dogmas the intellectual gap in Neo-Paganism did not become evident, did not worry people. And even after lip-service had ceased to be paid to Christian theology, it was still possible to live for a long time on the, so to say, accumulated capital of Christianity. The ordinary man to this day, as we know, clings to a large number of traditions and beliefs which, when analysed, have no foundation but for the theology of Christianity, the chief one being, in fact, his belief in his own ultimate importance. However, while the positions taken up by the new Paganism were surviving because Christianity still nominally survived were as a legacy of the past, the intellectual leaders of the Western world were doing all they could to discover new and sufficient grounds for the importance they put on themselves and man as such. They at least had soon realized that with the loss of their faith in Christianity there disappeared also all old reasons for their faith in themselves. So they set to work to find new reasons which should be valid in terms of the new Paganism itself. The history of modern philosophy from Descartes onwards is the somewhat dismal record of the attempt. And the history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is the evidence of its failure.

It is quite certain that in the long run you can't cheat truth, you can't survive on a lie. Western man has pretty well been trying to do this since the Renaissance, and it is unfortunately our sad fate to have been born in the days when the reckoning is being paid. Let us try and see how this is so. I have said that it has been in Christian revealed dogma and in that alone that man has found a sufficient reason for belief in his own ultimate importance, for belief that he really matters. Before Christianity, and still today where Christianity has not been assimilated, no such belief exists. Man under such conditions can only really accept a passive, a negative religion of mere submission or of self-denial, a religion whose highest ideal can only be to transcend the illusion that time, space, and individuality are in any sense real and meaningful and through this transcending to be gathered somehow into an Eternity that may be con-

ceived as a sort of negative Nirvana or as some eternally recurrent cyclic process. Under such conditions man can only conceive of social order here on earth either as acceptance of convention or custom in some form of Church-State with the completest rights over himself, or as an animal struggle for power and mastery among rivals with the survival of the fittest.

Now the process of contemporary history is in fact leading us back with an appalling relentlessness to precisely these pre-Christian interpretations of life, with one difference, the difference that not only are people not aware of what is happening, but that they are able to deceive themselves into believing that almost the opposite is happening, that in fact they are still in their own individual lives progressive, free and important. The contemplation of what is happening around us and has been happening for a hundred years should fill the cynic with the acutest pleasure, as it should fill us Christians with the acutest sorrow. In one respect we are much worse than pre-Christians, because Neo-Paganism has practically killed the sense of religion. Having become emancipated, having got the bit between our teeth, we cannot—or at any rate have not up till the present—found it possible to go back to the passive sense of submission to a God, a One, an eternal real in comparison with which time, space, change and individuality are but appearances, i.e. the sense of religion, and as far as it went true religion, characteristic of many pre-Christian civilizations and of Eastern civilizations where they survive in some degree, uninfluenced by the West, today. An occasional philosopher can achieve this, but he cuts no ice in the intensely this-world, hectic, changing, dissipated, distracted way of life of the present day. There exists indeed a sense of utter futility and meaninglessness of life, an admittance of appearance and illusion only. But it exists against a background of sheer irrationalism and materialism in respect of any ultimate reality.

But, apart from this, there is a remarkable similarity between the ends to which we are tending and the ends which pre-Christianity accepted, a similarity all the more

significant in that we imagine we are going in the opposite direction. Consider the three great forces that have moulded our times, democracy, nationalism and socialism. When a man calls himself a democrat he means that he considers himself to be and intends to maintain himself as one who has a right to exert his full influence in the making, keeping and running of the social and civil order of which he is a member. He claims this right in virtue of his fundamental equality with his fellow-men who may not make him a mere tool of their wishes, no matter how strong any one or any group of them may be. It is clear that no man could hold this view, and hold moreover that it is equally applicable to all his fellow-men, unless he believed that man is an end-in-himself, something ultimate and indeed spiritual. And he holds it in fact as a pure legacy from the Christian teaching about man. But supposing he has lost and forgotten the actual Christian teaching from which his belief has derived. What happens? He goes on believing that he has a right not to be passed over, that he has a right to preserve his own spiritual, personal and social integrity as a member of society. But what happens to the old belief upon which all this was founded, the belief that every man has a right to insist for his part that the society of men to which he belongs shall remain ordered towards that same supernatural and natural Truth whence also his own rights are derived? This belief is converted to a new one, to the belief that every man has a right, equal to anyone else's, to determine what Truth is; and since he claims to determine what Truth is, now that he has lost his faith in a common Truth, he must also claim the right to determine the very nature of the social order of which he is a member, since the nature of that social order must inevitably depend upon the nature of the ultimate Truth upon which he, as a free man and a democrat, has decided. And so from the picture of all men freely and intelligently contributing towards the social order which shall best conduce to the realization of a Truth which they have all accepted by Faith, a perfectly intelligible and workable picture, we find ourselves confronting the picture of all

men taking it upon themselves to decide freely about what kind of social order they will have and what kind of ultimate end they think that social order should try to achieve. It requires very little imagination to see that while from the first picture there is likely to emerge order, from the second there can only emerge chaos and self-contradiction. And it is the second picture which more closely illustrates the actual history of democracy.

Democracy has in fact developed in three stages, not necessarily temporal, but each one of which has been forced upon it in order to avoid the chaos and self-contradiction that lies at its very essence. At its first stage there still remains general agreement about what is ultimately wanted, an agreement founded upon considerable surviving religious belief and upon tradition or custom which takes some time to destroy. But even at this stage there is a huge leak through which the inevitable struggle as between free, emancipated and no longer supernaturally responsible men, breaks through. It is the leak into the economic field. While men appear to be developing a workable democracy in the political field, the struggle for survival of the fittest is breaking through in industry, where there is precious little equality as between different men. Emancipation, the breakdown of custom, *laissez faire* release the pent-up forces, and we get the spectacle of political democracy and unprecedented economic fighting with the strong growing stronger and the weak weaker.

This economic struggle with the dice heavily loaded in favour of the rich and employing class, a struggle carried on behind the democratic scenes, veiled by Parliamentary debates and public expression of opinion, makes political democracy little more than a hypocritical game, for how can an economic slave be at the same time a free citizen? Hence the formation of the second stage of democracy. Something has to be done to distract the so-called free citizens from the realities of the situation and something has to be invented as a substitute for the rapid decay of general agreement about the purpose for which they and the State exist, as Christianity had taught these purposes to be. Hence the rapid growth of the

pseudo-religion of Nationalism. I do not wish to say that these stages are the result of conscious direction, that Nationalism was a deliberate invention. Nationalism which is the exaggeration of the natural differences between different peoples, different customs, different lands under the common unity of Christendom inevitably grew as the sense of that unity weakened after the Reformation. But it is easy to see how the democratic idea enormously increased the tempo of that development. The very phrase, "Sovereignty of the People", an immediate deduction from the right of each man to decide how the society of which he forms a part should be run, carries in it the essence of Nationalism: the consciousness of a People as such to determine their destiny, to express freely that for which they think they stand, the raising of this national and popular self-consciousness to the level of passion, the encouraging of pride and sense of power—in the possessions, the military force and display, the aggressiveness of the self-determining People—all of these, be it remembered, in germ in that original democratic idea of the sovereignty of the individual; these are some of the characteristics of the Nationalism which grew apace during the nineteenth century, cloaking the economic struggle and intoxicating the minds of the emancipated people. But even Nationalism did not suffice to keep perpetually hidden the economic struggle, and the third stage of democracy arose through the application of democratic ideas to that struggle itself in the gradual realization by the oppressed that they had a right to fight for themselves against the privileged members of society and that they could do this by thinking of themselves together no longer as a Nation which brought them little advantage, but as a Class, a Proletariate bounded by no national boundaries but sharing the same interests and rights through its being internationally oppressed.

In this way we see the origin and inevitable growth of the three contending stages or movements in the assertion of the Christian insistence on the greatness of the individual but divorced from the Christian theology upon which this intuition of the rights of the human

person was founded. Out of it came Liberalism, or the first stage of an intellectual democracy unanchored in any reality ; Nationalism, or the second stage of a democracy seeking the most obvious pseudo-religious foundation and transferring the struggle for survival to nations ; and Socialism, or the third stage of a democracy applying the struggle for survival (inherent in any democracy that is without agreement as to ultimate Truth) to man's ever more hardly pressing needs, social and economic needs.

It should not now be necessary to apply these clues to the whole detail of recent and contemporary history. Everywhere around us we can watch the comedy of mankind, still nursing its pathetic belief in its own freedom, importance and progress, being ruthlessly enslaved by the religion-State which in its completest forms, Bolshevism or Nazism, combines most of the evils of both Nationalism and Socialism—and not merely being ruthlessly enslaved, but triumphantly enslaving itself since all the strength and impetus of its vaunted liberty are devoted to the worship of these substitutes for Truth. The wheel has come full circle and we are back again to the Pagan idea of slavery and submission from which the doctrines of Christianity emancipated man. And again we can watch the recourse to sheer force, the struggle for survival as between one kind of slavery and another, as between the different nations, as between man and man in such departments as have not been totally taken over by the Religion-State. All this only differs from ancient Paganism for the worse, for whereas custom and some sort of fatalistic religion governed the pre-Christians, the post-Christians have souls, minds, and hearts totally captured by the ideals of their Religion-State and hence devote to their struggles and rivalries a degree of wholehearted passion totally unprecedented. (Much of this, it must be confessed, is due not to the inevitability of the process but to the accident that science has put into men's hands instruments which make the enslaving of millions, both as to body and mind, a simple matter. Luckily, as we have just seen, the weapons of destruction which Science has

also provided us with are of such a terrible nature that man has at the very last moment recoiled from the supreme struggle which would have destroyed him as we know him altogether. But how far we can rely upon this present fear of the war which our philosophy and behaviour are working towards is another matter.)

III

It may be suggested that all this may or may not be true, but it has very little to do with our present position as Catholics in England face to face with certain anti-Christian revolutionary forces. I think it has and that it is the key to our understanding of these forces and our reaction towards them. This country, generally the seed ground of new social and political ideas but a bad soil for the subsequent growth of the plant, does not illustrate the full development of the tendencies under which our generation is condemned to live. The Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, Democracy, Liberalism, Imperialism, even the original Socialism—they all owed very much to Britain, but in our supposedly illogical way we have tended to mix them all up, thereby weakening the force of each, rather than to allow, as elsewhere, the second to feed fully on the first, the third on the second. This means that while we shall find about us the beginnings of every ingredient in Neo-Paganism and the real reasons for every kind of hatred of the Christianity which it has supplanted, we shall not find in this country the fullness of Neo-Paganism nor the fullness of Persecution. We shall seem from the Christian point of view a comparatively healthy spot, but if we look to realities rather than appearances we shall find little to be either complacent or careless about.

Liberalism and the first stage of democracy have survived here better than elsewhere, one reason being that the idea of civil and political liberty is much more deeply rooted in the history of the country than elsewhere and that those roots grew deep into the soil when it was still a soil fertilized by Christianity. It has there-

fore taken much longer to destroy those roots. Likewise Nationalism here has grown more naturally from a strongly entrenched Patriotism characteristic of an island that has for generations been unassailable and victorious. Hence the British form of Nationalism and Imperialism has not had to assert itself by the extravagances so common on the Continent; it has in fact been a far healthier substitute for Christianity than Continental Nationalism. Lastly the more firmly established democratic spirit and organization and the great wealth of this imperialistic country which obtained the lion's share of the fruits of the Industrial Revolution have softened the sharper edges of the economic struggle and made it more bearable for all classes except the least skilled and least well-organized. But despite all this, precisely the same anti-Christian or post-Christian influences have been at work throughout but with hitherto less obvious and less disastrous results.

That is as regards the past. What of the present and the future? Can we say that our democratic institutions and our traditional liberalism are maintaining their strength? Can we say that our position in the world as a great nation and a great Empire is assured? Can we say that we count in the future upon the same amount of wealth as in the past? I cannot see how any sincere and candid observer can possibly deny that in all three respects our position is rapidly deteriorating. What does this mean if this analysis of the main forces of European history is correct? It must mean that the full effects of post-Christianity, that the full force of the anti-Christianity which has been ravaging the Continent are yet to be felt in our country. At present they are, as it were, leaking through where the timbers are rottenest. And it is with this leaking through in various departments of our national life, press, literature, entertainment, science, education, industry, administration, religion itself, that the detailed study of Neo-Paganism in Britain should be concerning itself. Everywhere we shall find the same sequence: assertion of self, of the rights of the individual; loss of belief in any accepted and revealed Truth, first in the religious sphere, and

next, in the moral and social; the attempt to work up enthusiasm for a substitute; the enslavement by some aspect, often well disguised, of Nationalism or international Socialism, or a mixture of the two, passionately embraced; growing hatred for Christianity which is realized to be a perpetual challenge to bad and intoxicated consciences.

This analysis leaves us with a very depressing picture, one to my mind far more serious than the increasing tendency of Catholics to see the perils of the day in terms of Freemasons, Jews, Bolsheviks. The question remains whether an examination of this kind is more helpful to us when seeking the possible remedies. I am persuaded that it is, but it would require another article as long as the present one to make good the contention. With the permission of the Editor I would like to undertake it in a later issue.

MICHAEL DE LA BEDOYERE.

MORAL AND SPIRITUAL FACTORS IN FRENCH RURAL LIFE

FRANCE is above all a rural country, with half her population still engaged in agriculture. A large number of the provincial towns are marketing centres for primary products, with inhabitants, for the most part, of recent peasant origin. Madame de Sévigné was able to quote a proverb already old when she said: "We have all been labourers and have all followed the plough, only some of us left off in the morning and others at dusk." The saying has lost none of its truth since the seventeenth century, and the Frenchman who searches out his ancestors will nearly always find them settled somewhere on the countryside. On two occasions France has been saved by a countrywoman—by St. Geneviève and by St. Jeanne d'Arc—and this is as characteristic of the peasant character of the French tradition as is the genius of Charles Péguy and Paul Claudel in the realm of literature.

If there is in France today an agricultural problem which belongs to the sphere of economics, there is also a peasant problem of which the importance is psychological, and this latter is not limited to rural life but interests the most varied branches of human activity, for it is one of the functions of the French peasantry to feed the life of the cities with new blood. If this migration from country to town gives some cause for anxiety about the future of rural France it accentuates the influence which in our own time the peasantry is exerting on urban life, and this makes it worth while to attempt to understand the French peasant. We have all heard about his thriftiness, his hard life, the natural dignity of his open-air existence, and the taciturnity which he has acquired by years of silent labour. These, it is true, are all qualities of the French peasant, but they are those of men everywhere who work on the land, and they do not tell us much unless we study them in their particular setting. We must begin, therefore, by studying the conditions of rural life. They are not the same everywhere.

The French peasant may be divided into three classes—the *métayer*, the farmer, and the small proprietor. The *métayer* is a cultivator working the land of a proprietor from whom he receives an agreed advance and to whom he renders a half or a third of the product of the work. He does not usually own his implements or cattle, and the proprietor is the legal owner of the land. In practice, however, the *métayer* enjoys a considerable freedom in his work. His position is intermediate between those of the wage-earner and the farmer. In the second case, the cultivator holds his land on a yearly rental, which may be paid in money or in kind. Having paid his rent, he is free to farm in his own way provided that he does it according to the accepted formula, *en bon père de famille*. The farmer's position naturally varies according to whether he has a small farm of fifteen to twenty hectares as in the south-west of France, or a holding of a hundred hectares as in some parts of the west and north. The working small proprietor is the most numerous of all the classes. His property, which may range from five to forty hectares, is generally worked by his own family, and is, or should be, the most solid guarantee of a steady life and work for successive generations. Unfortunately, however, the inheritance laws, which have the good effect of breaking up the large estates and securing a more equitable distribution of property, tend, at the other extreme, to subdivide each legacy to a point at which the land becomes insufficient to support a family. The material and moral results are not difficult to imagine. Either the owner will limit his family, or the legatees, finding their small inheritance insufficient to maintain them, will migrate to the towns.

This problem has long engaged the attention of economists who have studied rural questions. Le Play and La Tour du Pin discussed it and suggested laws which would provide guarantees for all inheritors while safeguarding the principle of family farming. What is required of property of this kind is that it should be large enough to maintain a family but not so large as to demand a great deal of outside labour. French agriculture is traditionally conducted on a family basis. When

outsiders have to be brought in and paid, entirely new economic and social problems are raised, and the ideal is the small farm which can be entirely run by the parents and their children of all ages. A large family then becomes not a burden, but an asset. The immense majority of French farms, whether worked by a small owner, a farmer, or a *métayer*, have, therefore, this family character. Even among the large or medium-sized properties, which represent the last survivals of pre-revolutionary days, we often find agglomerations of small estates in which there are striking examples of continuity in the same family. It is here that we find a type of patriarchal life which the foreign visitor rarely has a chance to study closely, though it is an element of some importance in the French tradition. The rural aristocracy to which these properties still belong, however long or brilliant its history, is now an element in the peasant life of France, and that is more than can be said for the new order of land-owning capitalists, who have recently come into property which means no more to them than an investment or a source of income. They have a totally different conception from that of the last representatives of the feudal order, who still regard themselves, to use the expression of La Tour du Pin, as "stewards" of the land, responsible for what they have done or omitted to do for the common good.

This glance at a somewhat archaic form of property is not intended to introduce a touch of the picturesque into our account of the situation. It is important if we are not to neglect a factor which still influences French rural life. Apart from the western part of the country, where the feudal domains have survived more largely than elsewhere, and carry certain privileges to their holders, which may go so far as to assure them a seat in Parliament or on the local governing bodies, it is worth noting that even in those parts of France where the parliamentary representation is in the hands of the Left Extremists, the mayoralty may go by tacit consent to the squire of the village, who owns the poor remains of ancestral lands. Too often he fails to recognize that this influence should be used for something other than a

narrow conservatism which, while it is not generally selfish, springs from a blind and instinctive fear of social progress. The family is the essential basis of French agriculture, whether the property be large or small, worked directly by the owner or by a tenant. It is necessary to return to this fact in order to emphasize a point of the first importance. I mean the considerable part played by women in agricultural life. I do not think there is a parallel in any other department of French life to the feminine role in agriculture. The French peasant woman, whether she guides the team while her husband drives the plough, or whether she busies herself about the house, is intimately concerned with the work of the farm. At every moment she is an active partner and her work is one of the most important factors in food production. Hence the common expression in some parts of the north: "The woman pays the rent." Her influence is increased by the comparative isolation of the rural family from outside influences, and it explains why the peasant will not do anything without consulting his partner. In fact, though he may not be willing to admit it, her influence extends beyond the matters of business and has its inevitable repercussions in the sphere of local government, though it is interesting to note that, in spite of the role she thus plays in rural life, the French countrywoman is the least interested of all her compatriots in securing "women's rights". The idea that she should vote at elections seems to her to be inconceivable.

The fate of the French countryside, it will be seen, is largely in the hands of the woman. Upon the degree of attachment to the land which she displays will depend the readiness of her husband or fiancé for the rough peasant life, just as the future prosperity of the holding will depend on her fecundity. All this demands a rather high moral level, and apart from the ravages of Malthusianism in some parts, and the "village dramas" which occasionally figure in the newspapers, it may be said that the peasant life of France is carried on, generally speaking, in conformity with natural morals. This is all the more striking when we compare it with the deplorably

low standard of public morality in the great centres of Europe. Not that the unmistakable moral superiority of the peasant over most other social classes means that the countryman is necessarily a saint. His open-air life and hard work contribute to clean-living, but he is also known to all his neighbours, who can study him from close quarters, and he has not the opportunities of clandestine indulgence which present themselves to many "respectable" townsmen.

If the French peasant is hard-working and steady, a good husband and a good father, can we say that he is a good Christian? Any general answer to that delicate question would be misleading. I have known some in districts with little reputation for Christianity who are real mystics. There are others who do not so much as know the name of Christ, and who, if they saw a roadside Calvary, would ask the question which Mauriac once had the misfortune to hear: "What does that mean?" Still others, and perhaps they are the commonest type of irreligious peasant, spend their lives denying or blaspheming their religion, and tremble at the thought of hell. These are the ones who are elected to the Socialist councils as anti-clericals and are mortally offended if the Bishop refuses to nominate a *curé* for the districts they administer. An attempt has recently been made to classify the peasantry of France according to their religious merits.* M. Gabriel Le Bras, the author, postulates four categories: (1) the pagans, by origin or apostasy; (2) the occasional conformists, who are baptized in Church and enter it again only for their first communion and marriage, until they are buried; (3) the practising Catholics who communicate at Easter and hear Mass on Sunday, to whom M. Le Bras adds those who, while neglecting these elementary duties, nevertheless show real signs of fidelity; (4) the devout, who carefully obey the Church's counsels, frequent the sacraments and take part in good works.

It is not always easy to make a geographical division of these various classes of the faithful and unfaithful.

* Gabriel Le Bras, *Pratique Religieuse des Paysans Français* (Études, 20 April, 1938).

Narrow strips of de-christianized country will be found in parts where faith is generally intense and religious practices almost universal; while in paganized districts there are to be found some villages of exceptional fervour, such as Mesnil Saint Loup, which, in one of the most disinherited regions, from the spiritual standpoint, is itself a centre of piety irresistibly recalling the most Christian years of the Middle Ages. Speaking broadly, however, we may say that the Basque country, the Vendée, a considerable part of Brittany, and a large part of Flanders, are the regions where religious observance is general, and, in some places, almost universal. Take, for example, two cantons in the Diocese of St. Brieux, where out of 11,072 inhabitants there are only 220 men and 28 women who fail to fulfil their Easter duties. In another Breton canton, that of Carentoir, there were, in 1930, 9,047 inhabitants of whom only 81 failed to communicate. Alsace-Lorraine has a place among the regions where religious observance shows no decline, and there are excellent Christian districts on the Swiss and Italian frontiers and in most of the Dioceses of Auvergne. Quite near, on the other hand, in Limosin, whole cantons are paganized. The most distressing example quoted by M. Le Bras is that of the deanery of St. Sulpice les Champs, which has 5,500 inhabitants with only one in four of the children baptized. The Dean, who has 1,500 souls under his personal charge, has no male communicants at Easter and only 28 women. This is an exceptional case, but the dioceses of the centre, the middle-north and the south-west are anything but encouraging from the point of view of religious observance, though most of them contain some privileged areas in sufficient numbers to defeat any attempt at a strict classification. What adds to the difficulty of anything of the kind is that, in some parts where religious observance is almost non-existent, it is nevertheless altogether exceptional to find a funeral without a priest or a death without the last sacraments. The dechristianization is often superficial and if there were more priests these indifferent populations would display more fervour.

The absence of priests vies with secular education as a cause of the painful decline of religious practice in the countryside. Since the Separation Law has considerably reduced the financial resources of the clergy, the peasants are the daily witnesses of the privations of the clergy, which, though borne heroically, create a certain apprehension among peasant families at the thought of their children being called upon to face such sacrifices. The State schools are naturally not likely to develop the seeds of a vocation to the priesthood, and we find its ranks recruited increasingly from the towns, even in the working-class districts, where the influence of the priests and of the specialized work of Catholic action is more effectively felt. This poverty of the priests increases the necessity for a lay apostolate in the country, and Catholic action has for some years given special attention to this, even in the most paganized parts.

The J.A.C. (*Jeunesse Agricole Chrétienne*) naturally comes to mind in this connexion, but it is fair to remember that this specialized movement, which dates officially from 24 June, 1930, was preceded by the U.F.A. (*Union Catholique de la France Agricole*) and the E.A.C. (*Etudes Agricoles par Correspondance*). These two movements had the common object of rechristianizing the agricultural centres, the U.F.A. devoting itself particularly to spiritual culture and organizing exclusive retreats for the peasants, while the E.A.C. was specially concerned with giving the young peasants a technical equipment which would qualify them to be masters. The need of the rural world is mainly for leaders. It is half-consciously recognized, and in a village a man who tends to distinguish himself from his neighbours by his competence and initiative will have no difficulty in becoming the leader of the Commune, at least in its trades union or professional aspects and frequently in the Municipal Councils.

Mention must be made of a problem which, while it does not directly concern Catholic action, may nevertheless be influenced for good by it—the problem of agricultural trades unionism. It would be beyond the scope of the present article to attempt an exact account

of the organization of agricultural trades unionism in France, nor shall we discuss its efficacy. There are, however, a number of local professional organizations in the country which, owing to defective co-ordination, have little influence outside a narrow circle. These unions, whether a part of the work of great Catholics like the Villeneuves and the Gaillard-Bancels in the last century, or of more recent origin, offer an opportunity of co-operation free from political influence and they show what agricultural unionism could do to create a spirit of fraternity in a village and reduce the asperities of controversy. There are no Christian Unions among the agriculturists apart from those of rural wage-earners in some districts. These are what the members make them, and this emphasizes the importance of Catholics joining them and taking the lead by their competence and public spirit instead of leaving them to be exploited in the interests of this or that political ideology. In this way something might be done towards the eminently desirable achievement of a Christian corporative order. From this point of view it is permissible to hold high hopes of the J.A.C. Chiefly concerned with the spiritual development of its members, it also aims at improving their efficiency and qualifying them to become leaders.

A brief survey of "Jacist" methods will show how these results are achieved. Each parochial section holds a meeting on an average twice a month. This opens always with the reading of a passage from the Gospels, which is then discussed by those present. The chaplain's function is a purely advisory one, and, as far as possible, the young peasants are allowed to draw their own conclusions from what they have read so that they may become accustomed to meditating on the scriptures. The results of this are seen in their daily life, and Father Foreau, the Chaplain-General of the J.A.C., told me last year that in most of the dioceses of the west there was at least one young peasant in each parish who found the time in the midst of his work to spend half an hour every day in prayer. The J.A.C., it will be seen, aims at the rechristianizing of the peasant masses by deepening

their lives. Too many works up to now have been content to get the young people together in a sports organization or something of the kind, and if the young men could be induced to promise a perfunctory attendance at Mass and abstinence from the graver sins it has been considered satisfactory. It is hardly surprising that a surface Christianity of this kind has not proved very resistant to the assaults of the enemy. A Jacist said recently: "If you want your faith to shine you have to be a Christian twice over, once for yourself and once for others." A fine declaration and no exaggeration, for innumerable active workers have shown that they mean it. After the meditation a Jacist meeting proceeds to examine the three functions of perception, judgement and action, by which the young workers are trained to develop their observation, criticism and initiative. The usual subjects of study from these standpoints are the conditions of rural life as we have endeavoured to outline them and the principal deficiencies observed in the Christian life of the neighbourhood. In this way an apostolate becomes also a movement of material and moral betterment of peasant life.

The J.A.C. also exerts its influence very beneficially on the life of the women. Nearly 100,000 young countrywomen are now associated with the movement. Needless to say, domestic questions have a large place in their studies, and, in view of what we have said about the essential part played by women in the home and in the rural community, it is unnecessary to stress the value of this feminine apostolate. The character of the J.A.C. work puts some difficulties in the way of recruiting members. If it were simply a matter of offering the young people congenial recreation for their leisure there would, no doubt, be a steady accretion of members, but since the aim is to create an ardent faith and determination to spread the Kingdom of Christ it is useless to present so high an ideal to minds that are not prepared to receive it. This preparation is the work of the Jacist Press, which has the double function of stimulating the zeal of the active workers and inciting those outside to seek admission to the movement. Not that the recreative

side is neglected. The question of leisure is of the first importance if we are on the one hand to prevent the desertion of the countryside and on the other to maintain the moral level of those who remain there. Hence the anxiety of the J.A.C. to render village life more attractive and sociable, to give a Christian tone to the existing festivals, and to revive some of the old customs that formerly gave so much charm to the life of our ancient provinces.

An immense amount remains to be done. Many country churches are deserted, in too many places the altar lights are extinguished; there are too many abandoned hearths in the old villages of France. But, following in the footsteps of the mediaeval monks, who reclaimed the land and built the colleges around the steeple, the Church renews the work of bringing Christ back to the deserted tabernacles and uniting the peasants in villages which, if they are not to perish, must remain, in Péguy's phrase, "villages of Christendom". This is the special task of the rural Catholic Action. It has rekindled the smouldering flame, and it is thanks to its work that the French peasants can proudly take their place with their brethren, the intellectuals and the artisans, who, in such large numbers, are grouped at the foot of the Cross in the astonishing Catholic Renaissance of contemporary France.

MARQUIS D'ARAGON.

THIS RACIALISM

I

RACIALISM is regarded with much justice as the root of half the political problems of our day. But, just because it can so plausibly be made the villain of so many dramas, it is not sufficiently realized that it is not one thing, but several, according to the conception of race on which it is founded, and that the problems that it creates are correspondingly diverse. Unless the context is clear, an attack on "racialism" may easily confound a number of quite different, not to say contradictory, ideas.

Note first the variety of political questions in connexion with which the idea of race is invoked :

(1) There is first the colour question. This has been created by the emigration of Europeans, and particularly northern Europeans, into Africa and Asia ; by the importation of negroes into the United States of America ; and by the desire of the yellow peoples to expand into the lands around the Pacific. In all these regions the problem is felt, rightly or wrongly, to be at bottom biological ; but it has political aspects of the first importance and, on this plane, is not one but several problems. For example, it is a caste question in the northern States of the U.S.A. ; a constitutional one also in the southern States, in India, and in the British Colonies ; a life-and death struggle for economic survival in South Africa ; an Imperial problem when the coloured inhabitants of one part of the British Empire are denied entry into another ; and a clash of Empires where Japan covets the unoccupied territories of Australia and the western coasts of the two Americas, and proclaims her own "Monroe doctrine" for China. It is also, in the view of many, a "yellow peril" for the whole white race if the yellow peoples join forces. All these problems have been superimposed by political or economic circumstances and ambitions upon its biological aspect.

(2) There is the "inferior European" question, created by the claim of peoples describing themselves as Nordic

to be superior to other European stocks, particularly the Mediterranean and the Slav. So far as Europe is concerned, this question merges to a large extent into the general problem of national jealousies and rivalries. But in the U.S.A., where all the racial stocks of Europe are included within a single nation, it has been the cause of great searchings of heart, and of immigration laws that, in effect, discriminate against the southern and eastern Europeans; and in both Europe and America it has given rise to theorizings concerning the necessity of Nordic supremacy that have entered, and still enter, into the politics of the nations.

(3) There is the Jewish question, created by the dispersion of the Jews throughout the nations of the world, by each of which they are regarded as an alien element. Here again the question is sub divided, from the political point of view. It is one problem where there is a mass settlement of Jews so as to constitute practically the whole population in certain districts, where they retain their own customs and religion, as in Poland; another where they have penetrated into certain occupations and professions holding key positions in the general community, such as moneylending, law, or entertainment, so as practically to control them and, through them, the nation. It is another problem again when they are regarded as an international force, as in the sphere of finance or of anti-Fascist politics; yet another when viewed from the Jewish point of view as an episode in the age-long struggle of the Chosen People to maintain its separateness and superiority in the midst of a Gentile world; while in Palestine a new variety of the problem has been created artificially in an attempt to satisfy the claims of Zionism.

(4) There is the constitutional question created when racialism is pressed into the service of an authoritarian government. The part that in some countries has been played by appeals to class solidarity or Imperial traditions has been played in others (notably Germany) by an appeal to race consciousness; and it has proved peculiarly effective in bringing about the emotional fusion at which it aims. For it creates a feeling of almost physical

solidarity between individuals, especially of the younger generation, taught to believe that they are of the same blood ; and makes a physical revival the basis of national renovation. Thus the individual tends to become merged in the community in a rising tide of animal impulses, and his fundamental political liberties are endangered.

Closely connected with this racialistic totalitarianism is the racial mysticism that translates its racial claims into religious terms. Religious doctrines and even the precepts of the moral law are tested by their agreement with the supposed character of the race in question, and racial intermixture is condemned as resulting in moral chaos. God Himself is conceived pantheistically, and regarded not so much as choosing the favoured race, but as in a special sense identical with it, since it is His highest manifestation. The race is deemed spiritually self-sufficient, and the highest destiny of the individual is to promote its honour and salvation and to survive in it through the transmission of its blood to his descendants. Between these claims and those of revealed religion there is an irreconcilable conflict, which inevitably has a political aspect when Christian citizens and Christian institutions find their essential liberties curtailed, and particularly when those liberties are defined by the supra-national and world-wide Catholic Church.

(5) There is the minorities question, created by the claim of so-called racial minorities to autonomy, or at least fair treatment, within the State to which military conquests or political treaties have allotted them. With this may be grouped the problems created by the "Pan-" movements (Pan-Slav, Pan-German, and so forth) inspired by the claim of a race-conscious State to unite to itself, or at least exercise some sort of protectorate over, the scattered minorities of its own race and over smaller States that are racially akin.

There is no need to enlarge upon the bitterness and the explosive force generated by these questions. Almost any one of them is capable of tearing a State to pieces or precipitating a world war. But they are wholly distinct questions. The mind, as it passes from one to the other,

is conscious of turning to wholly distinct departments of world politics.

Note in the second place that the word "race" is used in quite different senses in connexion with these different questions :

(1) In connexion with the colour question it is essentially a biological term, denoting a section of mankind distinguished from other sections by separate descent from ancestors of their own and by special physical (and perhaps psychological) characteristics—in this case literally colour, together with obvious traits of physiognomy and physique usually associated with colour. In the present case it usually carries also a suggestion of physical antipathy and of evil effects supposed to result from racial intermixture, and implies wide differences of racial origin and development. Even when economic considerations are prominent, the difficulty is attributed to biological differences in the standard of living.

(2) Racial distinctions between peoples of European origin are made, in the first instance, on the basis of physical differences that have struck the popular imagination, helped out by temperamental differences, religious prejudice and barriers of language. They are given an air of scientific exactitude by the use of measurements of less obvious characteristics, such as the shape of the head. But, as the appeal to such measurements itself indicates, no such biological distinctness exists in this case as could form a natural barrier to interbreeding.

(3) In connexion with the Jewish question, identity of race denotes common descent, but common descent regarded from the genealogical rather than from the biological standpoint. In other words, in spite of the caricaturists, physical criteria are with good reason deemed less satisfactory than birth certificates ; and it is the solidarity of an alien clan rather than a difference of physical type that is the principal object of the anti-Semite's dislike. In fact, the Jew who is not known to be a Jew is one of his particular aversions.

(4) In connexion with the appeal to racial feeling on behalf of the authoritarian State, the essential ideas are

three : consanguinity, freedom from alien strains ("purity of blood"), and physical distinctness from other peoples. The conception of race in this case also, therefore, is theoretically biological ; but political considerations cause these three characteristics to be attributed to the population within a political frontier regardless of biological fact. Racial mysticism, while emphasizing the idea of blood as the life of the race, adds the conception of a racial soul. "Each race has its own soul", which its physical type expresses. Consequently that type comes to be identified with some physically ideal type on mystical grounds, with little regard for the actual prevalence of that type in the population in question.

(5) In connexion with the minorities question and the "Pan-" movements, identity of race denotes, for most practical purposes, little more than the possession of a common language for a considerable period of time. There is seldom any other working test available. Racial mysticism cannot help on this plane. Appeals to traditions of migration or settlement carry little weight if unsupported by contemporary evidence of language, unless the language can be shown to have been lost under governmental pressure in recent times. Nor do contending statesmen or arbitrating Commissions resort in practice to anthropometric tests—cephalic indices, colour gradations and the like. The most ignorant of them know that, if they did, their lines of demarcation would cut across every minority line in Europe, and partition every racial majority also.

This analysis does not profess to be exhaustive. It would be easy to refine upon it, and quite important conceptions of race are omitted. For example, the newly formulated Italian racialism, which is not mystical, and is concerned chiefly with the first and third political questions in our list, has put forward a quite reasonable conception of a race as a stock which may originally have been in some degree mixed but has been isolated in a region of its own for long enough to acquire common physical and mental characteristics by which it can be identified. But enough has been said to illustrate the fact that the diversity of meanings attached to the word

"race" in connexion with political questions is as great as the diversity of the political problems themselves. And just as no realistic politics can be based on the assumption that all racial questions are politically akin, so also there can be no scientific discussion of racialism that does not begin by recognizing that the meanings attached to the term vary very much in value from the scientific point of view.

II

Only one of the groups of racial problems in our list has any real claim to be considered a biological one, and that is the colour question. Even in this case the claim must be qualified by the admission that from the strictly biological point of view the so-called races of mankind can count as no more than varieties, since they are ordinarily fertile when interbred and are all members of a single species. But the probability remains that within the oneness of mankind there does exist a certain amount of real biological diversity affecting interbreeding, call the sub-divisions what you will; and it seems that the popular classification based on colour does in a rough and ready way coincide, at least in part, with the lines of biological cleavage.

It is common knowledge that, according to this classification, there is a white race, mainly European; a brown race, mainly in southern Asia and northern Africa; a yellow race, mainly in the rest of Asia; a copper-coloured race in the two Americas; and a black race, African in origin. When this grouping is combined with the supposedly more precise classification based on the form of the hair, the result is to make the brown and white races sub-divisions of the Caucasian, and the copper-coloured and the yellow races sub-divisions of the Mongolian. This systematization is, however, less helpful in the present connexion than the observations of Sir Arthur Keith, who seems to have shown that the principal characteristics of the yellow Mongolian and the black (or negro) types respectively are identical with those which may appear in Europeans as the result of

abnormal developments in certain of the ductless glands of which contemporary physiology makes so much. In Europeans they can be produced as pathological symptoms in a single generation or even within a single lifetime. As permanent and normal characteristics of large sections of the human race they may well be related to hereditary diversities of glandular development originally brought about by profound physiological disturbances.

However this may be, it is difficult to escape from the conviction that between certain combinations of these races there is, when it comes to interbreeding, a real barrier of physiological discord going deeper than any artificially manufactured dislikes, and most acute between the more blond peoples of the white race on the one hand and the black and yellow races on the other hand. It is certainly noticeable that those who make light of it are generally found never to have actually resided where the races in question are living side by side. There is no space here to discuss the pros and cons of the argument. It must suffice to say that the validity of the belief is not disproved by the employment of, say, negroes even in intimate domestic service in white households, since it is precisely in those cases that intermarriage is least thinkable; nor by irregular sexual intercourse, for lawless passion transgresses all laws.

As to the actual results of interbreeding once it has been established, here again the biological facts are obscured, and indeed modified, by psychological factors. The circumstance, for example, that half-breeds in South Africa (outside the Cape area) are virtually outcasts from both the white and the coloured communities must immensely aggravate whatever physiological instability results from the cross, and the same consideration applies to Eurasians in India and in the white settlements in further Asia. Nevertheless, when all necessary allowances have been made, it would seem that the general law holds good for human beings as for the beasts, namely that, while interbreeding between nearly related varieties often produces offspring superior to either, interbreeding between more distant varieties generally produces offspring inferior to both, because

two incompatible life-patterns are confused. Furthermore, the critical point at which interbreeding becomes disastrous seems, in the case of human beings, to lie very much where instinctive "colour prejudice" would put it. Indeed, many would deduce from ancient and modern instances taken, for example, from the later Roman Empire and from contemporary South America, that it would have been well if this prejudice had operated even more strictly.

In spite, therefore, of the many uncertainties surrounding the subject, the colour question in its biological aspect remains one that cannot be disposed of by amiable sentiments about human equality, or even by the great truths that the human race is one and all men have souls—truths that give little guidance on this plane. A frank recognition of its existence is all the more necessary because, when two races live side by side in fear of having interbreeding forced upon them by doctrinaire politicians, the antipathy that originally caused the fear is dangerously increased. In particular, it ill befits Englishmen, who in most places hold themselves aloof from their coloured subjects like Brahmins from the lower castes, to invoke Liberal principles to condemn the Italians because the latter, having belatedly acquired a coloured Empire which they propose to colonize, have decided for the first time in their history to impose a colour bar. Still less would it be seemly for Americans to take this line. For not only have they an unsolved colour problem of the first magnitude within their own borders, but they have hitherto made it a special grievance against the Italians that they were too ready to intermix with the negroes, and have dreaded, for that reason, their migration to the southern States.

At the same time it is necessary to beware of accepting fatalistically as biological difficulties problems that are only in part biological and have been aggravated, if not transformed, by perversities of economic or political policy. Thus, in South Africa, where the racial difficulty would in any case have been grave enough, it has been aggravated past all bearing, and apparently beyond orderly solution, by the refusal of the white man to do

his share of the manual labour of the country or to accept as normal for any of its members a standard of living below that of highly paid foremen. The resultant tension is considerably more than could arise from a simple difference in standards of living such as causes apprehension on the Pacific coasts of America. The whole economic structure of the Union rests upon an utterly uneconomic exaggeration of this difference, enforced by every kind of non-economic pressure.

Another instance of the aggravation of an already difficult problem, in this case deliberate, is supplied by the propaganda of the Comintern, which (with examples like that of South Africa to appeal to) equates the distinction between the coloured peoples and the whites with the Marxist conflict between the proletariat and the capitalist class. This has been spread throughout the coloured world with effects even more disturbing than those which followed the penetration of Africa by Islam, with its rejection of all distinctions of race and colour. It is evident, indeed, that the path of wisdom in this matter lies neither in shutting one's eyes to racial differences and antipathies in a vague hope of making them vanish, nor in exploiting them for economic or political ends, but in finding a practicable *modus vivendi* between divergent but equally legitimate ways of life.

The Church has a special interest in this task as a missionary body. She is not directly concerned with the question of interbreeding, except to affirm that, since all men are descended from a common human ancestor, and all have been redeemed by One Incarnate God, there can be no veto upon interbreeding based upon differences in biological origin or in the nature or destiny of the rational soul. She makes no claim to pronounce on whether in particular cases there may or may not be physiological or temperamental incompatibilities between branches of the race sufficient to make interbreeding inadvisable, just as there may be between individual men and women. But she is very intimately concerned with the repercussions of these incompatibilities upon the personal and cultural relations of those who may not be well advised to intermarry but have nevertheless been

together incorporated by baptism into the universal humanity of Christ.

How intractable she finds the problem at times is shown by the separate places of worship for the white and the coloured peoples to be found in South Africa and the U.S.A., where one is told that they are necessary because fellow Catholics of different colours will not enter the same building even for Holy Communion. Yet these same whites in their own homes will employ blacks to cook their food and nurse their children. It may be that a return to the catacombs will be necessary before they will consent to forgo a separateness before the altar that was not found necessary there between Patricians and slaves in Imperial Rome. Again, missionaries have the task of steering a middle course between Europeanizing coloured converts in the manner prevailing in non-Catholic missions during the nineteenth century and leaving the structure and culture of pagan society intact in the matter favoured by contemporary colonial administrators. The Catholic Church has never officially encouraged Europeanization, but she has to discriminate rigorously between practices which can be permitted to converts without danger to their new faith and practices with definitely pagan associations. This problem, however, is not specially connected with colour. Something like it has arisen wherever a people with a deeply rooted pagan culture has accepted the faith.

III

If the colour question may be described with sufficient accuracy as primarily a biological question giving rise to, and in some cases aggravated by, political or religious difficulties, the other so-called racial questions enumerated at the beginning of this article may correspondingly be described as primarily political issues in which the idea of race, adjusted to its non-biological context, is invoked for political ends.

The second on the list, the question of the so-called "inferior European stocks", is not obviously of this

character, but proves to be so upon analysis. Those who claim racial superiority over other Europeans stress its biological importance and make a parade of biological language. But the criteria by which the supposed superiority is measured, so far from being taken from scientific biology, are almost wholly subjective, and unintelligible to those against whom the northern European peoples wish to discriminate. The Italians, for example, who with some reason see themselves as, on the average, more handsome, more intelligent and clear-sighted, more open and warm-hearted, more hard-working, more artistic and, in general, more alive than the English, cannot reasonably be expected to see any sense in being contemptuously dismissed as dagoes. Nor, within the limits of the properly European peoples, is there any serious question of ill-effects from interbreeding. On the contrary, it is commonly held to have been beneficial. Certainly all the leading European nations include a great variety of types in their populations.

Indeed, it is possible that interbreeding is not the right term. It is by no means certain that the main population of Europe is racially composite. We have all heard of the three sub-races that are supposed to constitute it: the tall, fair, dolichocephalic Nordics around the Baltic; the small, dark, dolichocephalic Mediterranean race from Africa, and a stocky "broad-headed race from the East" along the central mountain zone. But though this theory has enjoyed a great vogue since it was first given currency by Ripley, a strong case can be made out for the view that these "races" are simply three modifications of a single European strain that have arisen in response to environmental differences in and around Europe itself. There is, for example, a parallel in China, which covers much the same range of latitude. There, in a population almost uniformly Mongoloid, three sub-types (so the anthropologists tell us) can be distinguished: a tall, comparatively fair, dolichocephalic type in the north; a small, dark, dolichocephalic type in the south, and a stocky brachycephalic type in the central mountains. Two things at least are certain. Individuals

of all these types have lived side by side in all the principal countries of Europe since history began; and no one has ever waited to get married until he or she has had the beloved's head measured. But politicians without number in Europe and America have pretended to reduce to an exact science the claim of their own section of the population to dominate over the others.

When we turn to the Jewish question the assertion that it is political rather than racial may savour of paradox. Yet if the word "racial" is taken in a biological sense the paradox vanishes. In the first place, apart from the diversity of Jewish physical types (concerning which much might be said if this were a biological study), it is a fact that biological problems of interbreeding are no real part of the Jewish question. Except for a few fanatics, no one seriously objects to the intermarriage of Jew and Gentile because it would be biologically disastrous. The reasonable anti-Semite objects to it because he fears that the offspring will regard themselves as Jews; the Jew because he fears that they will be lost to Jewry. But these are exactly analogous to the reasons for which Protestants and Catholics respectively object to "mixed marriages". If we take the sub-divisions of the Jewish question we get similar results. The nearest analogy to the problem created by the existence of a self-contained Jewish community within a Gentile State such as Poland is the communal problem in India, where Hindu and Moslem communities live side by side. The objection to Jewish control of key professions and industries would be directed against any group with alien culture, mentality, and loyalties (think of Germans in England) who had somehow obtained citizenship and were using it in this way. The fear of the hidden power of international Jewry is similar to the fear of international Freemasonry. And the Jews' own conception of their relation to the world finds a parallel in the attitude of the first Christians, which indeed was inherited from it.

The Jews, in fact, are a religious, or at least an ethical, society, differing from most others in being traditionally recruited by birth. That was what was meant by saying,

earlier in this article, that in connexion with the Jewish question "race" is a genealogical rather than a biological term. It is this ancestral tradition, and not biological traits, that is responsible for the widespread suspicion, to which (in the matter of ordination to the priesthood) even the regulations of the Church have at certain times and places seemed to give countenance, namely that even the Jew who has been baptized may remain a Jew at heart, together with the first generation of his progeny.

It is not necessary for the present purpose to add much to what has already been said concerning the remaining questions of racial totalitarianism and mysticism and of racial minorities and the "Pan-" movements. In both cases the ends in view are political, and the conception of race employed in the pursuit of them is forced to be largely political also. For within every important political frontier in Europe, actual or coveted, the population is not only diverse in type but also multiple in origin. At the same time, none of these populations can properly claim to stand wholly apart, in a biological sense, from all the others. Politicians, therefore, who are pursuing the ends in question, and are not content with merely arbitrary assertions, have to modify the biological conception of race by the test of language or by an appeal to a common historical and cultural tradition. It is a measure of the realism of the new Italian racialism as compared with the German that, unlike the latter, it accepts the mixture of physical types as a relevant fact and does its best to work out both its biological ideals and its political objectives with some regard for it.

Finally, the appeal to race for the purpose of creating an emotional atmosphere favourable to totalitarianism or neo-paganism lies outside the plane of biological fact altogether. It is certainly biological in the sense that it plays upon the animal impulses rather than on the rational side of man's nature, so as to induce him to surrender his mind and will to the State and to withdraw them from God. But, as one may learn from Huxley's *Brave New World*, to say nothing of the psychological technique of other totalitarian States of today, there are

several ways of dehumanizing the citizen without bringing in the idea of race at all. The appeal to it was convenient for Hitler because, when he began his career, he was not politically a member of the nation he aspired to lead, and it suits now the Nazi neo-pagans who wish to represent the Catholic Church as the enemy of German life. Similarly it suited Mustapha Kemal, because it enabled him to provide a rallying-point for a people whose political consciousness had hitherto been bound up with a religion which he intended to separate from the State. But for all of them it has been essentially a rhetorical device in the sphere of politics and religion.

This is not to deny that here is such a thing as a rational appeal to proper racial self-respect for legitimate biological purposes, such as the improvement of the national physique and the promotion of births. The better element in the new Italian racialist propaganda provides an example of this. But, indeed, it has not been the purpose of this article to deny all validity or value to racialism, even of the political kind. Its purpose has been to emphasize and illustrate the necessity, in any discussion of the subject, of being clear at the outset whether one is dealing with a genuinely biological problem, with or without political complications, as in the colour question; or with partly political, partly biological aims based on a biologico-political conception of race, as in Italian racialism; or with purely political aims supported by essentially political definitions of race, as in the minorities question; or with political aims pursued with the aid of pseudo-biology, as in a great deal of anti-Semitism and of "inferior European" talk, and all totalitarian and mystical racialism. Only by making some such analysis of the subject is it possible to escape from its many ambiguities and to go straight to the real point at issue in any particular phase of it

F. R. HOARE.

EDMUND BURKE OUTSIDE POLITICS

EDMUND BURKE is a writer and a thinker who has always fascinated not only the student of politics, but also the student of literature and the student of human nature. His views about institutions—about principles, about persons—and, not least, his revelations about himself, command attention and often breathe enchantment. It is delightful, therefore, to come upon some "new" early writings of his, several of which, one ventures to think, reveal to us still a little more of Burke's mind, and still a little more of his character than we have hitherto known—or at the least reveal them at an earlier stage.

Arthur Cobban, in his *Edmund Burke and the Revolt against the Eighteenth Century*, has remarked that even in the early political essays published by Burke in his early days in Dublin, and reprinted by Mr. Samuels in 1923, even here Burke's characteristic outlook seems already formed. And that is true. The Dublin Essays, however, were chiefly *political*. It is, then, a discovery of an additional interest to find Burke in some other early works—*opuscula minora* though they be—already displaying his very characteristic views in the treatment of general as well as political subjects; that is to say, in thoughts and reflections on manners, on morals, on natural science, on religion, and on human nature in general. For a small notebook has lately been brought to light containing not only a collection of short political reflections, but also a general *promus* or larder (as Bacon would have called it) of reflections on various subjects, the whole of which might well bear the title that Burke affixes to one of these 'obiter dicta'—namely "Scattered hints from my notebooks and writings"; though the little book also contains some "characters", in the French sense of the term as used by La Bruyère, "characters" both of real persons and of types of persons.

At the moment, however, we may confine ourselves to the general reflections on various subjects. And it is with a sort of start of delighted recognition that we find revealed here, in jottings written, apparently, for the most

part in the 1750's, just those features of Burke's intellectual and moral outlook which are the most original and distinguishing marks of his later style and outlook in the 1780's and '90's. We note, for instance, that just as in his later speeches and writings Burke was ever the enemy of "pure reason" and of "metaphysical politicians", so in several of these early essays he expresses, in his own unmistakable fashion, his belief in the importance of the feelings and of the emotions, as well as of the reason in human life; even though he points out that this fact may lead to abuses and to wrongful exploitations of the emotions, as well as to worthy appeals to them. His criticism of the methods of the Methodists of his day, indeed, might well be applied to many modern movements. But to quote* from some of these reflections on the reason and the emotions, Burke writes:

In writing the wisdom of Nature ought to be strictly imitated which has made all things necessary to our preservation in the highest Degree pleasing to our appetites. Dry precepts and reasoning do little. It is from the imagination and will that our errors rise; and in them as in their first beginnings they ought to be attacked. Men are full as inclined to Vice as to Virtue. Now suppose a piece was written describing the Nature and extent of any Vice, suppose that it shewed its Limits, described its several species, gave Directions about the increase and furtherance of it; suppose this done in such a manner as to avoid carefully the affecting any of the passions, and then see how little the reader shall be incited to profit from the Lecture. I believe very little. But then try what a Lascivious Song will do. This is directed to the imagination; and in a moment the desires are raised. And so undoubtedly, and much more, will it hold in Virtue. Therefore they who would introduce new Religions must aim at the imagination not the understanding. Thus Mahomet's paradise is famed for the Indulgence of all the soft Eastern passions; while in our colder Climates the Methodists, by painting hell(s) torments in all its terrors, like the Rattle-snake does the Squirrel, terrifies the poor wretch into his snare; but neither Mahomet nor the Methodist have anything to do with the understanding. To instance the Methodist; all their terms with a wicked wisdom, are chosen by them too unintelligible and inexplicable, for fear the

* It is by the kind permission of Lord Fitzwilliam that we give these selections from Burke's note-book.

Understanding should have any play: thus '*the New Light*', '*the inward feeling*', '*born again*'. When a reason of their faith is demanded, this cant is the answer you receive. . . ."

Burke writes also in a manner characteristic of his later outlook, though that is not, of course, the chief interest of these quotations after all, which is surely their own intrinsic wisdom and charm; but Burke does, nevertheless, write also very much in his later manner of the weakness and shortcomings of the human reason and of the need of a something higher—of a sort of intuition or instinct, a sort of angelic wisdom as St. Thomas might have called it—in an essay on "Religion of no Efficacy considered as a State Engine", where he says, *en passant*:

Men never gain any thing, by forcing Nature to conform to their Politicks. I know the Clergy, shamed and frightened at the imputation of enthusiasm, endeavour to cover Religion under the shield of Reason which will have some force with their Adversaries. But God has been pleased to give mankind an enthusiasm to supply the want of Reason and truly enthusiasm comes nearer the great and comprehensive Reason in its efforts, though not in the manner of operation, than the Common Reason does, which works on confined, narrow, common, and therefore plausible Topics. The former is the lot of very few. The latter is common and fit enough for common affairs; to buy and sell, to teach Grammar and the like, but is utterly unfit to meddle with Politics, Divinity and Philosophy. But Enthusiasm is a sort of Instinct in those who possess it that operates like all Instincts, better than a mean species of Reason. It is true indeed that enthusiasm often misleads us; so does reason too: such is the Condition of our Nature and we can't help it. But I believe that we act best when we act with all the Powers of our Soul; when we use our Enthusiasm to elevate and expand our Reasoning, and the Reasoning to check the Roving of our Enthusiasm.

This, surely, is a noble passage; and incidentally it shows Burke as essentially a leader in what Professor Cobban calls "The Revolt against the Eighteenth Century", and as a precursor of the Romantic movement, of Coleridge, and, indeed, of the modern German theological writer Otto.*

* See Otto's *The Idea of the Holy*, passim.

Meanwhile, in another passage—in a few sentences on the superior influence of good conversation over mere reading—Burke again refers to reason, as contrasted, this time, with custom. But in this instance he is concerned to defend reason, for he holds the scales fairly, and he writes here: "It is but reasonable that our general conduct should be a good deal modelled by the general sense of the publick; and that, unfortunately, leads to amusements, trivial or worse; but I would willingly give something to Reason as well as to Custom; I would be its humble servant but not its slave." How surprisingly modern, meanwhile, is the young Burke in his realization of the deceitfulness of the appearances of all material things! He might well be supposed to have known the most up-to-date theories of the electron. For he writes, in a piece headed "Phoenomina": "Perhaps the bottom of most things is unintelligible; and our surest reasoning when we come to a certain point is involved not only in obscurity but contradictions." But he seems to fall back upon authority for his religious beliefs, for in another essay he writes: "The establishment of a church is upon this principle which a man cannot be reasoned with who will controvert, that the majority of men take their opinion of religion upon trust."^{*}

A sentence on natural science is also worth quoting, and provides a striking contrast to the attitude of the French "common-sense" "philosophers" towards the positive sciences. Burke says:

It might perhaps humble us and abate something of our confidence in our opinions if, after taking a view of the rise and fall of kingdoms, we observed the use of science; to see it rise from chance, grow by industry, strengthen by contention, refine by subtlety and ease, fall then into nicety, error, guess, and, dissolving at last, make way for new systems which rise by the same means and fall by the same fortune.

But we will give the whole of his remarks upon "Phoenomina". He writes:

^{*} Burke here, of course, is on dangerous ground; as were the Romantics later in their neglect of the reasoned foundations of belief.

The common people are puzzled about extraordinary phenomena, and wonder at nothing else; the learned wonder not at uncommon things; 'tis about the most ordinary things they are puzzled and perplexed; they can account for earthquakes and eclipses, but doubt of their seeing feeling hearing etc.

For reasoning about abstruse matters and the assent we give to Propositions concerning them, we don't sufficiently distinguish between a Contrariety and a Contradiction. No man in his senses can agree to a Contradiction; but an apparent, nay a real Contrariety in things may not only be proposed and believed but proved beyond any reasonable doubt. Most of our enquiries when carried beyond the very superficies of things lead us into the greatest Difficulties and we find qualities repugnant to each other whenever we attempt to dive into the Manner of Existence.

Nec tamen istas questiones Physicorum contemnendas puto. Est enim animarum ingeniorumque naturale quoddam quasi pabulum, consideratio contemplatioque Naturae.

Perhaps the bottom of most things is unintelligible; and our surest reasoning when we come to a certain point is involved not only in obscurity but contradiction. Suppose we divide a Body into many parts; yet each part will have *Length, Breadth, Thickness*; and so will every part of those Parts, and so *ad infinitum*: but these Qualities are sensible properties, and when they do not affect the sense we cannot be certain that these qualities exist, since they do not operate; for we know of their Existence but by their Operation. If it be said that they grow too small for the sense, I believe these words are not well understood; for small and great are only in reference to the impression made on the sensory; and if there is no Impression I don't see how any thing can be called *great* or *small*. So that if they exist, they must have other Properties, since those they have are not sensible Qualities. Again all Bodies being composed originally of minute parts, they may in that separate state have qualities different from what they have in the aggregate: and may be otherwise coloured, figured etc.

But the most interesting and, perhaps, the most typically Burkeian of all these pieces is a little essay on Customs and Forms which seems, indeed, to contain the very essence of Burke's outlook on men and things. This essay has the initials "E. B." written on it in a later hand. But in fact it is, as indeed are all these pieces, to employ an expression used by artists, "signed all over". It runs as follows:

The more a man's mind is elevated above the vulgar the nearer he comes to them in the simplicity of his appearance, speech and even not a few of his ideas. He knows his reason very well and therefore he is suspicious of it. He trusts his passions more on some occasions; he reins them, but does not fetter them. A man who considers his nature rightly will be diffident of any reasonings that carry him out of the ordinary roads of life; custom is to be regarded with great deference especially if it be an universal custom; even popular notions are not always to be laughed at. There is some general principle operating to produce Customs, that is a more sure guide than our Theories. They are followed indeed often on odd motives, but that does not make them less reasonable or useful; a man is never in greater danger of being wholly wrong than when he advances far in the road of refinement; nor have I ever that diffidence and suspicion of my reasonings as when they seem to be most curious, exact, and conclusive. Great subtleties and refinements of reason are like spirits which disorder the brain and are much less useful than ordinary liquors of a grosser nature; I never would have our reasoning too much dephlegmatic; much less would I have its pernicious activity exerted on the forms and ceremonies that are used in some of the material Businesses and more remarkable changes of life. I find them in all nations and at all times and therefore I judge them suitable to our actions, and do not like to hear them called fopperies. Our fathers, ruder indeed than we, and if not instructed at least not misled, practised them; we should follow them. But they ought not to affect us beyond their just value. When Diogenes was dying, his friends desired to know how he would have his Body disposed of. "Throw it into the fields," says he. They objected that it might be liable to be devoured by wild Beasts; "Then set my staff by me to drive them off." One answered: "You will be then insensible and unable to do it." "So shall I be (sayd he) of their injuries."

I like the vivacity of the Turn in this story. The philosophy is shewy but has no substance; for to what would he persuade us by his odd example? Why, that our Bodies being after Death neither capable of pain nor pleasure, we should not trouble our heads about them. But let this pass into a general principle and thence into a general practice, and the ill consequence is obvious. The wisdom of nature or rather providence is very worthy of admiration in this as in a thousand other things by working its ends by means that seem directed to other purposes. A man is anxious and solicitous about the fate of his body which he knows can have no feeling. He never considers what a nuisance it would be to society if it was exposed. He considers such an event as personally

terrible ; and he does piously for others what he would wish done for himself.

It is not easily conceived what use funeral ceremonies (for my story led me to think) are to mankind. Trifling as they may seem, they nourish humanity, they soften in some measure the rigour of death, and they inspire humble, sober and becoming thoughts. They throw a decent veil over the weak and dishonourable circumstances of our Nature. What shall we say to that philosophy, that would strip it naked ? Of such sort is the wisdom of those who talk of the Love, the sentiment, and the thousand little dalliances that pass between the sexes, in the gross way of mere procreation. They value themselves as having made a mighty discovery ; and turn all pretences to delicacy into ridicule. I have read some authors who talk of the Generation of mankind as getting rid of an excrement ; who lament bitterly their being subject to such a weakness. They think they are extremely witty in saying it is a dishonourable action, and we are obliged to hide it in the obscurity of Night. It is hid it is true ; not because it is dishonourable, but because it is mysterious. There is no part of our condition, but we ought to submit to with cheerfulness. Why should I desire to be more than man ? I have too much reverence for our nature to wish myself divested even of the weak parts of it. I would not wish, as I have heard some do, that I could live without eating or sleeping. I rather thank Providence, that has so happily united the subsistence of my body with its satisfaction. When we go into another state we shall have means fitted to it, with equal wisdom no doubt. At the present we ought to make the best of our condition ; and improve our very necessities, our wants, and imperfections into elegancies—if possible, into virtues.

The concluding sentence of this essay is surely one of the most charming, as well as one of the most typical, that Burke ever wrote. And with it we may well close our notice of these early writings. They have, as we have said, a twofold interest. First for their own sake : for the good sense, the balance, the loftiness, and the penetration of their thought, and for the aptness, freshness, and vividness of their language ; and second for the proof which they give of the inherent consistency of Burke's thought from his early manhood until his death.

H. V. F. SOMERSET.

THE EVE OF THE REFORMATION

Pre-Reformation England. By H. Maynard Smith, D.D., Canon of Gloucester. (Macmillan & Co. Pp. 556. 25s.)

YET once again the ever fascinating problem has provoked an able and industrious writer, and the result is a first-class essay in aid of a solution. It is an essay which, in its turn, will provoke other writers—writers, if we are lucky, equal in ability, in industry, and in true scholarly friendliness to Canon Maynard Smith—and ultimately, we may hope, from many minds working together the whole truth will emerge.

What was the nature of the series of events in English History which we call collectively the Reformation? What was the religious belief and practice of the English people in the years immediately preceding the first of the changes? In the answer to these two questions is contained the essence of our chief domestic historical problem, and a good deal else besides, of religious and social and political controversy. And as, year by year, the detail of our historical knowledge grows, the chances of any one man solving that problem from his own knowledge of every detailed fact become more and more remote.

A hundred years ago the discussion was more simple, in more than one way. For generations the heirs and successors to the party triumphant in the Reformation held it as a self-evident truth that the Reformers were men sent by God to renew the elements of true religion in a world that was buried in ignorance, given over to superstition, and rotten with moral corruption. Thanks to the success of the Reformers, faith was restored, and the practice of true religion and purity of life. And it was never a matter of any real difficulty, for scholarship less insular and less isolated, at any rate to disprove the calumny upon fifteen hundred years of mediaeval christianity that this thesis implied.

The discussion was then all the simpler inasmuch as no heir to the Reformation position dreamed of claiming to be, at the same time, a Catholic. His theological

outlook kept him one with the most rigorous of the first Reformers in this that the papacy was the source of that ignorance, that superstition and, thereby, of that wholesale moral corruption from which the Reformation had delivered all those peoples who accepted it. Where the Pope stood in the time of Cranmer and Ridley and Matthew Parker he still stood. His church was no more the Church of Christ now, three hundred years after them, than it was when they were still alive. And the historical discussion between the two parties, for all its greater bitterness, was saved the additional complication of a claim by one of them to remain, despite its inheritance of and loyalty to the Reformation changes, one with that body upon which came the Reformation and to which the Reformation introduced new beliefs, new rites, and a new religious discipline. Writers who, a century since, belonged to the Church of England hailed those novelties, introduced in the sixteenth century, as a rediscovery of Christ's primitive institution, divinely sent to thrust out corruption. And there are still not lacking writers of that same church who hold this same view. But there are others also, and for these there is no substantial difference between what their forebears (and their colleagues today) style "corruption" and the beliefs and rites through which, since the sixteenth century, God has been worshipped in the mediaeval cathedrals and the ancient parish churches of England.

This emergence in the Church of England of a claim to be considered no less Catholic than the Pope, this willingness, on the other hand, to see the Pope's Church as a true part of the Church of Christ, and this new fashion of reading Roman Catholic doctrine into the classic formularies of English Protestant belief, have inevitably complicated the whole business of writing about the Reformation, and have given it something of an apologetic motif on the Anglican side, just as truly as the active calumnies of the past gave to the writing of the first Catholic historians an equally evident apologetic tinge. It is not necessary to impute bad faith to either party. The historians on both sides are, often enough, apologists against their intention and without realizing it. For the

event of this historical debate must matter intensely to those who are contending. Whether Peel or Disraeli was in the right in 1846, whether Pitt or Grattan in 1800, these are questions that can still raise passionate argument, but no man's salvation hangs upon his determination of them, and no more than a habit of political thought at most is affected if the opinion of a lifetime is found to be wrong. In this debate, however, the issue is the gravest of all, and the terms of the debate are such that the issue is, ultimately, inescapable. Is the Church of which the Archbishop of Canterbury is the chief spiritual officer one and the same body with that Church in England of which Canon Maynard Smith writes so learnedly and so pleasantly? Are its relations to the Pope's Church the same as those of that Church in England? If they are not the same, which has changed since 1521, Canterbury or Rome? And if it is Canterbury that has changed, how is it still the thing it was in belief, in practice, in discipline, how is it still the Church of Christ? And if it is Rome that has so changed how is Rome the Church of Christ?

I am not seeking to launch yet another religious controversy, but merely concerned to suggest that, given the practical issue of this historical debate, the personal concern inseparable from it—the genealogical interest, so to call it; are these men, or are they not, of my religion?—it is all but impossible for those who take part in it, if they are Protestants or Catholics, not to be apologists in part. This apologist strain is evident in Canon Maynard Smith's book, but he must not be adversely judged as a historian because of its presence. For he never is such an apologist that his apologetic distorts, or even colours, his facts. No Catholic reader can complain of him on that score, but many will be disconcerted, and indeed plainly bewildered, by the sincerity with which he holds to his belief in the identity of the post Reformation and pre-Reformation Church of Canterbury while he is yet enunciating facts which, to a Catholic, cry out a difference that is essential.

The author divides his book into two main sections. In the first (pp. 3-266) he describes the *Condition of Pre-*

Reformation England and in the second (pp. 267-526) he attempts to account for the *Tendencies of the Time*. The treatment of the subject matter differs, naturally, in the two parts. In the first it is almost entirely with the first twenty years of the sixteenth century that we are occupied. In the second section the author, concerned with the origins of all the forces he sees operating in the sixteenth century, ranges over the whole of the Middle Ages, and, of course, does not confine himself to purely English events. This is perhaps the place to say that Canon Maynard Smith makes no claim to have discovered any new facts. He "has not undertaken original research", he modestly declares. His has been that other task of the historian, no less important than the discovery and the preparation of sources, namely the fitting together, to make a picture and a whole, of the thousands of fragments salvaged by the research student properly so called. And in this work, if he has had the help of the work of his many predecessors, the historians whose books are listed in the fourteen pages of his bibliography, he has had also the worrying responsibility of according the new knowledge with the old, a task that calls for the very perfection of patient, dispassionate, critical practice. *Hic labor hoc opus!* It is not then the question of what happened at the Reformation that is the subject of this book, but rather the condition of Religion at the time when the Reformation began.

After an introductory description of the funeral and pious bequests of the last king to die before the storm, Henry VII, the writer opens his study with a chapter on the State of the Church. Here, turn by turn, he considers the papacy, the English hierarchy, the financial situation with regard to benefices, the quality of the clergy's professional knowledge, their morals, their worldliness, the nature of endowments, the relation of the clergy to the law of the land in criminal matters and their jurisdiction over the layman. The long chapter of eighty pages closes with a vivid resumé of the famous and illuminating business of the trial of Richard Hunne for heresy—after he had drawn down the wrath of his parish priest by refusing to pay a stole fee—his imprisonment

and alleged murder by the Bishop of London's officials while he lay in prison. In this tragic business all the forces which, fifteen years later, constructed and imposed the Royal Supremacy are clearly to be seen, alive and vigorous and only awaiting the opportunity which the king's adoption of them will provide.

We are given a fair, non-partisan picture of ecclesiastical life in which, while we have no difficulty in recognizing our spiritual ancestors, tried by much more than has ever tried us—and, by modern standards, hardly trained to meet any trial at all—falling frequently, falling fairly generally, where falls now are pretty well unthinkable. There are the succession of the bad popes of the later Italian Renaissance, the system of papal taxation of the universal church that was the arch-scandal of the time, in its degree and in the manner of its collection no less than in the manner of its spending. A Bishop of Winchester must pay £40,000 to the Pope on succeeding to the see and an Archbishop of Canterbury, in addition to a like sum, a further £20,000 for his pallium. Taxes and fees at every turn, an army of officials who had bought their jobs—whose jobs had been indeed created in order that, by their sale, revenue might be raised—and who, at every stage of every administrative process, must (since it was for this they had bought the job and been sold the job), be fee'd and heavily fee'd. Then the pardoner, and the indulgences he brought—often, too often, hawked about like merchandise. The English bishops are seen to be, on the whole, not men of evil life but “excellent laymen who had been obliged to take holy orders in order to qualify for receiving episcopal revenues. Their vocations for the priesthood were dubious and their pastoral experience nil”. St. John Fisher stands out an immense—and solitary—exception to this rule. Such bishops were inevitably absentees. Subordinates supervised their too extensive sees, and administered the episcopal sacraments. But, whatever the quality of this administration, it was the bishops, severally and jointly, who were the rulers of the flock, masters in Israel, and when their hour struck they behaved like the civil servants that in fact they really were. “The machinery

no doubt worked smoothly enough, but the Church is not a machine, and how could a bishop care 'for souls whose bodies he never saw'?" Wise words, truly. "And so the bishop was out of touch with his clergy; while to the pious laity he was just a splendid personage who lived somewhere in the Strand."

These "splendid personages" continued to be splendid patrons of learning, few of them failing to found grammar schools or colleges at Oxford and Cambridge. It is a curious comment of the author here that, by founding schools to provide the "new" learning—i.e. humanism and positive theology rather than the once all powerful theology of the schools—they "did much unwittingly to precipitate the Reformation". The connection between the new learning and the Reformation is surely accidental only. Luther was, assuredly, no friend to the new learning and St. John Fisher is the typical humanist and positive theologian. And instances could be multiplied in illustration of the objection. The familiar tale of the day's clerical abuses is told, soberly, fairly, in summary form, of absentees, of pluralities, and of the farming out of livings to ill-paid vicars. Were the parochial clergy as illiterate as Erasmus and the rest made out? In the more distant parts, in Wales and in Yorkshire no doubt they were, but one must be forgiven for not accepting, in proof of the Yorkshire clergy's illiteracy, their inability to perceive the rightness of the Royal Supremacy. This, I hasten to add, is the proof of their ignorance adduced by their turncoat archbishop, Edward Lee.

"Much has been written about the sexual immorality of the pre-Reformation clergy; but the evidence is far from conclusive" is the fair opening of the next important point to be considered, and in this respect the author notes, what is too often slurred over, that Cranmer was no better than Wolsey. He takes note of what figures can be gathered from visitation records, and will pay no attention to "the dirty scurrility of Simon Fish", preferring the witness of St. Thomas More "a man better acquainted with the clergy". Colet, in his attribution of all the day's evils to clerical immorality, he wittily notes as the forerunner of the exaggerated old-

fashioned temperance advocacy. "Erasmus was cold-blooded and took an almost malicious pleasure in exposing the clergy's sins." Against the lawyer, More, we have, of course, his lawyer contemporary St. Germain, and here Dr. Maynard Smith sums up comparatively, saying, "If we want to know the truth about the clergy, Sir Thomas is the better guide; but if we want to know what people in London were saying about them we must go to St. Germain. *He will help us to understand how so great a change as the Reformation came about.*"* And "the majority of the clergy were miserably poor". Very pertinently, admitting the great wealth of the church as a whole, the author says, "After all, the problem has not yet been solved: How ought the clergy to be paid?"

Much more than any spectacle of clerical incontinence, the clerical jurisdiction over the laity, in what affairs brought them before the bishops' courts, was a cause of permanent hostility, and the way in which all London reacted to the affair of Richard Hunne is a fine example of what anti-clericalism could mean. "If my Chancellor be tryed by any XII men in London, they be so maliciously set *in favorem heretice pravitatis*, that they will cast and condempne any clerk, though he were as innocent as Abel" wrote the bishop to Wolsey, beseeching his aid. For centuries now "a border warfare" had been waged continuously between the layman and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Now it was about to develop, rapidly, into "a decisive campaign". And the grim word *praemunire* had been successfully pronounced.

Dr. Maynard Smith's next topic is the religious belief and practice—particularly the practice—of the English people. To this he gives two chapters, (III) *The Popular Religion* and (IV) *Superstitions and Abuses*, 114 pages in all. The English of the time were reputed devout by their Continental fellow-Catholics. "They all attend Mass every day" is one contemporary report and Erasmus cannot but confirm this, and Cranmer also, to justify his attack on the Mass. The king, Henry VIII, heard his three masses daily and sometimes five. But hardly any

* The italics of this immensely significant sentence are, of course, my own.

one went to Holy Communion more than once a year. Did the people, the ordinary people, know what the Mass was? "It is surprising how many explanations of the Mass have survived" and the author gives interesting details about the most popular of the lay folk's mass books. Probably more than half the population could read, and once printing began to develop, edition after edition was produced of spiritual books, prayer-books and works of the mystics—the *Imitation of Christ* among them, but, strangely, never the Bible, nor even the New Testament, in English.

The English churches were the wonder of the time for their number and the beauty of their adornment, and the familiar picture is again drawn for us, in all its rich detail, of the parish church as the centre of the social life of the whole community. Were these people "so zealous for their church and its adornment, ignorant of the faith for which it stood"? Were they taught, and how? What of the preaching? The author is optimistic about this. "If the parish priest neglected preaching altogether, no one could well escape the wandering friars, who would hold forth in fields and market-places if they were denied the church." As for the parish priest, "obviously sermons were expected and required". Liturgy and ceremonial is one important way of teaching Christian doctrine and in connection with this the author has a thoughtful comment on the abuses and decay in the popular devotional ceremonies by the end of the fifteenth century. "Careful weeding and pruning was everywhere needed, but the Reformers found it easier to dig up the garden. . . ."

As for superstition, while Dr. Maynard Smith declares it is impossible to say how far it was prevalent, in serious matters—and no doubt he is right—he considers that "It was the indifference of the authorities to patent superstitions which made the Reformers so zealous in rooting up wheat and tares alike . . ." the said Reformers being, of course, the nothing-achieving Catholic critics of abuses and their tolerance, down to the moment when the change gave them their opportunity. There were superstitions in regard to Our

Lady's power of intercession, and superstitions in plenty gathered round the cult of the saints, and the author sets down all he thinks *ad rem*, but always without losing his head. But why should he think the Council of Trent likely to be suspected as defending superstitions? "Even the Council of Trent", he writes, could not deny the fact of such superstitions. He notes, making the inevitable comment, the way in which devotion to particular saints rises and falls without any reference to the degree of their sanctity—so far as it is known to us—or indeed to our knowledge of them. He quotes St. Thomas Becket with the most splendid shrine in Europe, and in the same cathedral, but wholly neglected, St. Anselm, and St. Augustine who had founded it and with it all our English religion.

Deriving from the doctrine of the saint's role as intercessor are the cult of images and of relics and the practice of pilgrimage. These three institutions, as the latter Middle Ages knew them, have been the subject of endless criticism and of controversy. Once again we find Canon Maynard Smith informed, cautious, instinctively reverent to the religious spirit however it shows itself, and, as always, moderate and reasoned in his criticism. The images which, moved by internal mechanism, rolled their eyes, bowed their heads, and the like, "are offensive to our taste, and it is of course possible that a child or very ignorant person may have been deceived . . . but there is no evidence to substantiate the charge of deliberate imposture". In the same fair spirit he writes of the provenance of the extraordinary relics that mediaeval shrines often boasted. "A childlike simplicity, a passionate desire to collect, a reverence for holy things, and a superstitious dread of the consequences of unbelief alike contributed to the ready acceptance of the strangest relics. . . . Ignorance there was and also knavery; but in most cases it is probable that legends grew up naturally without any consciousness of deceit." Again, in regard to the related subjects of the belief in Purgatory and the practice of offering the Mass for the Holy Souls, the author stoutly sets aside the traditional Protestant notion, to wit that the Church invented Purgatory in order

that clerics might make money out of peoples' fears. He seems, however, to think that sacraments were really sold (whatever Theology and Canon Law had, admittedly, to say in condemnation of such practice). But as to another insinuation, once very popular, he says very appositely, "Even today disappointed heirs . . . are quite ready to accuse a clergyman of undue influence if there is any chance of upsetting a will."

This first part of the book is, to my mind, the more successful. The subject matter of the second part is, in fact, too vast for any single writer to be able, usefully, to do more than summarize it. And in its presentation, it is, therefore, necessarily, something of a contrast to Part I. For the present reviewer it raises more frequent movements of dissent and contradiction—very possibly because of its inevitably summary style. In these last 250 pages the author proposes to account for the *Tendencies of the Time*. These tendencies are six, Lollardy, Scholasticism, the English Mystics, the Literature of the People, Humanism, and the Catholic Reformers. There is in this section ample evidence of a scholarly reading of the relevant literature that must have occupied the writer for years. And it is with a feeling almost of impertinence that one who is not a specialist in the matter puts forth the objections that occur to him.

But first of all it must be said that the same fair, scholarly, kindly spirit presides here that informed the earlier part of the work, and there is the same unhesitating rejection of a traditional view once it fails to prove itself true to the author. For example, in the matter of the early repression of Lollardy, "I cannot accept the legend of Foxe, though endorsed by Professor Trevelyan, of an ignorant, brutal and bigoted priesthood persecuting pious people because of their superior enlightenment." And is not such a sentence as the following, evidence, not only that an age of prejudice in the writing of ecclesiastical history is passing away but also that it is simply untrue that non-Catholic means anti-Catholic in reference to historical studies? "When we read this" [the story of a Lollard execution] "and other lamentable stories, we

honour the heroism of those who died for their faith, we hate the law under which they suffered, but we dare not condemn the judges. Neither should Protestant writers make party capital out of these horrors. . . . We ought to pity the ecclesiastical rulers who have to deal with fanatics impervious to reason ; while we pity the suffering fanatics, who in the way of unreason, witnessed so bravely to the supremacy of conscience. . . . Four hundred years hence men may regard capital punishment as we regard the burning of heretics ; but the men then will be wrong if they stigmatize our present judges as inhuman monsters."

The long chapter on Scholasticism, full of interesting matter as it is, and valuable as a resumé, fails yet to tell us, and must fail, what exactly was the kind of theology taught at Oxford and Cambridge in these years when St. John Fisher was Chancellor of the one university and Wolsey of the other. For this is one of the vital matters that so far no scholar has really explored. And, incidentally, it is a matter of great surprise that Canon Maynard Smith has not made use of St. John's Latin writings for the light they throw on the faith of the English Church at this time. He would surely have found there something to give him pause before he wrote, "No one probably at the beginning of the sixteenth century held that religious faith in the see of Peter which characterizes Roman Catholics today." And on this point it is singular that he has altogether overlooked the General Council in session during the years he is studying (5th Lateran 1512-1517) with its disputes and definitions about the relation of Pope to Council—a reflection of the recent controversy between Julius II and Louis XII's schismatical council of Pisa, a controversy whose most permanent memorials are two remarkable tracts by Cajetan, then Master General of his order, on the Roman Primacy.

The mystics, so the author thinks, accustomed their followers—the pious, comfortable, middle-class people who bought their works, that is to say—to the idea that union with God could be attained without the need of any help that priest or church could give, and so prepared

the coming welcome these middle classes would one day give the anti-sacerdotal reformers. Not that the mystics were themselves so unorthodox, but they emphasized religion as personal rather than corporate, and the connection between the interior life and external means to it was not shown so closely as it needed to be.

It is characteristic of Canon Maynard Smith that, familiar as he shows himself with the popular literature of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, he will not commit himself to any easy generalizations. "It is difficult to determine what influence all this literature had on the minds of the people, or how far it reflected what they were thinking. It is still more difficult to assess the evidence it offers concerning religion and morals." In an age when a name for mediaeval historical scholarship has been gained, time and again, by reckless judgment based simply on masses of instances collected uncritically from the literature of the time, these words are truly golden.

With the chapter on Humanism we begin to approach the internal causes of the coming crash. The Church's apologetics, the author thinks, were out of date, her theologians had never worked out (for nothing had happened to direct their thoughts towards it) any real theory of the Church's nature. This view, it seems to me, fails to take account of Turrecremata and of Cajetan. But that the "new knowledge came as a shock" to the generality, in such matters as its criticism of the False Decretals and the Donation of Constantine, is only too true. "It seemed to render everything insecure." The revelation of new worlds in Africa, Asia, and the Americas most of all, completed the shock for many people. While some asked were the Indians men or animals, others were scandalized at this revelation of whole worlds to whom Christianity had always been unknown. Could it be only a local religion after all? And there came a generation "like boys let out of school, running hither and thither, ready to defy authority, but with no settled plans for the exercise of their freedom".

The last hundred pages of the book are dominated by two figures, Erasmus and St. Thomas More. When the

author declares that "The reformation was bound to come Colet or no Colet" one cannot but ask, immediately, what he means by "the Reformation". Is it a tightening up of clerical morals and Catholic life in general, such as Trent ultimately produced? Or a general destruction of the mediaeval spiritual machine like that achieved by Luther? Or the invention of the new dogma of the Royal Supremacy? The section on St. Thomas More is, needless to say, written in a mood of wholehearted admiration. But one must object that it was not just "for the freedom of the Church" that he gave his life, but for the Roman primacy, and also, one would gladly break a lance on the interpretation given here of Erasmus' remark about the saint's youthful love affairs. Mr. Algernon Cecil in his portrait of the saint has surely ended that controversy.

To the learned author of one of the most agreeable books the last twelve months have produced no one who reads the book will fail to offer congratulations and thanks. And every reader will look forward to the promised volume that is to describe what happened between the day when Henry VIII received from Leo X the title *Defender of the Faith* and that other, seventy-two years later, when Elizabeth his daughter came to die at Richmond. "The ornaments have been lost," says Canon Maynard Smith, writing of the fate of Henry VII's chapel at Westminster, "but the fabric is secure. The breaks in continuity were spectacular, but the changes were more apparent than real. The chapel may be regarded as a parable in stone, illustrating the fact that while the Church may change her clothes and adornments from time to time she is herself indestructible because she belongs to God." This may serve as an instance of what in the introduction to this article was described as bewildering to a Catholic reader. May one such reader say, without offence, that some treatment much more realist, much more factual, and much more fundamental than this passage is witness to, will need to be found for the next volume if it is to attain, as a piece of historical work, the same standard as *Pre-Reformation England*.

PHILIP HUGHES.

CARDINAL WISEMAN AND CARDINAL MERCIER ON REUNION

When this address was first written out for publication it was sent, as was fitting, to Cardinal Mercier. A few days after it was sent the writer of the address was overwhelmed by the graciousness of the following letter.

ARCHEVÊCHÉ DE MALINES

22 Mars 1924.

DEAR FR. McNABB,

Many thanks for sending me the context of the paper you read at Birmingham.

I most cordially approve both the matter and the expression of it, and thank you heartily for the sympathy you express for all who have been and are willing to do their best to help wanderers back to the fold.

I feel sure that your words can but serve the cause which Leo XIII and Pius XI have put forward on more than one occasion, as one to which they give particular interest, and to which they attach a great importance.

I fail to see what ever the severest critic would find fault with in your paper ; and I, for my part, would gladly see it published in *Blackfriars*. Indeed, if you permit, I would have it translated and published here and in France.

I will, therefore, be grateful to your Very Reverend Father General for granting you the leave you will ask for and I make no doubt, as he is in Rome, that he will know that the Vatican has expressed its full sympathy with what has been done.

Yours very sincerely,

✠ D. J. CARD. MERCIER,
Archbishop of Malines.

So great is now the need and desire for a Christian United Front, and so much of Cardinal Mercier's unflinching and winning charity is astir, that there seemed no veiled reason for further withholding this address from the publicity he wished it to receive.

LET it be stated once for all that the writer of the following pages is too deeply conscious of the gravity and delicacy of the present religious position to endanger or dishonour it by his unsought criticism. An event which unsays many of the perplexing war-cries of

three centuries, has given publicity to the temperate utterances of His Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury and of their Eminences the Cardinal Archbishop of Malines and the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, and is known and approved by His Holiness Pope Pius XI, is in a plane where the criticism of the rank and file of the clergy could easily be an impertinence. In refusing to be a critic of events which are too official and delicate for aught but official wisdom, we shall content ourselves with the humble necessary task of accepting the event with understanding, if only for this reason: that no one can truly accept or reject what he is not at pains to understand. Moreover, as the event of the Malines Conversations is not the miracle of a phenomenon without antecedents we shall endeavour to throw light on the present by borrowing from the past, so that the words spoken by Cardinal Mercier in 1922 may be seen to carry on a tradition witnessed to if not begun by, Cardinal (then Bishop) Wiseman in 1841.

The first document we must consider bears on its title-page: "A LETTER ON CATHOLIC UNITY—ADDRESSED TO THE RIGHT HON. THE EARL OF SHREWSBURY—BY NICHOLAS, BISHOP OF MELIPOTAMUS. LONDON, CHARLES DOLMAN, 61 NEW BOND STREET. MDCCCXLI." The writer dated it St. Mary's College, St. Matthew's Day, 1841. Every fact in the title-page is of significance. Nicholas, Bishop of Melipotamos, is not a foreign prelate like Augustine or Theodore or Anselm. This almost oriental title introduces us to that most loyal and illustrious Englishman Nicholas Wiseman, then President of St. Mary's College, Oscott, Birmingham, and Co-adjutor Bishop of the Midland District. John Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury, friend of Ambrose de Lisle Phillips, is a nobleman who left the family wealth the poorer, but the family name the richer, by his munificence in trying to bring his country back to its old religious unity and artistic beauty. He was, in the craft of hope, the worthy yoke-fellow of Nicholas Wiseman.

The spring of the year 1841 had been made historic by John Henry Newman's Tract XC, which unaccount-

tably precipitated the battle which sooner or later would separate the new catholic party and the older protestant party in the Church of England.

One surprising circumstance of this event is the surprise of Newman and his friends when Tract XC drew the two forces within the Church of England to a general engagement. In seeking to defend the Established Church from Disestablishment by a Liberal Government the Tractarians could find no final entrenchment within the liberties of their own country. Parliament had long acted on the principle of its own sovereign rights, which made no legislation *ultra vires*. When, therefore, the Tractarians fell back from a national to an international base, i.e. from the English Church to the Catholic Church, the men themselves whose intelligence had planned this defence were tempting the fate of the secular hand that stretched forth to save the falling ark. Even if the defence proved wholly successful it could only be partially acceptable even to the defended. The Tudor Settlement had been too long co-terminous with England and co-incident with all that was influential in Church and State to be cut down at the sabre-stroke of a group of Oxford mystics. If the reaction against Queen Elizabeth meant the creed of Pius IV, if to be free from Whitehall meant to be subject to the Vatican—and especially if Cranmer by his Thirty-Nine Articles was really a delegate from Trent—then the successful defence of the Establishment against liberalism was bought at too dear a price. Sincere-minded men on both sides felt it their duty no longer to tolerate a state of religious defence which was in its essence intolerable. The welcome offered to Tract XC has been thus described by a temperate historian :

Most men would now admit that for the purpose which he had in hand Newman's argument was in the main sound ; but in 1841 the tension of public opinion was too great to admit of dispassionate treatment of such a subject. Convinced of the inherent dishonesty of the movement, its opponents could see nothing in the tract except proof positive that a conspiracy was abroad to undermine the English Church, and establish once more the supremacy of Rome. All Protestantism flew to arms. The heads of houses

at Oxford acting on the representation of four tutors, one of whom was Tait, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury, condemned the tract as a dishonest evasion of the articles. The issue of the tracts was stopped at the request of the Bishop of Oxford. Bishop after Bishop condemned them in their charges, some in most unguarded language.*

It was at this moment that Nicholas Wiseman, the young, brilliant, Roman-trained friend of kings and statesmen, ventured amidst the combatants with the gentle charity of this letter on Catholic Unity. Nothing could present a greater contrast with the almost fierce war-cries of the moment. From beginning to end in this letter from St. Mary's College there is nothing but the still, small voice, which becomes at last impressive by its almost unearthly contrast with the tragic passion of the battle. All the spirit of the great peace-maker is in the following words :

Ought we to sit down coldly, while such sentiments are breathed in our hearing, and rise not up to bid the mourner have hope ? Are we, who sit in the full light, to see our friends feeling their way towards us through the gloom that surrounds them, and faltering for want of an outstretched hand, or turning astray for want of a directing voice ; and sit on, and keep silent, amusing ourselves at their painful efforts, or perhaps allow them to hear, from time to time, only the suppressed laugh of one who triumphs over their distress ? God forbid ! *If one must err, if in mere tribute to humanity one must needs make a false step, one's fall will be more easy when on the side of two theological virtues than when on the cold bare earth of human prudence.* If I shall have been too hopeful in my motives, and too charitable in my dealings, I will take my chance of smiles at my simplicity both on earth and in heaven. Those of the latter at least are never scornful (pp. 20-21).

Wiseman's life was too many-sided and parti-coloured to be expressed by a phrase. But were one phrase needed to remind posterity of this peace-maker, none could be found more fit than this, which discounts beforehand the mistakes of love. That this resolution to rest his policy on two theological virtues was not a

* Henry Offley Wakeman : *An Introduction to the History of the Church of England* (1912), p. 475.

blind impulse but a reasoned conviction may be seen in the following words :

We find on a former occasion that a great prelate like the *Eagle of Meaux* felt it a duty to enter into earnest discussion with Leibnitz, upon the possibility of re-uniting Germany to the Roman Church, when there was nothing to encourage, nothing to promise success, except the desire of the political rulers, and the zeal, however enlightened, of Molinus alone ; but no feeling of want, no craving eagerness on the part of the separated Church herself, no yearnings after unity, *no filial respect for the mother-church on the part of her teachers*.* If this has been considered no discredit to one of Bossuet's immense perspicacity and great prudence, surely one so much his inferior in every respect need not be severely blamed if he attach some importance to the gradual approximation of many to the same desirable end ; and reject not at once and utterly their now clearly expressed wishes of seeing their Church restored to Catholic Communion. Again, Bossuet was a foreign bishop, having no stake or responsibility in that country ; and yet he deemed it his duty (instead of at once scouting all advances on the other side) to attend seriously to the most partial proposals for a restoration to unity, and to treat it with earnestness and kindness, and devote his talents to forward and mature it. Surely it will not be thought inconsiderate in one who *has* a deep and an eternal interest laid in this kingdom, who has a personal and serious stake in that very portion of it which forms the centre and focus of the new movement, to pay attention to far more striking and more positive declarations of a similar desire, and to direct his small ability to seeking the best means of accomplishing it (pp. 11-13).

This undaunted peace-maker, humble enough to sit at the feet of Bossuet, was largely prophetic in the advice he gently ventured to offer his separated brethren.

Their duties [he wrote] seem to me to be as follows :

1. To the Church of Christ. The paramount duty of healing the present schism. Not to be deterred by past failures, nor by

* Cardinal Wiseman here calls the "Roman Church" the "Mother Church" of the Lutherans ! He realized that if the Lutherans agreed with him in this title the disunion of two centuries would be at an end. With how much more truth could Wiseman have spoken of Rome as the "Mother Church" of those who claimed to be in communion with Canterbury and York !

present difficulties, nor by future sufferings, but to begin at once, and to persevere energetically in such measures as *directly* tend to the work of religious reunion ; not to say that the time is not yet come, but to hasten it forward, and strive with providence for the shortening of the days of trial.

2. To the people. Their predecessors in the ministry have done much to mislead the population of this country on the subject of religion, especially regarding the true character of the Roman Church, and its differences with the Anglican. The prejudices thus engendered have stood, and yet stand, much in the way of their reconciliation. It is the duty of actual members of the same ministry to undo the mischief, remove the obstacle, and by every means bring back the people to kindlier, juster, and truer views.

3. To the State. To draw a clear line between its functions and those of the Church ; and to apply at once to its rulers for revision of all that interferes with true religious liberty, that is with the power of claiming all the privileges of the Christian system—unity, universal charity, Catholic communion from which the nation is now debarred by the cramping and straightening enactments of an oppressive age. And if this shall fail who will say but that a sterner duty may arise ? The *regale* and the *pontificale* do not always run together ; and one may have to choose between the two.

4. To their own Church. If they love her as they say, they must not cease in their efforts to make her what they wish her.

It is as if we saw a law fulfilled when we compare what has actually come of the Anglo-Catholic movement with what this quiet lover of England suggested as a policy for the movement.

The advice given with such prophetic wisdom to the catholic group in the Church of England was followed by advice given to his fellow-catholics in words of heroic humility :

As far as concerns whatever the Church sanctions or clearly permits, I feel sure (as every Catholic must) that all can thus be placed in a right view. On individual cases of abuse or local malpractices, on all the results from the depravity of human nature or its frailties, let us willingly acknowledge that we have reason for grief or for shame ; but let it not be in a criminating spirit. Let the communion of saints on earth be a communion of sorrow, of confusions, of compunction, as well as of gladder sympathies ; let us bear each other's burdens, but let us not measure too jealously how

much is others' share. . . . My feeling is, *let condemnation be by each one on himself, and let our looks abroad be in charity and affection.* Let us English Catholics mourn over our own backwardness in much that is of duty, our own coldness in much that is of zeal. Let us English clergy lament our deficiencies in much of that ecclesiastical tone and spirit which abroad gives regularity to the sacred ministry and influences the commonest actions and habits of the priest (pp. 32-33).

Then follows a passage from the heart of one who thought that to be always right with mere human prudence was a less safe state of soul than sometimes to fail in company with two of the theological virtues :

When Divine Providence shall have brought us together it will be time to mingle our tears in any common mourning ; there will be family occasions of sorrow ; there will be domestic secrets communicated that may cause general pain ; there may be discoveries of frailty which will lead to Catholic sympathy. When brothers and sisters have quarrelled and re-embraced in reconciliation each is anxious to take upon himself as much of the blame as possible, and to discharge the others of it. At least, all of us will be glad that we were ever estranged, or why (pp. 32-33).

He adds a note which reveals the perfect charity of one whose love of souls and of truth is content to learn from any source—even beyond the frontiers of his native land : “Such is the feeling of the profound and pious Möhler. After observing that no Catholic can refuse to acknowledge with humiliation the corruptions of past ages ; that the proof lies in the very existence of Protestantism, which could not have existed without them, he thus concludes : Apprenez donc une fois, 8 Protestants, à mesurer la grandeur des abus que vous nous reprochez sur la grandeur de vos propres égarements. *Voilà le terrain sur lequel les deux églises se rencontreront un jour, et se donneront la main. Dans le sentiment de notre faute commune, nous devons nous écrier et les uns et les autres : “Nous avons tous manqué ; l'Eglise seul ne peut faillir. Nous avons tous péché, l'Eglise seul est pure de toute souillure.”**

His second counsel to his brethren is “self-improvement and, where necessary, self-reformation” (p. 34). He is of the line of seers who foretold the mediaeval Catholics

* *Symbolique*, t. II, §. 37, p. 33. The italics are Wiseman's. They are eloquent of the peace-maker.

that unless self-reformation was undertaken by themselves, great chastisements would be sent or sanctioned by God. His third counsel is that "harshness of language, sarcasm and bitterness will not either convince the understanding or win the affections. On the other hand, trustfulness in the sincerity of others, and in the goodness of their motives, hopefulness in the result of our endeavours . . . the Spirit of Christ and of His Church will not fail" (p. 35).

His last counsel is so apostolic and Pauline in its charity that its lesson is timely even for today :

A foreign priest* has pointed out to us a valuable document—*Bossuet's Reply to the Pope*—when consulted on the best method of reconciling the followers of the Augsburg Confession with the Holy See. The learned Bishop observes that Providence had allowed so much Catholic truth to be preserved in that Confession that full advantage should be taken of the circumstance, that no *retractions* should be demanded, but an explanation of the Confession in accordance with Catholic doctrines. Now, for such a method the way is in part prepared, by the demonstration that such interpretation may be given of the most difficult Articles, as will strip them of all contradiction to the decrees of the Tridentine Synod. The same method may be pursued on other points ; and much pain may thus be spared to individuals and much difficulty to the Church (p. 38).

The Rome of St. Gregory, the Rome that sent Augustine and Theodore, had sent this Nicholas with all the unchanging mercifulness of the Alma Mater. To us who live too near the active centre of the estrangement to foresee its cure this mercifulness would almost seem an unfounded, and indeed a dangerous, optimism. But in these matters Gregory and Augustine and Theodore and Nicholas are our masters. There was no mere thoughtless optimism about this last peace-maker whose faith and hope, like all living faith and hope, grew out of the charity which believeth all things, hopeth all things. He looked out on the harvest-field of England not with the yet untutored eyes of John or Peter, but with the divine eyes of Him who saw even in Samaria the fields whitening

* It will be noted how much of Wiseman's charity came from the Church abroad.

to the harvest. Assuredly it was a divinely given sight that could see in the year of Tract XC the promise of a reunited Christendom. But had Wiseman left his spirit to other Wisemans the hopes begotten of his charity might have been still nearer their fulfilment. . . .

Eighty-seven years have passed since Wiseman the peacemaker spoke his first noble words of peace. There have been moments of misunderstanding when even the gentle trust of Wiseman seemed folly or something worse than folly. There have been such undeniable outbursts of the mere man within us that our differences have seemed to be as natural and ineradicable as the colour-difference between West and East. We have again and again mistaken the back-wash of the wave for the outward ebb of the tide. It is therefore good for us to hear in our own tongue the words of one whom the world would probably call "the foremost prelate of his age", the Cardinal of Malines, the prelate-lion of Flanders. When Lord Halifax laid down the Presidency of the English Church Union we know that it was not in order to withdraw into the quiet of a sybaritic or student's idleness. But we did not know that his activities would be to such purpose as they have been. When he felt moved to ask the Cardinal Archbishop of Malines to offer his house as a meeting-place for men on both sides of our religious division, the prayers and hopes of Wiseman were receiving a fulfilment.

Far be it from me, a simple priest under the command of my Lord Pope, to offer even the criticism of approval to those informal talks which have been "known and approved by His Holiness Pope Pius XI". Yet there is a special joy in feeling how by his heart-felt approval the simple priest was in unison with his own immediate diocesan, who, though Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, was proud to call himself the dutiful child of the Holy Father. His words on the Malines Conversation are to be remembered and prized all the more because they have the solemnity of an Archbishop's Lenten Pastoral to his flock :

Wiseman and Mercier on Reunion 169

It is to us a matter of rejoicing that members of the Establishment, to whatever school of thought they may belong, should seek from representative Catholics whether they be in France or Belgium, or at home, or in any other country, a more complete understanding of what the Catholic Church teaches. Such contact, with the help and guidance of the Holy Spirit, must be productive of good even though no actual result may be immediately attained.*

The spirit of Rome is in the following noble profession of charity. Speaking of one who seemed to underrate the interest of English Catholics in the matter of Reunion, the Pastoral says :

How little does the writer or utterer of such things realise what we feel with regard to the restoration of England to the unity of Christendom—how there is no sacrifice of place or position that we are not prepared to make in order to attain so great an end—how there is not a Bishop among us who would not gladly resign his See and retire into complete obscurity if thereby England could again be Catholic (p. 5).

With words like these ringing in our ears, and clinging about our heart, can we doubt that our chastened hopes are something more trustworthy than untempered optimism ?

.

But these same Malines Conversations, which have thus been approved and supported by a Pastoral of His Eminence the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, have been to some extent unveiled in a Pastoral Letter of their chief actor, the Cardinal Archbishop of Malines. This letter, so unmistakably in defence of religious peace, is worthy to take its place with the immortal letters he wrote in defence of international justice during the Great War. The spirit of Cardinal Wiseman has passed into the peacemaker who has written the unforgettable words :

Obviously the disagreement of both sides on several fundamental questions was notorious : we all knew that. *But we also know*

* *Lenten Pastoral of H. E. the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster, 1924, p. 7.*

that if truth has its rights, charity has its duties. We thought that, perhaps, by dint of open-hearted converse and the intimate conviction that in a vast conflict centuries old, *all the wrongs were not on one side.**

Wiseman was never so consummate a wizard of words as to leave such a phrase on truth and charity to enrich the fierce annals of controversy. But again, what are the closing words of the extract but a re-echo of Wiseman's invitation to both sides to begin their discussions not with *Peccastis vos*, but with a meek *Peccavimus*, or, in the Cardinal's simple phrase, "All the wrongs were not on one side"? Moreover, few incidents in modern ecclesiastical peacemaking have been more courteous—and even chivalrous—than Cardinal Mercier's defence of the Archbishop of Canterbury's letter to the Archbishops and Metropolitans of the Anglican Communion :

For more than two years I have been in close and intimate touch with a few prominent Anglicans, for whom I feel a deep regard and sincere affection. We have met several times. I have exchanged with them letters on the matter which lies closest to my heart, the interests of the Catholic Church my Mother. I had no thought of acquainting you with this intercourse for the very simple reason that its object is, of its nature, confidential; and that, furthermore, we had mutually agreed not to make it public without previous consent; the agreement has been lived up to. The Archbishop of Canterbury has revealed nothing of the subject-matter of our conversations nor of the conclusions arrived at; but he considered that the time had come for him to define for the members of his community the stand he had taken with regard to our conferences. *This was on his part a loyal initiative, in which moreover I fully acquiesced. It was also a courageous line of action to take.†*

Men who read the courageous and loyal letter of the Archbishop of Canterbury with the hope of finding in it the account of furtive meetings which could have been worthy of Canterbury only had they been known to the Holy Father were surprised—if not shocked—to read the Cardinal's simple words: "Our discussions were thus in no sense *negotiations*. To negotiate it is necessary to hold

* Pastoral Letter of the Cardinal Archbishop of Malines.

† Ibid.

a mandate ; and neither on one side nor on the other side were we invested with a mandate. And I for my part had asked for no such commission ; it was enough to know that I was acting in agreement with the Supreme Authority, blessed and approved by it.”* Of course the more thoughtful spectators of events had no need of these reassuring words. The consummate master of *comme il faut*, the official councillor of the Sovereign Pontiff was not likely to meet a crisis needing diplomatic skill by a sudden lapse from his personal quality and official duty of wisdom. Perhaps for us obedient children of St. Peter the most significant paragraph in the letter of H.E. the Cardinal of Malines is the following :

Sincere Christians who feel powerless—a feeling we also share in a lesser degree—to arrest this evil (of irreligion) appeal to us for help ; at least they invite us to discuss with them the means of stemming the tide of irreligion ; and rigorists would fain bar the way ! . . . So far so good, will perhaps be the answer ; but this was not the primary object you had in sight. The main point was to bring immediate weight to bear on men of faith, members of the High Church, in order to bring them back to Rome. The main point ! How does the critic know ? We never had the thought of ranging in order of importance the guiding motives of our conduct. We took a broad view of the whole problem in which were concerned men whose souls were keenly alive to their duties towards themselves and towards others by reason of their social influence. . . . Next we are told that we are going the wrong way to reach our goal and that our method is a clumsy one ; experience, it is alleged, has taught us not to consider groups ; individual conversions alone must be sought for. Here I say to my critics, *by what authority do you limit the workings of the Divine Mercy ?* By all means be bestirred about individuals ; enlighten, pray for, work for, as much as you may, every soul God sends across your path ; no one will think of blaming you. But what entitles you to put aside bodies of men ? It is your exclusivism which is to be blamed. Allow me to refresh your memory. Listen to Leo XIII’s weighty words, when on April 14th, 1895, in his Apostolic Letter AMANTISSIMAE VOLUNTATIS, he spoke not to individuals, but to the whole English people, *Ad Anglos*. . . . He ends his Apostolic Letter Apostolicæ Curæ. . . . “We will, to the best of our powers, never cease to further their reconciliation to the Church ;

* *Ibid.*

and we fervently hope that their example will be followed by individuals *and groups*.”*

We feel no call or capability to supplement these words with criticism. Indeed, we hardly dare add a word of comment lest it appear to be criticism. But those of us who have had to answer men whose arguments made the narrow way of reunion still narrower have now the power of offering these men the mercies of this pastoral of Malines. There they will learn, under Papal approval, that Corporate or Collective Reunion, so common in the East, is not to be denied by private authority to the West. Many if not most of the contrasts between the circumstances of the first and second letter are towards chastened hope. The letter of 1841 was but a gesture of peace towards a little group of men who found small sympathy either in or out of their communion. When their action was only the sign for a concerted repudiation by their hierarchy, hope for the success of that action seemed foolhardiness rather than heroism. Some things must have greatly changed that we are now witnesses of the courteous, courageous letter of the Archbishop, and the no less courteous, courageous letter of the Cardinal Archbishop of Malines. The spirit that led the Lambeth Conference to say that “there can be no fulfilment of the Divine Purpose in any scheme of Reunion which does not ultimately include the great Latin Church of the West, with which our history has been so closely associated, and to which we are still bound by so many ties of common faith and tradition” must surely have been abroad in the Hierarchy which with a few exceptions has offered their Archbishop no word of disapproval.

Perhaps an equally significant incident is outlined in the following words of King George V in answer to the usual address of the deputation from the House of Convocation of Canterbury: “I observe with special satisfaction that you have placed foremost amongst the tasks awaiting you the vital question of Christian unity. It has always been my fervent hope that a greater

* *Ibid.*

measure of unity might be promoted among the different religious communions; and I trust that your deliberations may be so guided as to lead to closer fellowship between Christian people." A similar answer was made by His Majesty to a similar deputation of the Convocation of York. His Majesty's reply is all the more significant as neither of the deputations had made any allusion to Reunion.

Utterances like these, made at a time when ancient dynasties and empires are being superseded, make the work of forecast difficult. Yet, where it is hard to foresee, it may be easy to hope. Perhaps the most entangled side of the restoration of the Church of England to Catholic Unity is the legal settlement which was originated and forcibly carried by the Crown, against the wishes of the Church. If, as an accredited Crown lawyer has suggested to the present writer, these proceedings of the Crown and Parliament were *ultra vires*, and therefore reversible by a decision of the power that consummated them, the peace efforts of Mercier and Wiseman may one day make the bells of England to ring out with joy at an Armistice which stills the religious war of three hundred years. *Faxit Deus.*

FR. VINCENT McNABB, O.P.

PASTURES GREEN

Not in Jerusalem only are green fields
Conductors of the Lord Almighty's will ;
The exhausted soul breathes where the dewpond yields
Coolness, where grass is long, and the air still.

The body resting flat on earth, the spirit
Swells to the sweet expanse of silent peace ;
Pastures are here, roots, thickets, thorns to inherit
With unity, fulfilment and release.

Where cattle browse to fullness of their food,
There, ruminating as the cleaner beast,
The soul can feed upon a rarer good
And wax contented at the Father's feast.

In crowded offices, where leer and smile
Dull the pure sense and send the heart asleep,
There, in the mind, leap over the mind's stile
And, landing on the grass, become a sheep.

Whatever Falstaff said,—a billiard table
Had the redeeming freshness of a meadow
As, when he died, the fumes of pub and stable
Cleared to a grassy vision, and the shadow
Of heavenly goodness brought to him the field
Where long grass grows and where the clovers smell,
With kingcups in Jerusalem that yield
A golden harvest and a holy spell.

KATHARINE GARVIN.

SOME RECENT BOOKS

Symbolism and Belief. By Edwyn Bevan. (Allen & Unwin. 15s. net.)

THIS book contains the Gifford Lectures of 1933 and 1934, and is a book of vast horizons and of uncommon depths. It deals with an aspect of human reality which is coming more and more to the fore both inside and outside the Catholic Church. This aspect is what I should like to call man's essential "sacramentality". Man, while constituted of body and soul, of matter and spirit, is none the less perfectly one, with one set of forces to live out one life and one purpose. The interdependence of the twin tendencies manifests itself not only in his constitution, but in his every action, exterior or interior, of volition or of apprehension, in the secular sphere as well as in the religious. Man is a living sign which holds in itself its living reality. How since the Reformation individualism with its innate tendency towards unchecked analysis, with its narrowing and disintegrating subjectivism caused man to lose the sense of the "whole" and the power of synthesis is a mightily interesting story full of excellent lessons for humanity, but beyond the scope of a book review. Yet, to understand the meaning of Edwyn Bevan's lectures, one should really be fully conscious of the mentality that animated the last four or five centuries. The lectures show a remarkable change of mentality, a change towards a sounder, a more balanced, a fairer, and in the end a more genuinely human outlook. This is the more important since such a change means that the modern mind draws closer to the reality of the Catholic Church, and nowhere is true humanism better and more completely preserved and fostered than in Catholic Christianity. This is, I dare say, what Edwyn Bevan discovered for himself; it explains and justifies his respectful treatment of Roman Catholic doctrine and tradition.

The problem which Mr. Bevan chose and for which his anterior works on religious philosophy had well prepared him is an extremely vast and deep one. It is, moreover, a problem which in so far as its scientific treatment is concerned is relatively new. For the essential "sacramentality" of man demands a treatment of man *as a whole*, whilst, in spite of solemn assertions to the contrary, the philosophy (scholastic as well as non-scholastic) of post-Reformation times viewed man in a most disconcertingly analytical way. This philosophy forgets the "rational" when it treats of the "animal", the "individual" when it treats of the "social", the unity of essence when it treats of the numerical multiplication,

and *vice versa*. But when one starts by accepting man (better still, mankind) as a whole, our view of all problems that affect him in one way or other will obviously be greatly altered thereby.

Mr. Bevan has chosen five symbols (height, time, light, spirit and wrath) to illustrate the "sacramental" feature of human nature in its relation with religion. Then he devotes two lectures to symbols and their intrinsic meaning, after which he is in a position to compare the fundamentally Christian "symbolic" or "sacramental" interpretation of reality with other solutions, such as pragmatism, Mansel's pragmatism (softened by a certain amount of analogy) and scholastic analogy. Professor Bevan seems to prefer Mansel's position—with certain nuances—to the scholastic position. I am not sure that the scholastic—or, rather, the Thomistic—position has been granted the thorough investigation with which Mansel has been favoured. Where Mansel's position has been evidently studied with a fair knowledge and frankly sympathetic approach, the author seems to have "looked up" St. Thomas rather than studied the Thomistic synthesis. In regard to Thomistic analogy he admits that he "cannot profess himself able to make sense of this explanation" (p. 315). Obviously not, if it is not first realized that the notion of "being" is the key to Thomistic analogy. And to this it must be added that the two deepest interpretations of analogy are not Sertillanges and Garrigou-Lagrange but Penido (*Le rôle de l'analogie dans la théologie dogmatique*, Paris, 1931), and Przywara (whose book on Analogy has been translated by Professor Bouquet, of Cambridge. C.U. Press, 1935). And, in brackets, it might be noticed once for all by non-Catholics that there is no such thing as an official philosophy in the Church, still less an official theologian, and I am sure Father Sertillanges's humility would be greatly hurt—and perhaps other people's feelings as well—if he is proclaimed that official theologian. The last lecture is a discreet but forceful defence of a Christocentric religion coming very close to what the Catholic liturgical movement hails as its ideal for mankind.

A book with such a vast scope is not a book for criticism in detail. One remark may, however, be permitted as to its method. No one could doubt the immense erudition or the astounding facility of assimilation or the charmingly gallant sincerity of Mr. Bevan's mind. Yet on the whole the scientific fashions and the slightly naïve ways of arguing that characterize the modern mind have rather weakened the general thesis of the book. The predominant argument is the argument *ad hominem*—which is not exactly the most convincing. It may silence an opponent in a public debate; but to silence is one thing, to convince another. There is, in spite of the persevering attempt at going to the root

of the matter, a lack of the philosophic power indispensable in such a synthesis as has been construed here. And if many thinkers, Catholic as well as non-Catholic, disagree with the actual state of scholasticism or even of Thomism, it cannot be denied that there is no system which can rival its mental training, its relentless discipline. And it is precisely this lack of mental discipline or training which seems too mortifying to be accepted by non-Catholics, and which prevents non-Catholic works rousing a genuine, whole-hearted interest among Catholics. I give a simple instance of this lack of mental discipline in Mr. Bevan's argument. "Even if the established philosophy of the Roman communion teaches that the animals inferior to men have no rights, it seems incredible that, if God is at all what Christian theology believes Him to be, the infliction of unnecessary pain upon any of His sentient creatures is not an offence to Him" (p. 303). This sentence implies that there is a contradiction between "Roman philosophy" (if such a thing exists) and Christian theology. But is it not elementary first to explain what is meant by "right"? If "Roman philosophy" holds that only *persons*, that is, rational creatures, are capable of rights, it surely holds, too, that God is personal and the source of all rights. God's rights extend as far as His creation which is His "possession" in a superior way to any human way of possessing. There is therefore an infringement of *His* right if man violates the laws which govern *His* creation, and among these laws there is the fundamental law by which each being (whether animal, human, spiritual or vegetative or merely material) is given existence in order to attain the highest perfection within the scope of each one's existence. The ends of *all* creatures may only be interfered with when a higher being substitutes a *higher* aim to the lower aim: this is merely a consequence of the organic hierarchy of God's creation and its cosmic solidarity. Hence it is mere sentimentality to stand up for animals as if plants or the other beauties of this universe were not equally bearers of God's rights like the animals, or man himself for that matter. But there is no need whatever to endow animals with personality (the only source of "right" in the strict sense of the word, according to the scholastics), it suffices that man treats animals according to the laws which all men have engraved upon their conscience. Thus the whole sentence quoted above becomes simply irrelevant.

The same limitations of thought hamper the author's view of evolution. He seems to conceive of evolution only as a *progress* from matter to spirit, from the gross to the perfect. *Because* some term was used by primitive people this term *must* have an exclusive material content. The scientific results of Wilhelm Schmidt's

researches, to which the author seems quite rightly to adhere, should have made him aware of the extreme complexity of the problem of evolution. History is there to prove that evolution may mean decadence and disintegration, that the increase of the number of men brings in the factor of the "crowd", with its heaviness and its debasing passions. One might conceive the religious evolution before the coming of Christ to have taken place as follows, taking of course scientifically established facts as the starting-point :

(a) Man lived first in a world in which his economic needs were limited to a mere matter of subsistence, which he found in a rich nature with sufficient freedom of movement to be ignorant of genuine economic pressure. His world of ideas was probably exceedingly simple—but this does not necessarily mean "material". Even mystics of modern times show us how it is possible to have an extremely rich spiritual life of great depth without culture and with only some very few and rather general ideas like "Providence", or God's "sublimity", or God's fatherhood. The new discoveries made in ethnology show us precisely that the most primitive people had such an idea of God as father. Now this idea of "fatherhood" cannot reasonably be supposed to have been purely anthropomorphic, for they never "saw" God as a material father, nor any of the ordinary signs that mark out a purely human father.

(b) This simple world of ideas would tend towards a gradual blunting of conceptions, by reason of the spreading of the human race, multiplication, separation, passion, etc.

(c) On the other hand, these same factors which might bring about a grosser conception of the spiritual world (the law of inertia holds good in all human spheres) would bring about a material progress postulated by the increase of economic needs, practical experience, possibilities of collaboration and organization, etc. This is a "progress"; but, as our own civilization shows, such an "evolution" in civilization based on practical science does not necessarily mean an increase of man's spiritual power or nobility.

(d) As a consequence of the withdrawal from the more simple but also more spiritual stage of early civilization, together with an intense concentration upon new needs and new possibilities, an anthropocentric outlook becomes substituted for the old theocentric outlook.

I have not even made mention of any supernatural facts, because my aim is simply to show that even a non-Catholic cannot reasonably maintain the naïve scientific outlook on evolution. All this serves only to show that in spite of the powerful and most gallant

effort made by Mr. Bevan in defence of Christianity, he does not seem to have achieved more than indicating the majestic outlines of an approach to his thesis. But though these points had to be made, it must be admitted that he towers high above the sophistry of Dean Inge, the scientific platitudes of Julian Huxley, and the great hollowness of H. G. Wells. Mr. Bevan has done pioneer's work, and as such it is an ungracious task to criticize an effort in which he has at any rate surpassed the inertia of us Catholics. He has a definite claim to our gratitude—and no less to that of non-Catholics.

DOM THEODORE WESSELING.

The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure. By Etienne Gilson. (Sheed & Ward. 18s. net).

History of Mediaeval Philosophy. Vol. II. The Thirteenth Century. By Maurice de Wulf. Translated by E. C. Messenger, Ph.D. (Longmans Green & Co. 17s. 6d. net).

SCHOLASTICISM is not Thomism. Though its greatest representative, St. Thomas, did not exhaust the *philosophia perennis*, hitherto he has been the only scholastic doctor whose work was accessible to English readers. Now, however, we possess an excellent account of another version of scholasticism, the philosophy of St. Bonaventure. Professor Gilson proves that St. Bonaventure was no rudimentary or imperfect St. Thomas, but represents a deliberately different presentation of the same fundamental philosophy.

Scholasticism is a blend of Augustinian neo-platonism and Aristotelianism. St. Thomas is predominantly Aristotelian, Bonaventure Augustinian. Both, however, combine both factors, though in different proportions.

Whereas St. Thomas believed in the possibility of a philosophy based solely on reason and owing nothing to the data of revelation, for St. Bonaventure the unaided reason of fallen man could not achieve such a philosophy. It could be attained only by employing in the light of faith the revealed doctrines of Christianity and the experience of Christian mysticism. Surely we must admit that even if St. Thomas's view be correct in the abstract, in the concrete a satisfactory philosophy has not been reached by pagan or even by Moslem thinkers. But we are not prepared to grant even the theoretical and abstract possibility of a true philosophy apart from revelation and mystical experience. Of its nature philosophy is an interpretation of human experience as a whole. It must therefore take the whole of that experience into account. If, however, there has entered into human experience a public

revelation of religious truth and a mystical experience of God, and if religious truth is the highest truth, religious experience the deepest apprehension of the nature of reality, then it is impossible to elaborate a true interpretation of human experience if these supreme truths and experiences are left out of account. We do not even think that Thomism is a philosophy independent of theology, whatever its author may have intended and believed. If it is, where are the non-Christian Thomists? One or two here and there, perhaps—certainly no thinker of outstanding rank. St. Bonaventure, it is true, regarded as revealed truth biblical utterances concerning the scientific sphere, and this fundamentalism led to an unwarranted appeal to revelation at points and on levels where pure reasoning from empirical data was alone justified. But only the details of his system are affected by this.

There remains a magnificent vision of the universe seen in the light of the incarnate and crucified Word in which every creature in its own order and on its own level manifests that divine Word to us. For whether as vestige, image, or by grace a likeness, the creature realizes an exemplar in the Divine Mind. That is why for St. Bonaventure exemplarism is a doctrine of primary importance, possibly more important than it was for St. Thomas, though we think that on this point M. Gilson exaggerates the divergence between them.

Exemplarism displays creatures as natural incarnations of the Word because realizations and concrete embodiments of the Divine Ideas which are aspects of the Word as imitable by creatures. The Christian revelation reveals the Word as personally incarnate in man, the microcosm of all orders of created being, to redeem man, and through man his earthly environment, by His sacrificial death, and raise man and instrumentally the sub-human to the supernatural order of communion with the divine life. And the earthly consummation of this supernatural communion, the mystical union with the Word made flesh, is not only the highest fulfilment of man's purpose possible in this life and the earnest of perfect redemption and union hereafter in body and soul, but in its very darkness of a knowledge of God exceeding all distinct notions is an illumination whose light clears and elevates the understanding to grasp whatever truth about God and the relation of creatures to Him is knowable on earth. Thus for St. Bonaventure Christ, and Christ crucified, is the centre of his entire philosophy, both the light whereby he knows it and the ground and end of the truth thus known. As M. Gilson very happily puts it, in St. Bonaventure, Mount Alvernia and the schools of Paris are wedded—in the supreme wisdom of the Cross.

There could not be a more timely companion to M. Gilson's

book than the second volume of Professor de Wulf's *History of Mediaeval Philosophy* which has now appeared in an English dress. For it deals with the golden century of scholasticism in which the *philosophia perennis* achieved an abundant flowering of great representatives, agreed on fundamental principles but displaying a vital individuality and freedom in their distinctive variations upon the common theme. The Dominican and more Aristotelian school passed through St. Albert the Great to St. Thomas; the Franciscan school, often called Augustinian, though in fact it drew largely from neo-platonizing Arab and Jewish thinkers, through St. Bonaventure to Duns Scotus. Professor de Wulf brings out the greatness and importance of Scotus, and he concludes his concise account of individual thinkers—and all, even the least important and least gifted, were individual thinkers—by an excellent conspectus of the metaphysical position. He displays the background of common doctrine against which alone we can judge the diversities between the schoolmen. We cannot, however, but think that even with Scotus Aristotle tended to acquire an undue predominance at the expense of St. Augustine and other representatives of the platonic aspect of scholastic ideal realism.

It is interesting to note the objective view taken by Albertus Magnus of the divine exemplars. For him "they are the *essentiae simplices* which radiate from the Divine Essence and exist in a pure state". He must, however, have located them in the Divine Mind, though as formally distinct.

Far from agreeing with St. Thomas that "action cannot belong to the substance of a contingent being", we believe all substances are energy—objects, though in so far as they are not in act that energy is potential in respect of its accidental actuations. Surely this view reconciles the act-potency principle of all contingent being, which St. Thomas brings out so magnificently, with the essentially dynamic character of all beings.

Blinded, we think, by the intellectual splendour of the greatest century of human philosophic thought, Professor de Wulf fails to see the dark aspect of the Middle Ages. "Under the rule of the feudal monarchy the populace was relatively happy." The thirteenth century was not only the age of St. Louis and St. Thomas, it was also the age of Ezzelino and King John.

Neither Salimbene's *Chronicle* nor the *Divina Commedia*, the latter looking back upon the thirteenth century from its close, paints a rosy picture of it. Even in the Franciscan order the difference between the Spirituals and the mitigated parties in the order was fought out with the aid of imprisonment for years in solitary confinement. It would finally be decided by the stake, though not till the fourteenth century. "Life seemed good to

live". We are prepared to challenge Professor de Wulf to show us the thirteenth-century writer who regarded life as good apart from the possibility of attaining salvation and so escaping to a better life: we are "weeping and mourning in this vale of tears". We do not imply that the mediaeval man is to be blamed for his pessimism about earthly life; even for the happiest of us it would not be worth living were there no God and no hope of a blessed immortality. But why impute to him the transitory optimism of the Victorians, and not of the deepest thinkers even among them?

What we need is the ultimate metaphysical and religious optimism of mediaeval thought which sees, through and beyond the tear mist which clouds even the loveliest earthly landscapes, the more real world of God and of souls perfectly united with God. That vision and that vision alone makes life good to live. And it was the vision of all the thinkers whose achievement is here studied, with the exception of the vanquished and inconsistent Averroists.

In that vision philosophy and revealed religion united—however that union was conceived—to present a world view reaching from solid earth, the acceptance of the sensible world as in its order real, to the height of God, and comprehending in its vast sweep the entire range of man's experience.

Unfortunately, this vision remained in great part a framework which could not be filled in theoretically for lack of scientifically established facts—though science began again with Grosseteste, Albertus Magnus, and Bacon—nor carried into practical effect for lack of the necessary social and political organization.

To combine the scientific achievement of modernity both in theory and practice and the organization it has permitted with the mediaeval vision of philosophic and religious truth is the sole hope of human civilization. A distant hope, unfortunately; indeed, impossible until the radically false ideologies which at present darken man's vision have been exposed by the logic of events. Meanwhile, those who treasure the saving vision, the synthesis of a Christian ideal realism, will welcome the clear account here given of its great exponents and builders.

E. I. WATKIN.

The Jacobean Age. By David Mathew, Litt. D., M.A., F.S.A. (Longmans Green & Co. 15s.)

"Such was William Cecil," writes Mr. Belloc, "one of the greatest and certainly one of the vilest of men that ever lived. His work has outlived him and his associates by many hundred years."*

* Characters of the Reformation, p. 205.

It is interesting to compare with this characteristic dictum Dr. Mathew's judgement on his son Robert; if I do not mistake him, he makes his own the words of Sir Simonds d'Ewes: "The times since have justified this man's action, that howsoever he might be an ill Christian . . . yet that he was a good statesman and no ill servant of the Commonwealth." In these two judgements on the founders of the two great branches of the Cecil family is to be seen the fundamental difference of outlook between two of the leading English Catholic historians of today, and it gives us the clue to Dr. Mathew's approach to a period which he has studied probably more thoroughly than it has ever been studied before. Though he writes of the seventeenth century he does not use the fierce lights and shades of a Caravaggio or a Zurbaran; his work, with its subtle and at times scarcely perceptible changes of colour, descriptive rather than dramatic, with a keen sense of domestic detail, recalls the atmosphere of the Dutch school. Here and there, however, there are keen flashes of satire which seem to hint that the influence of Hieronymus Bosch may not be completely absent. To this latter class belongs his account of King James's funeral sermon, which was preached by Bishop Williams, a painfully successful prelate: "As he came to the fall of the peroration, the Bishop did not forget to pay a tribute to the Duke of Buckingham, and introduced a simile from the Life of Christ. 'How did he thrust,' he declared, in reference to King James's magnanimity, 'as it were into his inward bosom, his *Bishops*, his *Judges*, his neare *servants*, and that *Disciple of his whom he so loved* in particular.' How strongly do these words suggest the courage, the doubtful taste, and the flamboyant cracking imagery?"

A remarkable amount of learning and research has gone to the making of this book—most important of all being the author's access to the unpublished Hatfield House MSS. dealing with the years 1606 to 1612; as the result of this, chapters III, IV, and V dealing with the work and influence of Lord Salisbury are a contribution of the greatest value to historical studies. With constant skill and insight is the contrast drawn between the more youthful and boisterous days of Queen Elizabeth, and the reign of peace and construction which the country knew under her clever, canny, disordered Scottish cousin. Peace and construction there was, but nevertheless all was not well; after death had removed Salisbury's skilful and usually invisible controlling hand, an ominous gap began to form between the country and the throne, of which Charles I was to experience the full and disastrous effect. Dr. Mathew finds an interesting symbol of this gap in the development of the masque: "The scenes of a former time had

stood at the street corners in the progresses. The familiar parables were re-enacted, the magician of China coming down out of his 'heaven' and comparing the country from which he came with ours in a long, sleepy speech. But this comforting ritual had vanished with the Tudor epoch. It was the fashion of the age to regard this new vast expenditure on masques for a limited audience as princely and magnanimous. But if that adjective may apply it is also clear that James I, and still more his son, paid for that magnanimity with the nation."

This book abounds in pleasant thumb-nail sketches, and most of them are shrewd, just as his quotations from writers of the period are well chosen for describing personality. The following from *The Prudentiall Balance of Religion* by the Bishop of Chalcedon is a case in point: "I have also in this parte shewed that the Romane religion of St. Austin hath continued ever since unto our time in all our Bishoppes, Prelats, Devines and Cleargie (except Wiclif and his small crue) by the example of their heades the Archbishops of Canterbury, whom I shew to have bene in number sixty-nyne, and in religion perfect Roman Catholiques." It is to be hoped that if in three hundred years from now a historian of our time should write as delightful a book, he will quote as felicitously from the writings of the Bishop of Aelia. This book is, however, not only pleasant reading; it is of first-rate historical importance.

CLONMORE.

The English Recusants. By Brian Magee. (Burns Oates & Washbourne. 10s. 6d. net).

MR. MAGEE's book is undoubtedly a contribution of first-class importance to the history of Catholicism in England, and thereby also—as Mr. Belloc emphasizes in a stimulating introduction—to English history as a whole. It attempts to show how statistical data in regard to the numbers, influence in public life, and geographical distribution of the Catholics in England at different points between the crucial first Parliament of Elizabeth and the great Catholic slump under the Georges, may be calculated along scientific and historical lines. This is an inquiry of very great import for the history of England in the great formative period of the century and a half following the accession of Elizabeth, and it is one that has not previously been made on a sufficient scale by any author endowed both with the right spirit and an adequate equipment. Mr. Magee, however, while disclaiming finality in any sense, has put forward a method, and on certain points can be said to have reached valid conclusions. He has drawn upon a great variety of materials, published and unpublished, which he

has utilized with a nice combination of expert skill and common sense. The conclusions of each chapter are succinctly summarized at the end of it, and those of the whole book in a conclusion of some five and a half pages.

The book abounds in points of interest which cannot all be specified here. It may be noted that the greater part of the material used, though by no means the whole, refers to the landowning classes—squires, knights, baronets, and peers. No doubt this is inevitable; and no doubt, too, the landowning classes are, for seventeenth-century purposes, a fair indication for the country as a whole, even allowing for the growth of commerce and industry. The study of Elizabeth's first Parliament, originally published in this Review, stresses the influence exercised in the Commons by a group of important government supporters—a factor common, of course, as Professor Notestein has shown us, to all Tudor Parliaments, and utilized on many different occasions to put through government policy in various matters and keep Parliament and Crown in harmony. Mr. Magee shows how essential the assistance of such a group was in passing the Elizabethan bills of Supremacy and Uniformity which otherwise might well have been wrecked. His main statistical conclusions are that up to 1588 more than half of the population of England "remained attached to the Catholic Faith"; that the Armada and the Gunpowder Plot were the chief factors in a decline of numbers; that under Charles I and Charles II the figure to be suggested is about 10 per cent. of the population, with something a little higher for James II's reign. For 1715-1720 he estimates about 5 per cent., and by 1781, a nadir of 1 per cent. only.

If the idea of an England still 50 per cent. Catholic at heart throughout most of Elizabeth's reign and at least 10 per cent. so under the Stuarts cuts across many well-established, not to say hoary, notions, it must be admitted to cut, in a sense, more ways than one. These large numbers of Catholics were by no means all *recusants*, using that word in its technical sense of persons labouring permanently under the full and unremitting pressure of the recusancy laws; and Mr. Magee's book is perhaps just a little misleadingly entitled, seeing that he lays such great stress upon this distinction. The recusants proper, that is to say those Catholics who refused to go to the Established Church and had formally been indicted and convicted of this offence against the laws of the realm, were perhaps only a comparatively small proportion of the Catholics. There were also those who, while refusing to go to church, had not, in point of fact, been indicted or convicted. There were also the so-called "Church-Papists" who would go to the Anglican Church

on occasion, to avoid formal recusancy, but drew the line at taking communion there. We must not forget the existence of these different categories when making our picture of Catholicism in England in the seventeenth century. Furthermore, Mr. Magee establishes clearly what indeed was known before, that the recusancy laws were administered with a remarkable lack of uniformity and efficiency that varied often with general political or particular local circumstances. "The financial penalties for Recusancy" he writes (p. 80), "though theoretically overwhelming, were seldom enforced up to the hilt. In the majority of cases they were not enforced at all: only in a comparatively few hard cases were very heavy burdens imposed." It is well that we should realize this, and Mr. Magee's very interesting chapter on recusancy fines points the danger of reading sixteenth- and seventeenth-century history too much from the statute-book, while his general figures show how even in those centuries a comparatively large minority could be kept suppressed by stringent laws only spasmodically enforced, and even when enforced, only so by the active co-operation of the local gentry.

It is very much to be hoped that Mr. Magee's book, with its welcome absence of special pleading and religious polemic will get the attention that it deserves from historical specialists, even if its findings may not at all points command full acceptance. He has blazed a trail that should be followed up, and that may well lead in time to even richer harvests.

H. O. EVENNETT.

Seventeenth Century Studies. Presented to Sir Herbert Grierson. (Oxford University Press. 21s. net).

The Ferrar Papers. Edited by B. H. Blackstone. (Cambridge University Press. 21s. net).

THESE two volumes in their different ways each throw a clear light upon the Stuart century. Professor Dover Wilson must be congratulated on his talented editing of the fine tribute to Sir Herbert Grierson. The twenty-four essays are serious pieces of work, and nearly all of them possess that sophistication which is an essential quality in those who can hope to embark with some success on a study of this complicated period. The scope of the book suffers a little, as did the seventeenth-century exhibition of last spring, from its unco-ordinated breadth. In both cases a closing date at 1660 would have conduced to unity. The ten-page survey of English architecture during the seventeenth century seems very inadequate for a volume which contains the admirable and balanced essays by Professor C. J. Sisson on King James I

of England as poet and political writer, by Professor Geoffrey Bullough on Bacon and the defence of learning, and by Professor A. J. Barnouw on Joost van den Vondel.

Professor Barnouw's study places Vondel in relation to his background with justness and precision. He is particularly interesting in his appreciation of the sources of Vondel's *Mary Stuart, or Martyred Majesty*, and it is a strange commentary on the affiliations of the Palatine family to find that that play was dedicated to the Queen of Bohemia's son, Prince Edward, because he was the first among the Queen of Scotland's posterity "to quicken her holy ashes and spirit by embracing the Roman Catholic religion". There is in this essay a curious implied contrast between the conditions of life of the Dutch and English Catholics.

The next contribution, that by Professor A. E. Taylor entitled an "Apology for Mr. Hobbes", is balanced and constructive but somewhat pedantic in its emphasis. The long essay by Professor J. B. Trend on Calderon and the Spanish religious theatre of the seventeenth century is singularly lucid. The author, however, does not appear to have given any considerable thought to the meaning and implications of the Counter-Reformation. This is not the only instance in this valuable book in which the subtlety with which the literary problem is approached is not matched by any corresponding perception in regard to the religious problem. The two essays on Donne illustrate this contention. Mr. C. S. Lewis, writing on Donne and Love Poetry in the seventeenth century, gives us a penetrating analysis of one aspect of the religious problem as it affected this great writer, while Mrs. Bennett indulges in the superficial comment to which we have been so long accustomed.

Possibly the most attractive and distinguished essay in the volume is that by Dr. Mario Praz on Milton and Poussin. The Anglican movement is rather scantily represented, and Professor L. C. Martin, writing on Henry Vaughan and the theme of infancy, appears to underestimate the specifically religious background. Canon F. E. Hutchinson's essay on George Herbert is, however, delightfully suffused with the essential spirit of the Carolines. It is in this connection that Dr. Blackstone's edition of the Ferrar Papers is of so deep an interest. In the first place it is admirably produced and edited. The introduction is balanced and the selection of family letters well proportioned. The gem of the book is the ascetic dialogue entitled "The Winding-Sheet".

This is further described as being performed by the members of the Little Academy in the great chamber at Little Gidding. It occupies nearly one hundred pages of Dr. Blackstone's volume. In this case it is the background of historical knowledge which is

revealed that proves so interesting. The conversation turns, measured and didactic, from Maximilian of Austria to Alain Chartier and to "Titus his Bountie". There is at first no departure from the values of the Berners Froissart. And then the mood changes and there comes a description of an attack upon the Zurich Anabaptists. "Thus did Zuinglius tax these Luxurious impostures".

In the *Life of Nicholas Ferrar* by his brother, which Dr. Blackstone prints in the earlier portion of his volume, there is a curious reference to Catholics. "Theyr next Neighbour", so runs this paragraph, "was a Roman Catholique Gentleman, yt kept a priest in his house, this Gentleman & his wife came often to Gidding though Nicholas Ferrar carryed it so discreetly yt none of his Family return'd theyr visites however Invited, for he would say to ye Young people He is wise & good & likely to continue so yt keeps Himselfe out of Temptation." This is an interesting extract and well worth pondering. In their own ways both these volumes give us much of value.

DAVID MATHEW.

Bartholomew of Exeter: Bishop and Canonist. By Dom Adrian Morey. (Cambridge University Press. 21s. net.)

ANY account of the Church in England during the middle of the twelfth century is so heavy with the drama of Becket and Henry II that one is apt to miss the trees for the wood. For the discerning student, however, the so-called secondary actors will hold an interest little less than that of the protagonists in the tragedy. Thomas's contemporaries in the English Church, many of them like him protégés of the great Archbishop Theobald, were men of often outstanding ability and, what is more, brimful of that attractive but indefinable quality known as personality. Gilbert Foliot, Roger of Pont l'Évêque, John Belmeis, John of Salisbury, Roger of Worcester, Richard of Dover, Bartholomew of Exeter—all of them are worthy of study.

The last-named, one of the few episcopal friends of the king with courage enough to stand up on occasion for Becket, deservedly forms the subject of this meticulously careful study, presented to us on the highest and most varied recommendation: Professor Holtzmann, of Halle; Professor Z. N. Brooke, well-known historian of canon law in England; Professor Günther, the Catholic medievalist; and Professor A. O. Meyer, the Lutheran historian of seventeenth-century English Catholics, are sponsors enough for any man.

Yet Father Morey's work is well able to stand on its own legs.

With all the painstaking care of a devotee of the School of Infinitesimal Research, he gleans every known detail of Bartholomew's early years. His account of the Clarendon quarrel is in interesting contrast to the bolder lines drawn by Becket's latest biographer, Robert Speaight, for naturally he concentrates on the part played by the Bishop of Exeter in the tangled tale of the exile—and, indeed, the dual role of well-intentioned canonist bishops needs at times a little unravelling.

The correspondence between the two friends (who were also friends of Thomas), Bartholomew and John of Salisbury, dealt with homiletically by Dom Morey, sheds a luminous sidelight on the dispute. Two further pointers to the bishop's personal prestige are here shown, first, in St. Thomas's writing to Alexander III on his behalf after the general suspension of all taking part in the forbidden coronation of the Young King on June 14, 1070; secondly, in the bishop's change of opinion regarding Henry's complicity in the murder on hearing that the four knights had been bound by the king under oath to do their dastardly deed.

If further evidence is wanted to prove the Bishop of Exeter's eminence in both Church and State, it should be recalled that it was he who was asked by the monks of Christ Church to sing the Mass of reconciliation a year after the murder and to preach the sermon; he was, too, powerful enough to head the opposition to the strong-minded Richard of Dover, the new archbishop; finally, during these years he stood high in the king's favour, acting for him as judge in administering the new system of local justice, while all the time he was constantly in commission by the Pope as judge delegate.

It is in fulfilling this last office that Bartholomew's career is submitted to closest study by Dom Morey, who in his explanation of the theory of this form of papal justice, familiar to Englishmen since the days of Stephen, and in his analysis of a variety of cases of marriage, advowson and appropriation of parishes by religious with which the bishop had to deal, has made an important and valuable contribution to the study of Roman canon law as it affected twelfth-century England.

It was a legal century, that had known Ivo of Chartres and that now saw another great canonist, Master Rolando, on the papal throne as Alexander III. It is important, therefore, to realize that "canonical" activity in England was not just due to the Becket affair. Indeed, in an interesting account of the routine cases with which a diocesan bishop, such as Bartholomew, had to deal, Dom Morey shows that the great controversy over clerical privilege had no great effect on the ordinary church life of the country.

In appending to his study the hitherto unprinted text of the bishop's *Penitential*, Dom Morey adds to his account of specialist cases a document which enables us to see at first hand the kind of guide-book used by the spiritual G.P.—the parish priest.

A useful select bibliography, several excellent indexes and an abundance of reference notes with quotations complete a most scholarly work beautifully produced by the Cambridge University Press.

GORDON ALBION.

Philip II. By William Thomas Walsh. (Sheed & Ward. 18s. net.)

IN the general break-up of European Christendom following on the Reformation, Philip II held Spain for the Catholic Church. For that he has been painted by the historians from whom most of us have had to learn our history as the cruel, subtle, gloomy and bigoted recluse of the Escorial. That is a dark enough picture in all conscience, but even so it was not black enough for the more enthusiastic admirers of Good Queen Bess and the Cecilian diplomacy. They painted in a few more shadows that gave the impression that other unmentionable crimes were hidden in their dark recesses. Novelists like Harrison Ainsworth filled in the dramatic details, and, though no doubt conscientious teachers did their best to defend him, Philip of Spain became for generations of Catholic schoolboys a figure of whom they were heartily, if secretly, ashamed. Besides, did not our hero Drake, in the intervals of a bowling match, scatter his invincible Armada to the four winds? These early impressions last.

Dr. Walsh's biography is not a whitewashing experiment; he has, however, cleaned the canvas. Even so there are dark places and obscurities that will perplex the student unless he will bring his mind to understand, not merely the desperate life of the period, but the peculiar mentality of the central figure. From his earliest years Philip was trained by an emperor to be an emperor. That in itself is sufficiently remote from common experience to be difficult of apprehension; and there are other factors equally remote from modern conditions. Philip II regarded himself as the natural and traditional protector of God's Church not only against the Turk and the infidel and the gathering strength of Protestantism, but also at times against the Pope himself. These things are outside our experience, the catastrophic happenings of a system of society grown top-heavy and in process of crashing into a new configuration—the form in which Europe is cast today. The French revolution was a minor cataclysm in comparison; even the present danger from Communism, should it materialize, is likely less to change the face of European civilization than did

the upheaval that Philip strove with all his might—and he was a mighty man—to abate and to control. In the portrait that eventually stands out from these pages the lines of cruelty have been softened to lines of firmness, his reputation for subtlety is seen to be due to a curious simplicity of mind and singleness of purpose, the charge of gloominess and bigotry cannot be maintained against the evidence. Philip was serious-minded and had a firm faith in the mission of the Catholic Church and an almost equally firm belief in his mission to defend her interests: anti-Catholic historians have done the rest.

It is fairly easy—given a true historian's detachment and a love of truth for truth's sake (and Dr. Walsh has these two qualities in a remarkable degree)—to straighten out the tangle of good and evil motives and arrive at a reasoned judgement on the causes and effects of personal characteristics and political activities in a long-past era. It is not so easy to practise detachment and follow truth, lead where it will, when we are in the midst of the hurly-burly. Herein lies the value of historical studies; they can provide a wider outlook and ensure a steadier vision even when their subject matter is unrelated to our particular problems. But when they traverse the same battle-ground, when the same interests are at stake, they can teach us more. The position of the Catholic Church *vis-à-vis* the nations of Europe and their governments has altered less in the centuries that have elapsed since the death of Philip II than it altered during the seventy years of his life. The forces that conquered then and decided the lines of cleavage—the Protestantism of northern Europe, the Catholicism of the Latin races and Southern America—still persist. If in our day these forces are to be challenged and the boundaries redrawn we do well to examine their origins so that we may learn from former victories and be warned by past mistakes.

It remains only to add, for the benefit of the reader who, like Gallio, cares for none of these things but simply asks for a story of olden times, that Dr. Walsh's monumental work will give him satisfying entertainment, so well is the story written and so vividly are the characters portrayed.

S. J. G.

The Nestorian Churches. By Aubrey R. Vine, M.A., B.D., B.Sc.
(The Independent Press. 6s. net.)

As Principal Price has remarked in the *Congregational Quarterly*, "It is not often that we find English Free Churchmen displaying any very keen interest in the history of non-Protestant communions, least of all in the tragic fortunes of the schismatic

churches of the East." The work of Mr. Vine, a Congregational pastor, sets out to be "a concise history of Nestorian Christianity in Asia from the Persian schism to the modern Assyrians", and he has done this piece of work remarkably well; it can be confidently recommended to those who want a very readable conspectus of the fifteen hundred years of history of what was at one time the most powerful missionary body in Christendom and is now reduced to a few tens of thousands of harried "Assyrians".

Mr. Vine summarizes the results of the most recent scholarship in his subject, and is rightly at pains to exculpate Nestorius himself from the teaching of crude "Nestorianism", and he lays proper emphasis on the part of politics in the Persian schism. His attitude is notably eirenical and fair, as may be seen in, for example, his references to the Catholics of the Chaldean rite, who since the sixteenth century have represented the old orthodox church of Mesopotamia and Persia. It is interesting to learn that "the Holy Leaven has not been lost despite the catastrophes of recent years", but Mr. Vine is mistaken in referring to the East Syrian "cope": the *phania* or *maapra* is definitely a chasuble, though also worn in circumstances when a Western priest would wear a cope. Here and there (e.g. p. 48, pp. 180-81) references to the Roman Catholic Church are not quite accurate.

T. O. P.

The Massacre of Saint Bartholomew. By Sylvia Jennie England. (John Long. 12s. 6d. net.)

The House of Guise. By Henry Dwight Sedgwick. (Lindsay Drummond. 15s. net.)

DR. ENGLAND has written a very readable book which, if it adds nothing to the sum of knowledge about a much disputed subject, does at least steer a straight course through the troubled waters of controversy, and give a coherent account of the event and an acceptable interpretation of it.

Against the background of the Wars of Religion the author describes the Scarlet Wedding of Henry of Navarre and Margaret of Valois, and the festivities and pageants which gave it splendour. Then comes the attempt on the life of Admiral Coligny, and its failure, followed by the appalling massacre, first in Paris, later in the provinces.

The story is well written, without any attempt at writing it up; there was no need for that, the simple narrative being purple enough without any "purple patches". Dr. England dismisses the theory of a long-planned stratagem on the part of Catherine de' Medici, as also the theory of a plot of the Huguenots against the

king and the royal family. A plot there was ; but it was a Guise plot, for religious and family reasons, against the admiral. Catherine was only won over to it at the last moment, because the admiral, with whom she had tried to maintain peaceful relations, had compromised her whole policy by his insistence on war against Alva in the Low Countries. She had no need of a plot of her own ; the Guise plot was ready to hand, and it was the failure of this that involved the wholesale massacre of the admiral and all his followers who were gathered in Paris for the wedding. Once the blood-lust had been excited it spread throughout France. That is the thesis ; and if it cannot be proved, at least it seems the most intelligible of all that have been put forward.

The House of Guise, which deals mainly with the first three dukes and the two Lorraine cardinals, necessarily covers some of the same ground as Dr. England's book ; Mr. Sedgwick favours the story of a plot by the Queen Mother (though not a long-standing one) in which the Duchesse de Nemours was the only Guise implicated, but, while recording Cardinal Charles of Lorraine's subsequent approval of the massacre, he ignores the knowledge of the plot that has been reasonably imputed to that ecclesiastic. Throughout his readable and competent book Mr. Sedgwick shows himself sympathetic towards the Guises, but however sincere their religious motives may have been, they cannot in general be regarded as any great credit to their Catholic profession. It is a book for the intelligent general reader, and a useful addition to the author's considerable list of historical works. There are a number of interesting illustrations, well reproduced.

C. D. E.

The Anaphora or Great Eucharistic Prayer. By Walter Howard Frere, C.R., D.D. (S.P.C.K. 8s. 6d. net.)

FROM one with the reputation of the late Anglican Bishop of Truro we should expect a conscientious and careful study, accompanied by wide quotation from original sources. We have not been disappointed, and it is not with so scholarly a compilation but with some deductions made from it that we disagree.

Dr. Frere was writing with a purpose, for he wished to defend the introduction of an invocation of the Holy Spirit, an *epiklesis*, into the Order of Communion of the Revised Prayer Book. Holding the Catholic doctrine that the consecration and sacrifice are accomplished in the Mass at the moment when the priest pronounces Christ's words, "This is my body", etc., to be one of a series of mistaken views "dominant in the 'Dark Ages' which were fathered upon great leaders of the patristic heyday, such as

St. Chrysostom, St. Ambrose and, most of all, St. Austin", he considered that the new knowledge provided by liturgical history had brought the moment "for some revaluation of the principles that govern the form and structure of the Eucharistic Anaphora" (Preface).

All evidence which illustrates the history of the *epiklesis*, which is so venerable a feature of many Catholic rites jealously maintained by the Church, is welcome. But those who took exaggerated views of its primitive character have had to modify them in recent years. An article in the J.T.S. in July, 1924, by Dom Hugh Connolly disposed finally of the assertion that the earliest writers like St. Irenaeus used the term in the sense we are considering, and Dr. Frere himself agrees that "in earlier days [the Holy Spirit's work] had been associated almost exclusively with either the prophetic gift or the sacrament of Baptism and Confirmation: barely at all with the consecration of the Eucharist" (p. 43). He holds that the starting place for the documented history of the *epiklesis* occurs in a clause of the Hippolytean Anaphora, and that henceforth it developed with the theology of the Holy Spirit. This is obviously a most legitimate development expressing—as we believe—the attribution to the Holy Spirit of the change of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ.

But it does not follow from thence that the consecratory sacrifice of the Mass is not essentially completed by the pronouncement of our Lord's own words, and Dr. Frere gives the evidence so fairly that we think he himself provides sufficient answer to the contrary theory. It seems arbitrary to hold up Tertullian, and incidentally St. Cyprian, as those who introduced into theology the idea that the words of themselves accomplish the change. For there are other witnesses. Dr. Frere points out very well that St. John Chrysostom's statement, "the priest is set to represent Him in uttering those sayings; but the power and grace is of God. Christ says, 'This is my body': and this saying transforms the offerings" (*De Prod. Iudae*, 6, quoted p. 88), is not to be *contrasted* with his saying that "the Spirit's grace comes and implements that mystical sacrifice", but the fact remains that it is to the words of institution that he attributes the change—under the operation of the Holy Spirit.

So again, while St. Austin says that the "sacrament is not sanctified but by the invisible operation of the Holy Spirit", to minimize his clear assertion: "Tolle verbum, panis est et vinum. Adde verbum, et iam aliud est . . . corpus Christi et sanguis Christi" as "the curt epigrammatic teaching given to the children" (p. 120) is surely special pleading.

Equally St. Ambrose, while not of course ignoring the part of the Holy Spirit, attributes to the words the actual transformation. In the divine consecration itself, he says, "verba ipsa domini Salvatoris operantur. Nam sacramentum istum quod accipis Christi sermone conficitur. . . . Ipse clamat dominus Jesus, 'Hoc est corpus meum'. Ante benedictionem verborum caelestium alia species nominatur; post consecrationem corpus significatur. . . ." (*De Mysteriis*, 52, 54, quoted p. 125, n. 1).

If this is still thought ambiguous, we may mention an important conclusion of recent research adduced by Dom Hugh Connolly in his review of Dr. Frere's work in the July, 1938, number of the *Downside Review*. In dealing with liturgical evidence, Dr. Frere cites the treatise, *De Sacramentis* (which he dates—without supporting evidence—a century after St. Ambrose), as "closely interwoven with the theory of consecration by the Dominical Words alone" (p. 130), and he supposes a change in the canon since St. Ambrose's time, due probably to Roman influence. But the view, already thought probable by Bardenhewer, that St. Ambrose himself is the real author, has now been cleared of its difficulties by Dom Germain Morin in the *Jahrbuch für Liturgiewissenschaft* (8 Band, pp. 86–106) and the ascription has been accepted by the editors of the Vienna Corpus.

We think, therefore, that Dr. Frere's theory, in so far as it differs from the Catholic doctrine, breaks down before the teaching of the very fathers he mentions.

DOM RALPH RUSSELL.

Eastern Liturgies. By Séverien Salaville, A.A. Adapted from the French by Mgr. J. M. T. Barton, D.D. (Sands. 8s. 6d. net.)

At a first glance the work of Father Salaville seems to cover the same ground as those of Donald Attwater and Father Janin in giving a popular and comprehensive exposition of the worship of the Eastern Churches. But whilst the other books are concerned primarily with the groupings, organization, and history of the various churches, Father Salaville is interested solely with the strictly liturgical aspect—the division into liturgical families and their ramifications; the liturgical languages; arrangement of churches and their furnishing, vestments and insignia; and the liturgical books. The reader will find much to interest him in the book, and this is natural, considering Father Salaville's great learning, and Mgr. Barton's additional notes are very helpful. But perhaps it is because what is said is so interesting that the reader will feel a certain disappointment that, in trying to cover so much ground, the author is able to give only a general outline

of the subject under discussion. For instance, we regret that the chapter upon the origin of the Eastern liturgies is not followed by another which would explain their subsequent development, together with a study of their doctrinal implications. There is no special chapter explaining the order of the Eastern offices, and these are only mentioned in the chapter upon the liturgical books.

Father Salaville shows great sympathy for the Eastern Churches and appreciates the beauty and Catholic tradition of their liturgies, but occasionally he fails to understand a particular oriental mentality. Thus, in reference to the repetitions in certain hymns, he regrets the absence of an Eastern equivalent of the Congregation of Rites. He points out that in daily practice some of them are abbreviated, or even omitted, and would recommend for Catholic churches of Eastern rite a general official abbreviation of certain hymns and prayers. We consider any tampering with the Eastern liturgies inadvisable: the orientals would do better to continue their practice—a general one, if I am not mistaken—in abbreviating or omitting certain unessential hymns and prayers if lack of time demands it. We must always bear in mind that any alteration made in the liturgies may lead to new accusations of "latinization".

G. BENNIGSEN.

Ceremonial Curiosities. By the Rev. Edward J. G. Forse, M.A., F.R.G.S. (The Faith Press. 3s. net.)

ALL those who enjoy Mr. Forse's entertaining papers in the *Church Times* (including the Jesuit fathers at Stonyhurst to whom he refers in Chapter XV), will welcome this collection of them in book form, and will learn therefrom not only that Mr. Forse is (or has been) a colossal walker, but also that he can be just as interesting about food and beds and boots and policemen as he is about "ceremonial curiosities" (the expression is an understatement) that he has seen in churches of the Latin rite in Central and Western Europe.

When Mr. Forse writes that "what is good enough for the Pope of Rome does not become 'non-Catholic' when it is adopted—even by an Anglican bishop—in the Church of England", we would like to point out to him that a thing does not become "Catholic", in a liturgical sense, must not be esteemed to be "good enough for the Pope" (p. 75), simply because it is found in a Roman Catholic church. There is no question but that many of the things recorded by Mr. Forse would be strongly repudiated by the Pope, or by the Congregation of Sacred Rites for him: legitimate custom is one thing, illegitimate habit or abuse is quite

another, and "the gulf that exists . . . between *les ordonnances* and *les affaires*" is not a matter for Catholics to find satisfaction in. One thing that strikes us as curious in one so well informed as Mr. Forse is his apparent surprise when he finds the Blessed Sacrament reserved on other than the high altar: this is normal (in the strict sense of the word) in churches wherein the Divine Office is celebrated daily in choir, and there is no need to cross *La Manche* to see it in practice.

T. O. P.

The Enigma of the Fourth Gospel. By Robert Eisler, Ph.D. (Methuen. 12s. 6d. net.)

THOSE familiar with the author's *The Messiah Jesus*, which achieved an unenviable notoriety, will know what to expect in the present volume: an immense amount of reading vitiated by topsy-turvy argumentation and presented with an assurance which is positively amazing. Basing himself on the Marcionite Prologues to the Gospels which, apparently, no one has rightly understood before, Dr. Eisler erects a whole series of startling suppositions, the purport of which does not become clear till the very end of the book, when we discover that the author is after all only resurrecting the old notion that "the Beloved Disciple" must have been Lazarus! Traditions of unequal value assert, one, that John the Evangelist dictated the Fourth Gospel to Papias, the Bishop of Hierapolis; another, to Marcion the heretic, who falsified what John wrote and was therefore reproved by him. Dr. Eisler accepts this latter; but he is convinced that John xxi, 23 shows that "the Beloved Disciple" was already dead. Since, then, Lazarus is undoubtedly spoken of by his sisters as "he whom thou lovest", cf. verses 11 and 36, he must be "the Beloved Disciple", and though Dr. Eisler does not mention this, must have been at the Last Supper, xiii, 23, and it is he who "giveth testimony of these things", xxi, 24—namely, all the things for which he is quoted in the Fourth Gospel.

The ingenuity with which all this is worked out is remarkable. But the author has a gift for evading inconvenient evidence and treating "possible" arguments as grounds for "certain" conclusions. This is regrettable, because his learning is immense. He provides, however, difficult reading, and he omits practically all references. But he promises us a second volume, so we must look forward to that for enlightenment on many points. A little less assurance and less contemptuous treatment of the great men who have studied the problem of the Gospel of St. John already would make his work more acceptable.

H. P.

Morals Makyth Man. By Gerald Vann, O.P. (Longmans Green. 7s. 6d. net.)

THE world is all awry, the time is out of joint—at least, philosophers and writers think and say so. Shall we say that a cursed spite has made us born to set it right? Or, like *Candide*, shall we give it up, cultivate our back garden, and let the world go hang? Yet even in a garden we should need to plan our lives. And if we ceased to think about the major problems of life we should become sub-human. What is wrong, then, with the world? Easy enough to enumerate a host of things; but they are only symptoms. The cause? That man has lost his rational philosophy, his unifying principle that will bring order out of chaos, and unity out of multiplicity; and so all things are fallen into disintegration. The remedy? A return to Thomism, which is both a philosophy and a theology; and every thinking man must in the nature of things be a theologian as well as a philosopher; not the Thomism of the schools, a matter of syllogisms and jargon, but a Thomism which retains its essence and sloughs its skin: a Thomism expressed in modern language and adapted to new problems and acquiring new enrichments; which is not a going back to St. Thomas, but a carrying on and a carrying forward: an outlook, a habit of mind, a point of view.

That is Father Gerald Vann's contention. In this delightful book he first establishes the theory of Thomism. It all springs from Aristotle's distinction between *actus et potentia*, *matter and form*. Aquinas adopted this, and demonstrated that man's actuality demands perfection of body, mind, and senses. Father Vann adapts it to politics, economics, ethics, and maintains that the purpose of our philosophy is to produce the Christian humanist. *Christian humanist!* If that sounds like trying to make the best of both worlds, Father Vann would ask, why not? For man was intended to be a citizen of this world, and by reaching out to the utmost limit of his potentiality in this world to fit himself for eternal beatitude hereafter. Certainly the theory of Christian humanism presents difficulties, and objections can be raised against it from both sides, not least from the Christian side; but Father Vann does not shirk them. Indeed, it is the great merit of Thomism that it examines all philosophies and takes all the good it finds and assimilates it into itself.

In the second part of the book, Father Vann makes some applications of the theory of Thomism to present-day problems, and if some essays are included which seem to have little enough to do with Thomism, who shall complain? They justify their inclusion by their intrinsic interest, when, e.g. Father Vann pleads that a high altar in a Catholic church should be a Mass altar

and not primarily a Benediction altar (all those who are familiar with the carved and fretted stone erections beloved of the Victorians and Edwardians will understand), and when he pleads for the rebirth of a specifically English manner of Catholic worship we are with him heart and soul.

Altogether we owe Father Gerald Vann great gratitude for a great book: one which we cordially recommend.

C. E. E.

T. E. Hulme. By Michael Roberts. (Faber & Faber. 10s. 6d. net.)

THE main lines of Hulme's thought, tragically cut short by his death in 1917, were, and are, of considerable importance. *Speculations* is far too little known: there has long been needed an introduction to, and a prolongation and elaboration of, its central thesis. What looms largest in value in Hulme's writings is the distinction he draws between classicism and romanticism, employing these terms in accordance with definitions of his own. The romantic "treats man as the measure of the universe, naturally good and capable of perfection"; the classicist "recognizes that man is limited and sinful, that he cannot make any appreciable moral progress, and that . . . he can never build a Utopia; nor can he ever tell what is just unless his morality is founded on religion". The former attitude is the attitude of the pagan renaissance humanism; the latter, the religious attitude. And Hulme was convinced that the age of that humanism was drawing to its close and that the reaction to the sentimentality and excess of romanticist literature was a sign of a return to health in our civilization. That central idea is of immense interest and value, and one had hoped that a book on Hulme would be devoted mainly to discussion and elucidation of it. The present study, after a hopeful beginning—a short biographical portrait, a definition of terms—is disappointing. Hulme was not a philosopher in the sense of having thought out, or attempted to think out, a complete explanation of reality; his interest for us lies elsewhere. Yet a very large part of the book is taken up with the discussion of the philosophical notions which Hulme made use of, but which are really unessential to the main argument. It is here, moreover, that Mr. Roberts is least happy; surprising statements occur: "in this view . . . the [divine and the human] are united in the mystical body of Christ, as they are in the doctrine of Nicholas of Cusa"; elementary misapprehensions: thomist philosophy recognizes no "distinction between aesthetic and moral values"; and so on. Quite apart from blemishes such as this, one has two

misgivings about the investigation of Hulme's philosophical notions as a whole: it seems not to have been coherently integrated; it tends to distract attention from the literary preoccupations, since it is difficult to see them in relation to it; and thus there is a danger that this part of the book may distract from, rather than focus attention on, the main importance of Hulme's thought. These criticisms offered, one must pay tribute to the investigations of sources, of different spheres of thought, as pointing towards a complete picture of the man and his place in the intellectual trends of his time. Three poems, a Lecture on Modern Poetry, and Notes on Language and Style, all hitherto unpublished, are appended.

G. V.

I Believe. A Series of Personal Statements. Edited by R. Ellis Roberts. (1) *What I Believe.* By J. D. Beresford; (2) *Problems of Religion.* By Gerald Bullett; (3) *Pan, Cæsar and God.* By Renée Haynes; (4) *And He Shall Come Again.* By Kenneth Ingram; (5) *He Came Down From Heaven.* By Charles Williams. (Heinemann. 5s. each net.)

ONE approaches a series such as this, naturally, with respect and sympathy: respect for the sincerity with which they are written, sympathy for the conviction common to all of them that "materialism is not enough". And each of these books is the statement of a personal search and demands therefore the attention which any courageous original search demands. But, this bias notwithstanding, it must be confessed that disappointment meets one at the outset: disappointment at finding a lack of knowledge of fact, or a crass misunderstanding of fact, which might surely have been avoided if the investigations attempted were to be complete and satisfactory. To take a few examples only. In the first book we find it asserted without hesitation that "the truths of the fifteenth-century Church cannot be harmonized with twentieth-century science"; that all thought in the Middle Ages was merely deduction from truths accepted as revealed; that miracles are simply a capricious upsetting of natural laws. In the second, divine personality looms large as stumbling-block; and is interpreted as implying anthropomorphism, there being no attempt apparently to discover what theology means by its use of the term, and no suspicion that, if it really meant "limited by personal tastes and fancies", any Christian of the most mediocre intelligence would have been compelled long ago to notice the oddity of his religious position. This same elementary misapprehension crops up again in the fourth book of the series. And while it would be absurd to dismiss all the volumes equally with such strictures, and while

there is much in them of interest, the series as a whole, objectively regarded, is unsatisfactory: the feeling of dissatisfaction aroused by recurrent ignorance of fact is strengthened by the vagueness which surrounds the conclusions which the authors reach. Clearly, one is not quarrelling with the fact that these studies do not all arrive at the orthodox Christian position in its entirety; but they lack the qualities which compelled one to enthusiasm for, let us say, *Ends and Means, inter alia*, the coherence and completeness which one is surely entitled to expect from a book which sets out to present a statement of personal convictions and beliefs. Indeed, as one thinks over the series as a whole, one cannot but feel that behind more than one of them lies a lack of apprehension which robs the subsequent exposition of substance and, incidentally, makes it appear a little out of date: a failure to grasp the fact, so lucidly stated recently by Miss Dorothy Sayers, that it is not dogma but religion without dogma that is dull, and that without dogma religion must be confessed, however regretfully, to be doomed, for the amorphous cannot survive.

G. V.

God, Man and the Church. By Vladimir Solovyev. Translated by Donald Attwater from the French version of Father George Tsebricov and the Abbé Alfred Martin. (J. Clarke. 5s. net.)

THOUGH this work of Solovyev is not his most important, no better choice could have been made to present this noble thinker to the English-speaking public. This work was written by Solovyev when he had not yet taken any official steps towards his final reconciliation with Rome; moreover, the sophiological theme, though present (especially in the second part), does not stand in the foreground, so that the excesses of this doctrine are hardly recognizable. These two facts make the book eminently readable to Catholics and non-Catholics alike. This does not mean that therefore the impression given of Solovyev by this book is a false or even a diluted one. On the contrary, since Solovyev is far more an ascetic and a mystic than a philosopher, the approach made by reading his meditations on *The Spiritual Foundations of Life* (the original title) is a very fair one. This meditative character of the work is well stressed in the Flemish version, whose index shows that it is an extensive paraphrase of the *Our Father*. I wonder whether the French or the English version altered this.

The book shows the magnificently virile spirituality that pervaded Solovyev's brief but inspiring and noble existence. He

realized the ideal of the philosopher as put very profoundly by Lord Eustace Percy: "If the modern world is revolting against both cult and culture, it is chiefly because Christians have forgotten that the God revealed in Christ is not only a God whose will must be obeyed, but a God whose purpose must be understood." (*Philosophy*, 1937, p. 139.) Solovyev discovered the lines of this purpose of a "God revealed in Christ" in the organic structure of a universal cosmic church, of which Rome is the sole possible centre, postulated by the very unity and harmony of the organism. Solovyev saw religion in the concrete and acted accordingly.

Among the various translations of Mr. Attwater it would appear that this is the most literary; he has made a successful effort to preserve the depth and originality of Solovyev's ideas.

DOM THEODORE WESSELING.

First Chapters in Religious Philosophy. By Vergilius Ferm. (Putnam. 10s. 6d. net.)

THE first part of this work is devoted to the framing of a definition of religion. Professor Ferm concentrates on the personal attitude rather than on "religion in the abstract", and thus his formal minimum definition is as follows: To be religious is to effect a vital adjustment to whatever is regarded as worthy of serious and ulterior concern. The *differentium* suggested is contained in the word "ulterior", and by that term is meant that which matters *beyond* one's immediate everyday horizon. The "vital adjustment" is the implicit or explicit difference made in life by man's attention to some transcendent reality. Religion is more than an expression of intellect or of feeling or of will, and the *adjustment of life* differentiates it from mere theory or social practice.

Professor Ferm prefers to omit all reference to Deity in his basic definition, on the ground that otherwise it would need to include a definition of God, and also because he wishes to include religions which profess to be atheistical. It would seem, however, that these considerations do not actually justify the restricted definition, especially as the author's statement calls for a definite decision as to whether the reality towards which the "ulterior" adjustment is directed is finite or infinite. If religion involves an object which is precisely "beyond" the ordinary interests of man, can it be other than Infinite Being?

In the second part the author reviews the chief theories of religious philosophy. He considers that Kant has helped forward the theistic proofs, especially about the character of God as dictated by the categorical moral imperative. Various modern proofs are also recommended, particularly those of Professor

Macintosh of Yale. Theories of value, evil, and pessimism are then analysed, and the concepts of freedom, immortality and prayer clarified, and a carefully compiled list of recent works on these subjects concludes this useful volume.

ARTHUR L. REYS.

The Golden Book of Eastern Saints. By Donald Attwater. (Bruce, Milwaukee; Coldwell, London, 9s. 6d. net.)

Thomas Becket. By Robert Speaight. (Longmans Green. 6s. net.)

HERE are two hagiographies; that is really the sole point they have in common; the rest is a tale of their differences. Some of the differences arise naturally from the subject matter of the two books. Mr. Attwater has chosen some representative types of Eastern saints, Mr. Speaight's one saint is a typical Westerner. Even so, there are more points of similarity between St. Thomas of Canterbury and St. Basil the Great than there are between Mr. Attwater and Mr. Speaight. Mr. Attwater moves with ease in a terrain strewn with legends; he is reasonably careful that we shall not mistake legend for fact, but he does not shy at stories of the marvellous, or tell them, as some do, with a sophisticated air, as though afraid of being thought credulous and gullible. The legends are, if you like, historically untrue, but that is not sufficient reason why they should be thrown on the scrap-heap. They tell us a great deal about the aspirations and ideals of the people who made them, embroidered them and preserved them, and the knowledge we get is of a people for whom sanctity was an admirable thing, worthy of being recorded in the heroic manner. So this *Book of Eastern Saints* is quite truly edifying, and never more so than in the chapter devoted to some Russian saints. Every nation has some trait peculiar to itself, and when it is possessed in a heroic degree it commands our admiration; Russians have the ability to suffer, and to suffer with dignity—resignation and a meekness that recalls the Lamb of God. We like to think of saints as being human, that is to say we like to find traces in them of the faults and foibles so conspicuous in ourselves. In that sense the Eastern saints are very human; but they put first things first, and under stress the dross falls away and there stands revealed the pure gold of saintliness.

The same thing applies to Thomas of Canterbury. Not till the hour strikes for the great decision are we able to recognize the true lineaments of heroic sanctity. All through the long struggle with the king he is beset by traitors, lying tongues and unworthy brethren. It is hardly surprising that the archbishop sometimes

defended himself in ways that were neither wise nor Christ-like. But as time went on he saw ever more clearly the path he was to tread, and at the very end he had learned his lesson and spoke it triumphantly: "We came not to resist, but to suffer." At last he was the true disciple of his Master.

Mr. Speaight is a writer of distinction, though he is better known to the public as the actor who took the part of Becket in Mr. T. S. Eliot's play, *Murder in the Cathedral*. The book betrays his profession. The character of Becket is built up stage by stage as a great actor would naturally reconstruct it—quite accurately, but from the outside and not from within. There are few indications of the gradual strengthening of that interior spirit that converted a young man of the world into a martyr for justice's sake. What we do see is a tragedy in the Greek manner, the relentless march of Fate, whose first step was taken when the Chancellor of England consented to become the Archbishop of Canterbury to please the King, his master.

S. J. G.

The Saints of Egypt. By De Lacy O'Leary, D.D. (S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d. net.)

THIS publication of the Church Historical Society is a valuable addition to our reference books in hagiology and the Egyptian church by a writer whose scholarship in Coptic language and history needs no commendation.

After five short sections on the foundation of the Egyptian church (with a list of patriarchs of Alexandria down to Gabriel, d. 1145), the Coptic language, the Egyptian martyrs, the beginnings of monasticism, and hagiographical sources (33 pp., in all), there is printed a Coptic ecclesiastical kalendar which it is interesting to compare with the one given by Nilles. Then follows the main part of the book (226 pp.), consisting of brief accounts, arranged alphabetically, of the martyrs, ascetes and bishops commemorated in Egypt. After each notice sources and bibliographical particulars are given; where no *vita*, *passio* etc., exists Dr. O'Leary has perforce to fall back on the Arabic synaxary which was compiled by the bishop Michael of Athrub about the beginning of the fifteenth century, an authority which, as Dr. O'Leary reminds us, is "a very uncritical and apocryphal one". About some of the saints mentioned there is little or no information of any sort available, except the date of annual commemoration. With certain exceptions, the local and other saints of whom we read herein are celebrated by the Catholics of the Coptic rite equally with their dissident brethren.

It is notable that this volume was printed in India and it does

credit to the skill of the Madras Diocesan Press. There are typographical errors here and there (e.g. lines displaced and doubled in the middle of page 80), but these may be due to defective proof-reading.

L. E.

Prince of Pastors : The Life of St. Charles Borromeo. By Margaret Yeo. (Longmans Green. 7s. 6d. net.)

READERS of Mrs. Yeo's recent studies of St. Francis Xavier, Don John of Austria, and St. Francis Borgia, will turn with interest to this opportune biography. There is a vivid account of St. Charles's early life and especially of the hardships and humiliations endured by the young student at Pavia, kept in needless penury by an improvident and eccentric father. Then suddenly his uncle, Gian Angelo de' Medici (no relation to the Medici of Florence), was elected pope as Pius IV, and forthwith the "abbé" of twenty-two became archbishop designate of Milan and Cardinal-Secretary of State. The vertiginous promotion did not unsettle one of the strongest characters of the Counter-Reformation. As a boy of twelve he had firmly pointed out to his shiftless father that any money taken from the revenues of the family abbey of Arona would have to be repaid, and at twenty he had reformed this same abbey with a strong hand. So he was not unprepared for the tremendous burden. Fortunately his intense, vehement nature and reserved disposition fitted in easily with the complementary character of his shrewd, tolerant, easy-going uncle, from whom he rapidly assimilated the necessary knowledge of men and affairs. The enormous business of the Council of Trent was followed by the formidable task of reforming his own great diocese and province. Worn out by unremitting labours and sufferings, coupled with the fiercest personal austerities, his memorable apostolate terminated at the age of forty-six.

In the course of the narrative the reader meets with many notable personages : St. Francis Borgia, St. Philip Neri, Fr. Robert Persons, Bd. Edmund Campion, Bd. Ralph Sherwin, St. Aloysius Gonzaga, and there are many vivid pen-pictures of typical scenes. It should, however, be pointed out that Scott, Bishop of Chester, was not at the Council of Trent ; the only English prelate at Trent was Thomas Goldwell, Bishop of St. Asaph, who, moreover, was actually appointed a vicar general at Milan.

The spelling of Italian names is rather uncertain, and Mr. Outram Evennett's work on the Cardinal of Lorraine should assuredly have been included in the bibliography.

J. J. DWYER.

A Sicilian Borromeo. By a Benedictine Nun of Stanbrook. (Burns Oates & Washbourne. 7s. 6d. net.)

AN apter title than this could hardly have been chosen, for the similarities between this nineteenth-century Sicilian, Joseph Benedict Dusmet, O.S.B., and St. Charles Borromeo, are remarkable. Not only were both of noble birth, archbishops and cardinals, but both lived in difficult times when the need for ecclesiastical reform and reorganization and for the creation of social services was abnormal. As St. Charles won the undying love and gratitude of the Milanese during the plague of 1576-78, so did the Venerable Joseph Benedict during the cholera epidemics of 1867 and 1887 in Catania.

He was professed at the Abbey of Monreale, near Palermo, not many years before the anti-clerical laws secularized religious houses and dissolved monasteries in Italy and Sicily. Benedictinism, indeed, seemed doomed to extinction, but before the cardinal archbishop's death in 1894, at the age of seventy-six, he saw, and was largely responsible for, the restoration, almost the re-creation, of his order in Italy (1888) and the foundation of its great central college of Sant' Anselmo (1896). The story, too, of his foundations in Catania, of hospitals, charitable organizations, religious houses, etc., is a long one. No wonder his people acclaimed him as saint during his life and clamour for his canonization now after his death.

The book is excellently written, though a fuller account would have been welcome of that period of Italian history before and after the *Risorgimento*. Also—if one dare question a statement from Stanbrook on such a matter—surely, the English Black Monks being the first to put into operation Innocent III's decree of 1215, the English is the senior of all Benedictine congregations and yields precedence to none (p. 178). "Its re-foundation in exile" is rather a poor and misleading description of the almost miraculous way in which its continuity was preserved unbroken, largely through the efforts of the Venerable Augustine Baker.

MARGARET YEO.

The History of St. Louis. By Jean Sire de Joinville. Translated from the French text edited by Natalis de Wailly by Joan Evans, D.Litt. (Oxford University Press: Milford. 8s. 6d. net.)

JOINVILLE's "history" is indeed "a human and timeless book", and the Oxford University Press has done well to republish at a reasonable price the translation made by Dr. Joan Evans for the

Gregynog Press "fine edition". That translation is extremely well done, keeping the tone of the original without being too archaic, easily readable but without any sacrifice of Joinville's feudal dignity and leisureliness.

Dr. Evans has added an introduction and thirty-four pages of short notes. Her scholarship, as is well known, is excellent, but she does seriously less than justice to Joinville's religion (p. xxvi). Indeed, her own notion of sanctity is faulty, or "feudal", as is shown by her remarks on p. xxiv—"magnificence" is a virtue, and a saint need not be what is called a *dévo*t. A man who, when in a moment of danger a fellow knight manifests his conscience to him, replies, "I absolve you by such power as God hath given me", or records with approval the anecdote about Brother Yves le Breton (p. 133), has a very nice appreciation of his religion and shows his worthiness to ride in the train of St. Louis IX.

It may be suggested that the "Brethren of the Holy Cross" (pp. 221, 266) were the Crutched Friars, and that a "shrine of the Virgin" at Tortus earlier than 387 (p. 260) is unlikely.

T. O. P.

Charister. By Violet Clifton. 21s. net. *The Holy Sonnets of John Donne*. 10s. 6d. net. (Dent, for Hague & Gill.)

THE working definition of poetry for most people is that which is printed in "lines".

Violet Clifton's *Charister*, "a religious meditation in which the Woman converses with Dante", certainly deserves to be classed as poetry on this account. The poem goes:

"Dante discovered
That the cause of my beloved,
That the single cause of all things,
Is the beautifulness of God,
Because that God, in goodness,
Wills to manifest that beauty.

Written as prose, the sentence undergoes no appreciable rhythmic alteration. Mr. T. S. Gregory discovers that "Mrs. Clifton's free rhythm is capable of exquisite music"; but, like the music of the spheres, not all ears will detect it.

The failure of *Charister* as a communication of experience is due to a conflict in Mrs. Clifton's mind between the didactic and the poetic. Her poetic experience is theological, and theology is in the main concerned with ideas, not with things. But poetry uses language to communicate experience, not ideas. Poetry,

therefore, employs the most intimate associative qualities of words and pays special attention to their sensible nature—that is, the sounds of the sound symbols and the associated images and emotions—as well as to the universal ideas the words symbolize.

Mrs. Clifton has made the mistake of using the ideas themselves as counters. In order to try to express the poetical experience she derives from theological abstractions she has recourse to capital letters in the attempt to infuse some emotion—the ultimate device of defeat.

The failure is at root a failure in metaphor. For it is metaphor, with its insight into what is common to the diverse, which enables the abstract to be transmuted to the concrete and thus is the very stuff of poetry.

Here is an instance of totally unilluminating metaphor :

“Thomas of Aquin
With soul sailing in search
Of all far-tropic truths,
Anchored of Aristotle,
Chartered of Christ,
That Thomas said . . . etc.”

At times the metaphorical straining attains the ludicrous :

“The Heavenly Minds
Swarmed round the Hivèd Wisdom.
From the honey-sweet Wit
Came the conception of the combey cell.”

Mrs. Clifton has evidently read but not assimilated Hopkins ; and she has conversed with Dante by persuading him to use her own language—an unfamiliar tongue.

Donne is Donne, and stands in no need of appraisal. The nineteen Holy Sonnets, written in a sort of “dark night”, are briefly and adequately introduced by Hugh P’Anson Fausset, and embellished with four engravings by Eric Gill. It is Mr. Gill in an unaccustomed Doré-esque mood, which does not sit very comfortably on him : but the engraving “Thou hast made me” drives home its point with terrible directness.

Both these books are beautifully printed and produced by Messrs. Hague & Gill, the Donne being the first use in England of the Bunyan face. The editions are limited to 250 and 500 copies respectively.

E. D. M.

Oscar Wilde. By Frank Harris. (Constable. 10s. net.)

Oscar Wilde: *The Man: The Artist*. By Boris Brasol. (Williams & Norgate. 16s. net.)

WHATEVER else there is to be said about Harris's *Life of Oscar Wilde*, there can be no two opinions about it being—to use the words applied by Harris to the Queensberry-Douglas-Wilde scandal—a “squalid story”. Wilde's weakness, however, distasteful as it is in itself, is handled by the author as tactfully as is conceivably possible, and the question naturally arises as one reads the book: “What has hitherto prevented its publication in Great Britain?” Mr. Shaw answers the question for us on pp. xxxvi and xlii of his admirably cool and temperate preface, which, like many other prefaces, should be read after, if not before and after, the work itself. Speaking of Wilde's biographers, Mr. Shaw says of Harris that “for the purpose of telling Wilde's story both artistically and sanely, he was the noblest Roman of them all. He loved and admired Wilde, but always on this side idolatry”, and we can see no reason to disagree with this opinion, the only palpable flaw being that Harris continually complains of Wilde's unjust treatment at the hands of society, while failing to bring forward any grounds for his complaint.

To understand the tragedy of Wilde's life, it is enough to reflect on the implied consequences of some of his own sayings. “The artist's view of life is the only possible one, and should be applied to everything, most of all to religion and morality.” Then a remark at which we cannot help but smile: “Cavaliers and Puritans are interesting for their costumes and not for their convictions.” To the *Daily Chronicle's* attack on *The Picture of Dorian Gray* as “a poisonous book”, etc., its author replied: “It is poisonous, if you like; but you cannot deny that it is also perfect, and perfection is what we artists aim at.”

As a work of biographical literature, this “Life” is solidly good, and it is not without its flashes of humour, but it is perforce a “squalid story”. Mr. Brasol's opinion of Harris as Wilde's biographer may be learnt from the jacket of his volume, where we read that “Frank Harris evolved a character as indecent as it is fictional”; but it is not apparent why this accusation is made, for Brasol's portrait of the “ill-starred apostle of beauty” is in essentials much the same as Harris's. Mr. Brasol's work begins by giving promise of being a far deeper study of the man, but as it proceeds our expectations are belied. Wilde is introduced very ably as “the person who, even at the price of public ridicule, was to carry the protest against Victorian conventionalism to its bitter end”, but it is not long before we again find the man presented, not as a leader of a revolutionary movement, but as an

individual wrecked by vice—not that our sympathy is not aroused by Mr. Brasol's exposition of the fatal influence exerted on Wilde in his youth by his amoral parents and by his school, the spirit of which was alien to his nature. Wilde as a writer is dealt with in detail but rather unevenly; thus a chapter is devoted to the study of what is admitted to be a tedious play—*Vera*. Catholic readers will possibly be interested in the chapter "Athens versus Rome". Valuable features of the book are the illustrations, the bibliography, and the three indexes.

E. F. P.

Welsh Border Country. By P. Thoresby Jones, M.A. (Batsford. 7s. 6d. net.)

THE only drawback to this admirable book is that it is likely too well to fulfil the author's wish to make the Welsh border country better known. In that country, from Chepstow to Llangollen and from Hereford to Talgarth, Anglo-Welsh country life goes on relatively prosperously and unspoiled: the decent life of these people is more important than the recreation and delectation of holiday-makers, and too many of England's rural people are already parasitic on town visitors and spoiled by town ways of thinking and doing. May it be long before the inn at Llanthony—I mean the Abbey Hotel, not the Half Moon—succumbs to bathrooms!

Topographical writing, especially when it has to be concerned a great deal with scenery, is extremely difficult to do well. Mr. Thoresby Jones does it excellently, and he is, moreover, really an expert on the ground he covers: his book would be readable even without the 129 photographs—photographs so good that they made the present reviewer very homesick. Mr. Jones has sometimes a pleasantly ironical manner ("The Cholmondeley monuments, mid-Victorian—one is by G. F. Watts—are sometimes admired"), and an occasional prejudice peeps out cheerfully, but only the most opinionated reader would want to argue with so well informed and reliable a guide (though admirers of Owain Glyndwr will have to make an act of self-restraint). He seems to know every inch of a very beautiful, and in parts very complex, country.

Once again the admiring reviewer has to register amazement at how Messrs. Batsford can produce their "Face" and "Heritage" series at 7s. 6d.

T. O. P.

The Jewish Contribution to Civilization. By Cecil Roth. (Macmillan. 7s. 6d. net.)

IF we have in mind the Judaic origin of Christianity we may claim that all that is noblest in European civilization is derived from the Jews. Dr. Roth, however, is concerned mainly with other

aspects of the Hebraic contribution to the west European order and shows, with numerous examples and abundant evidence, what an important part Jews have played in learning, discovery, literature and the arts, in medicine, in economics and in public life. It is not surprising that those who have been most orthodox in their religious belief have brought the more abundant and the more typical gifts to mankind. They have been foremost in matters of natural learning, intellectual progress and humanitarian efforts, for their religion, being fundamentally true and teaching them to love their neighbours, encourages the pursuit of learning and of good works; and because many Christians have failed to appreciate the nobler faith that they possess the Jews have often excelled them in doing good. Undoubtedly the most attractive figures described by Dr. Roth are those who have been Jews by race and Christians by conviction, those who have combined the best of the Old Law with the values of the New.

At a time when the Jew is being grievously calumniated it is a good thing to have this book. But it is a great pity that it cannot be read in those countries where the attack on the Jew is fiercest; these, as Dr. Roth clearly proves, owe perhaps more than others to the race which they now seek to exclude.

E. Q.

Of Conversion. By Saint Bernard of Clairvaux. A translation of the Anchin manuscript with notes by Watkin Williams. (Burns Oates & Washbourne. 2s. 6d. net.)

THE manuscript which Dr. Williams has translated and annotated is part of the "earliest and most comprehensive *Corpus Bernardinum* known to us, and comes from the Abbey of Anchin, a house of Black Monks near Douai (hence its description as "Douai 372"), and was written within thirty years of the death of St. Bernard, probably before 1180". It is the longest sermon of St. Bernard known to us, and is addressed to the clergy of Paris. Its contents are a mighty effort to raise the level of the audience's conduct. St. Bernard succeeded sufficiently well to gather twenty monastic vocations as a first harvest.

In my humble opinion the sermon has a particular interest for the study of the religious outlook and spirituality of that particular period and of St. Bernard. There is no appeal to the social argument, there is no appeal to the life of Christ, there is no appeal to the Church and her mystic sacramental life—all the arguments are psychological and moralistic. The texts of Holy Scripture with which the sermon is saturated are also *exclusively* psychological and moralistic. I only state a fact. The translation is perfect and the notes bear witness to an enviably rich classical erudition.

DOM THEODORE WESSELING.

The Struggle for the Danube and the Little Entente. By Robert Machray. (Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d. net.)

MR. MACHRAY has a remarkable capacity for dispassionate narrative. He is eminently the recorder of contemporary history, as distinct from the man whose primary aim it is to make a readable or exciting book. Mr. Machray dealt with the history of the Little Entente from its foundation in 1920-21 until 1929 in a previous volume; in the present, he brings it up to the summer of 1938. The same order and precision, the same minute command of facts, the same refusal to pass judgment or to allow his writing to be coloured by his personal sympathies, is to be found here. Like his book on the Poland of Pilsudski, these works on the Little Entente provide an invaluable source of reference for the student of European affairs.

The Little Entente is now no more. Czechoslovakia, its leader, is disrupted; Benes, its prime mover, is an exile. There will be no third volume; had Mr. Machray deferred publication for three months, he might have summed up. It is a measure of the rapidity with which events in Europe now move that he decided to close his narrative in July, 1938. The German-Czech situation was then acute, but nevertheless the statesmen of the Little Entente were as far from anticipating the events of the autumn as they were from anticipating the Anschluss when the year opened. But the struggle for the Danube has not ended at once with the subjugation of Czechoslovakia. The Little Entente was not originally formed as a barrier to German domination, and therefore its end does not mean that the German *Drang nach Osten* can proceed unobstructed. It was formed by the Successor States to preserve Hungary in the crippled condition in which she was left by the Treaty of Trianon. The denial to the Magyars of a due participation in the life of the Danube basin, and the attempt to initiate a period of economic co-operation on an unequitable political basis, was a major disaster. The Little Entente has failed because it was not genuinely an instrument for achieving the common good, but a device for maintaining an ascendancy. All of the post-war settlement has succeeded or failed in proportion as it avoided or fell into the same mistake.

J. M. D.